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Abstract
A methodology is presented which can be used to determine if a proposed
fusion power plant design directed at improving plant safety is cost effective. Eco-
nomic risks related to both normal plant operation and accident situations can be
evaluated. The incremental costs involved with a dose reduction measure for nor-
mal plant operation or an accident situation are identified and models for their
assessment are developed.
An approach for evaluating the maximum justified spending on safety is out-
lined. By comparing the actual spending on the design modification to the expen-
diture ceiling, the appropriate decision can be made.
The utility of this approach for assessing cost effectiveness was illustrated
through two examples. In the first application, the cost effectiveness of the change
from the steel alloy PCA to low activation silicon carbide in the STARFIRE design
was assessed. A range of possible costs of high purity silicon carbide was investi-
gated. It was determined that if the installed cost of silicon carbide components is
less than 116 $/kg, then the low activation design is cost effective.
A second example served to illustrate how the methodology can be applied to
an accident situation. Four emergency detritiation options for INTOR,with zero,
one, two or three clean up units, were compared to determine which was most cost
effective. The evaluation was based on a release of 25 g of tritium into the reactor
building. The analysis indicated that if the probability of the accident occurring
over the plant lifetime exceeds 3.59 x 10-2, the most cost effective option would
be the option using one detritiation unit. For lower probabilities, the use of an
emergency detritiation system is not cost effective.
l I
PUBLICATIONS UNDER CONTRACT #K-1702
ON FUSION SAFETY
A. General Safety and Risk Assessment
1. M. S. Kazimi et al., "Aspects of Environmental Safety Analysis of
Fusion Reactors," MITNE-212, Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, M.I.T.
October 1977.
2. R. W. Sawdye, J. A. Sefcik, M. S. Kazimi, "Reliability Requirements
for Admissible Radiological Hazards from Fusion Reactors," Trans. Am.
Nucl. Soc. 27, 65-66, November 1977.
3. R. W. Sawdye and M. S. Kazimi, "Application of Probabilistic
Consequence Analysis to the Assessment of Potential Radiological
Hazards of Fusion Reactors," MITNE-220, Dept. of Nuclear Engineering,
M.I.T., July 1978.
4. R. W. Sawdye and M. S. Kazimi, "Fusion Reactor Reliability
Requirements Determined by Consideration of Radiological Hazards,"
Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc. 32, 66, June 1979.
5. M. S. Kazimi and R. W. Sawdye, "Radiological Aspects of Fusion Reactor
Safety: Risk Constraints in Severe Accidents," J. of Fusion Energy,
Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 87-101, January 1981.
6. S. J. Piet, M. S. Kazimi and L. M. Lidsky, "Potential Consequences of
Tokamak Fusion Reactor Accidents: The Materials Impact,"
PFC/RR-82-19, Plasma Fusion Center, M.I.T., June 1982.
7. S. J. Piet, V. J. Gilberti, "FUSECRAC: Modifications of CRAC for
Fusion Application," Nuclear Eng. Dept. and Plasma Fusion Center,
M.I.T., PFC/RR-82-20, June 1982.
8. M. S. Kazimi, "Safety and Risk Targets for Fusion Energy," Societe
Francaise de Radioprotection 10th Annual Congres, Avignon, France,
Oct. 18-22, 1982.
9. M. S. Kazimi, "Safety Methodology and Risk Targets," in Proc. of
1982 IAEA Workshop on Fusion Safety, IAEA-TECDOC-277, 1983.
10. M. S. Kazimi, "Risk Considerations for Fusion Energy," Nuclear
Technology/Fusion, Vol. 4, No. 2, Part 2, pp. 527-532, Sept. 1983.
11. S. J. Piet,. M. S. Kazimi and L. M. Lidsky, "Relative Public Health
Effects from Accidental Release of Fusion Structural Radioactivity,"
Nuclear Technology/Fusion, Vol. 4, No. 2, Part 2, pp. 533-538, Sept.
1983.
Publications under Contract #K-1702 (continued)
12. S. J. Piet, M. S. Kazimi and L. M. Lidsky, "Modeling of Fusion
Activation Product Release and Reactor Damage from Rapid Structural
Oxidation," Nuclear Technology/Fusion, Vol. 4, No. 2, Part 3, pp.
1115-1120, Sept. 1983.
13. S. Piet, M. S. Kazimi and L. M. Lidsky, "The Materials Impact on
Fusion Reactor Safety," Nucl. Tech./Fusion 5 (3), 382-392, May 1984.
14. M. S. Kazimi, "Safety Aspects of Fusion," A Critical Review paper to
appear in the IAEA Journal Nuclear Fusion, 1985.
15. S. J. Brereton and M. S. Kazimi, "A Methodology for Cost/Benefit
Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactors," PFC/RR-85-3, Plasma Fusion
Center, M.I.T., February 1985.
B. Lithium Reactions
1. D. A. Dube, M. S. Kazimi and L. M. Lidsky, "Thermal Response of
Fusion Reactor Containment to Lithium Fire," 3rd Top. Meeting on
Fusion Reactor Technology, May 1978.
2. D. A. Dube and M. S. Kazimi, "Analysis of Design Strategies for
Mitigating the Consequences of Lithium Fire within Containment of
Controlled Thermonuclear Reactors, MITNE-219, Dept. of Nuclear
Engineering, M.I.T., July 1978.
3. M. S. Tillack and M. S. Kazimi, "Development and Verification of
the LITFIRE Code for Predicting the Effects of Lithium Spills in
Fusion Reactor Containments," PFC/RR-80-ll, Plasma Fusion Center,
M.I.T., July 1980.
4. P. J. Krane and M. S. Kazimi, "An Evaluation of Accidental Water-
Reactions with Lithium Compounds in Fusion Reactor Blankets,"
PFC/RR-81-26,, Plasma Fusion Center, M.I.T., July 1981.
5. M. S. Tillack and M. S. Kazimi, "Modelling of Lithium Fires," Nuclear
Technology/Fusion, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 233-245, April 1982.
6. V. J. Gilberti and M. S. Kazimi, "Modeling of Lithium and Lithium-Lead
Reactions in Air Using LITFIRE," PFC/RR-82-08, Plasma Fusion Center,
M.I.T., January 1983.
7. E. Yachimiak, V. Gilberti, and M. S. Tillack, "LITFIRE User's Guide,"
Nuclear Eng. Dept. and Plasma Fusion Center, M.I.T., PFC/RR-82-11,
June 1983.
8. M. S. Kazimi, V. Gilberti and G. Florentine, "A Comparison of Lithium
Pool Fire Consequences to that of Sodium and Lithium Lead Components,"
Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc. 46, 291, 1984.
9. E. Yachimiak and M. S. Kazimi, "Safety Analysis of Liquid Lithium-Lead
Breeders in Fusion Reactors Geometries," PFC/RR-84-10, Plasma Fusion
Center, M.I.T., June 1984.
Publications under Contract #K-1702 (continued)
10. W. J. Ijams and M. S. Kazimi, "Temperature Effects on Lithium-Nitrogen
Reaction Rates," PFC/RR-85-7, Plasma Fusion Center, M.I.T., January
1985.
C. Tritium
1. S. J. Piet and M. S. Kazimi, "Uncertainties in Modeling of
Consequences of Tritium Release from Fusion Reactors," PFC/TR-79-5,
Plasma Fusion Center and Nucl. Eng. Dept., M.I.T., July 1979.
2. M. J. Young and S. J. Piet, "Revisions to AIRDOS-II," PFC/TR-79-8,
Plasma Fusion Center and Nucl. Eng. Dept., M.I.T., August 1979.
3. S. J. Piet and M. S. Kazimi, "Implications of Uncertainties in
Modeling of Tritium Releases from Fusion Reactors," Proc. Tritium
Technology in Fission, Fusion and Isotopic Applications, April 1980.
4. D. R. Hanchar and M. S. Kazimi, "Tritium Permeation Modelling of a
Conceptual Fusion Reactor Design," PFC/RR-81-27, Plasma Fusion Center,
M.I.T., July 1981.
5. D. R. Hanchar and M. S. Kazimi, "Transient Tritium Transport in a
Solid Breeder Blanket," Nuclear Technology/Fusion, Vol. 4, No. 2, Part
2, pp. 395-400, Sept. 1983.
6. D. R. Hanchar and M. S. Kazimi, "A Tritium Permeation Model for
Conceptual Fusion Reactor Designs," J. Fusion Energy 3 (1), 4-61,
1983.
D. Electromagnetic Considerations
1. R. W. Green and M. S. Kazimi, "Safety Considerations in the Design of
Tokamak Toroidal Magnet Systems," Trans. ANS 32, 69, June 1979.
2. R. W. Green and M. S. Kazimi, "Aspects of Tokamak Toroidal Magnet
Protection," PFC/TR-79-6, Plasma Fusion Center, M.I.T., July 1979.
3. M. S. Tillack, "A Study of Structural Responses to Plasma
Disruptions in Toroidal Shells," Dept. of Nucl. Eng. and Plasma
Fusion Center, M.I.T., PFC/RR-83-16, June 1983.
4. M. S. Tillack, M. S. Kazimi and L. M. Lidsky, "Aspects of the
Structural Effects of Plasma Disruptions on Tokamaks," Dept. of
Nuclear Eng. and Plasma Fusion Center, M.I.T., PFC/RR-83-30, 1983.
E. Others
1. M. S. Kazimi, "IAEA Workshop on Fusion Safety March 23-27, 1981,
Vienna, Austria," J. of Fusion Energy, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 241-243,
1981.
Acknowledgements
Several people assisted in various phases of this work. We sincerely appreciate
the time and effort taken by these individuals. Most notably, we would like to
acknowledge Ken Schultz of G A Technologies. His assistance and useful advice on
issues dealing with the low activation STARFIRE design are greatly appreciated.
We would like to thank George Hopkins and Isaac Maya, also of G A Technologies,
for their contributions. As well, we wish to express our gratitude to Steve Piet of
EG & G, Idaho, for his input and comments on this research.
The financial support of Ontario Hydro and the National Science and Engineer-
ing Council of Canada (NSERC) are gratefully acknowledged. Finally, we would
like to thank the Fusion Safety Group of EG & G, Idaho for funding this research.
4
Table Of Contents
Page
ABSTRACT 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 4
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 14
CHAPTER TWO: COST/BENEFIT SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR
NORMAL PLANT CONDITIONS 18
2.1 Sources Of Radiation Risk In A Fusion Power Plant 19
2.1.1 Radiation Risk During Plant Operation 21
2.1.2 Radiation Risk During Maintenance Outages 22
2.1.3 Radiation Risk During Waste Management Procedures 23
2.1.4 Risk Reduction 24
2.2 Cost Effective Radiation Risk Management Methodology 25
2.2.1 Factors Affecting The Expenditure Ceiling 26
2.2.2 Formulae For Evaluating The Ceiling On Expenditures 27
2.2.3 The Design Decision Process 29
2.3 Assessing The Total Cost Of A Particular Protective Action 31
2.3.1 Normal Operation Costs 37
2.3.1.1 Influence Of A Protective Action On Normal Operation
Procedures And Costs 37
2.3.1.2 Evaluation Of The Change In Normal Operation Costs 38
2.3.2 Maintenance Costs 39
2.3.2.1 Discussion Of Expected Doses During Maintenance At A
Fusion Power Plant 40
2.3.2.1.1 Exposures During Maintenance Of the Coolant/Steam
Generator System 40
2.3.2.1.2 Exposures Due To Tritium 45
2.3.2.1.3 Exposures During First Wall Blanket Changeouts 45
5
I I
Page
2.3.2.2 Influence Of A Protective Action On Maintenance Procedures
And Costs 46
2.3.2.3 Evaluation Of The Change In Maintenance Costs 48
2.3.3 Waste Handling Costs 49
2.3.3.1 Discussion Of Expected Doses During Waste Handling
At A Fusion Power Plant 49
2.3.3.2 Influence Of A Protective Action On Waste Handling
Procedures And Costs 50
2.3.3.3 Evaluation Of The Change In Waste Handling Costs 51
2.4 Assessing The Cost Effectiveness Of A Particular Protective
Act ion 52
2.5 An Issue Of Concern: Shielding Versus Downtime 56
2.6 References 61
CHAPTER THREE: COST BENEFIT SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS 65
3.1 Fusion Reactor Accidents 68
3.1.1 Categorization Of Fusion Reactor Accidents 68
3.1.2 Discussion Of Potential Fusion Reactor Accidents 70
3.2 Categorization Of Economic Consequences 74
3.2.1 Onsite Economic Consequences 74
3.2.2 Offsite Economic Consequences 75
3.2.3 Accident Risk Reduction 75
3.3 Cost Effective Accident Risk Management Methodology 78
3.4 Assessing the Total Cost Of An Accident Consequence
Mitigation Action 83
3.5 Economic Risks From Small Consequence Fusion Reactor Accidents 85
3.5.1 Onsite Economic Risks From Small Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents 85
6
Page
3.5.1.1 Replacement Power Costs 85
3.5.1.2 Plant Repair Costs 87
3.5.1.3 Worker Health Effects And Health Care Costs 88
3.5.1.4 Summary Of Onsite Impacts Of Small Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents 89
3.5.2 Offsite Economic Risks Of Small Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents 90
3.6 Economic Risks From Medium Consequence Fusion Reactor
Accidents 91
3.6.1 Onsite Economic Risks From Medium Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents 91
3.6.1.1 Replacement Power Costs 91
3.6.1.2 Plant Decontamination Costs. 92
3.6.1.3 Plant Repair Costs 96
3.6.1.4 Worker Health Effects And Health Care Costs 98
3.6.1.5 Fusion Power Industry Costs 98
3.6.1.6 Electric Utility Business Costs 99
3.6.1.7 Onsite Litigation Costs 101
3.6.1.8 Summary Of Onsite Economic Impacts Of Medium
Consequence Fusion Reactor Accidents 101
3.6.2 Offsite Economic Risks From Medium Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents 102
3.7 Economic Risks From Large Consequence Fusion Reactor
Accidents 103
3.7.1 Onsite Economic Risks From Large Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents 103
3.7.1.1 Plant Decommissioning Costs 104
3.7.1.2 Capital Investment Loss 106
7
Page
3.7.2 Offsite Economic Risks From Large Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents 108
3.7.2.1 Discussion Of Terms And Model Application 110
3.7.2.2 Discussion Of The Offsite Economic Models 112
3.7.2.2.1 Health Effects And Health Care Costs 113
3.7.2.2.2 Land And Property Decontamination Costs 113
3.7.2.2.3 Agricultural Disposal Costs 118
3.7.2.2.4 Population Evacuation Costs 119
3.7.2.2.5 Emergency Phase Relocation Costs 121
3.7.2.2.6 Intermediate Phase Relocation Costs 121
3.7.2.2.7 Land Interdiction Costs 122
3.7.2.2.8 Secondary Impacts 123
3.7.2.2.9 Offsite Litigation Costs 124
3.8 Assessing The Cosi Effectiveness Of An Accident
Consequence Mitigation Action 132
3.9 References 134
CHAPTER FOUR: ASSESSMENT OF THE COST EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF THE LOW ACTIVATION STARFIRE DESIGN 139
4.1 Description Of The Reference STARFIRE Design 140
4.2 Description Of The Low Activation STARFIRE Design 143
4.3 Assessment OF The Cost Effectiveness Of The Low Acitvation
STARFIRE Design 146
4.3.1 Ceiling On Safety Expenditures For Design Changes
To STARFIRE 146
4.3.2 Cost Of The Change To The Low Activation STARFIRE Design 153
4.3.2.1 Incremental Capital Cost Of The Low Activation
STARFIRE Design 153
8
l i
Page
4.3.2.2 Change in Normal Operation Costs For The Low
Activation STARFIRE Design 159
4.3.2.3 Change In Maintenance Costs For The Low Activation
STARFIRE Design 162
4.3.2.4 Change In Waste Handling Costs For The Low Activation
STARFIRE Design 170
4.3.2.5 Conclusions Regarding The Cost Effectiveness Of The
Low Activation STARFIRE Design 180
4.4 Rbferences 193
CHAPTER FIVE: ASSESSMENT OF THE COST EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF EMERGENCY DETRITIATION SYSTEMS FOR INTOR 197
5.1 Description Of The Detritiation Systems 198
5.2 Assessment Of The Cost Effectiveness Of The Emergency
Detritiation Systems 201
5.2.1 Ceiling On Expenditures For The Accident Being Studied 201
5.2.2 Health Effects Costs 203
5.2.3 Replacement Power Costs 208
5.2.4 Decontamination Costs 20?'
5.2.5 Other Costs 211
5.3 Conclusions Regarding The Cost Effectiveness Of The
Detritiation Systems For INTOR 213
5.4 References 217
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 219
6.1 Summary And Conclusions 219
6.2 Recommendations For Future Work 225
9
Page
NOMENCLATURE 228
APPENDIX A: DISCOUNT RATE USED IN COST ESTIMATIONS 240
APPENDIX B: HEALTH EFFECTS AND HEALTH CARE COSTS 243
APPENDIX C: REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS 246
APPENDIX D: LOW ACTIVATION MAINTENANCE DOWNTIME
ESTIMATES 256
APPENDIX E: TRITIUM DOSE CALCULATIONS 266
10
l i
I I
List Of Tables
Page
2.1 Principal Sources of Radioactivity Encountered at a Fusion
Power Plant 20
2.2 Data Required for Evaluating Radiation Protection Measures
in a Fusion Power Plant 33
2.3 Coolant Activity Levels for Water Cooled Power Reactors 42
2.4 Deposited Activity Levels for Water Cooled Power Reactors 43
2.5 Parameters Related to PWR and Fusion Reactor Dismantling 47
3.1 Important Cost Contributions for Fusion Reactor Accidents 76
3.2 Decontamination Cost and Effectiveness Values for
Farm Areas 114
3.3 Decontamination Cost and Effectiveness Values for
Non-farm Areas 115
3.4 Costs of Evacuation per Evacuee Day 120
3.5 Summary of Offsite Cost Components 125
4.1 Estimates of Exposure Rates and Times Spent in Radiation
Fields at the STARFIRE Plant 152
4.2 Effect of the Change to the Low Activation STARFIRE
Design on Capital Cost 156
4.3 Replacement Costs for First Wall Modules 164
4.4 Radioactive Waste Classification for the Reference and
Low Activation STARFIRE Designs 176
4.5 Cost Estimates for Plant Operation, Maintenance and
Waste Handling 187
4.6 Estimates of Annual Doses Incurred During Plant Operation,
Maintenance and Waste Handling 191
11
Page
5.1 Detritiation Options Capital Costs 200
5.2 Clean Up Option Parameters 205
5.3 Doses Incurred During Clean Up 206
5.4 Decontamination Costs for the Detritiation Options 210
5.5 Economic and Health Risks for the Detriation Options 215
5.6 Incremental Economic Risks and Health Risk Reductions for
Detritiation Options B, C and D 216
C.1 Typical Utility Operating Procedures for Short Duration
Outages 247
C.2 Average Fraction of Oil Fired and Non-Economy Replacement
Energy by NERC Region 250
D.1 Low Activation Scheduled Downtime Estimates for Reactor
Plant Equipment Maintenance 256
D.2 Low Activation Unscheduled Downtime Estimates for Reactor
Plant Equipment Maintenance 260
12
List Of Figures
Page
2.1 Cost Effectiveness of Design Alternatives 55
2.2 Plausible Maintenance Scenarios 59
3.1 Example of Fusion Reactor Economic Risk Spectrum 66
3.2 Event Categories for Estimation Of Economic Risk 69
4.1 Annual Cost Contributions for the Reference and Low Activation
STARFIRE Designs 184
4.2 Total Annual Cost for the Low Activation STARFIRE Design versus
Installed Cost of Silicon Carbide Components 185
4.3 Possible Financial Plans for Low Activation Materials Research
and Development 186
5.1 Tritium Activity versus Time for Detritiation Options. 207
C.1 Relationship Between Power Production Cost Increase and
Non-Economy Power Fraction 249
C.2 Regional Electric Reliabiltiy Councils of the National
Electric Reliability Council 251
13
I I
Chapter One
Introduction
As progress is made towards solving the physics and engineering problems of
creating usable energy from fusion reactions, it becomes increasingly important to
consider potential safety and environmental concerns. An effort to address these
issues and incorporate safety features into fusion reactor designs is needed at the
conceptual stage. However, another major factor in fusion reactor research, devel-
opment and design decisions is that of economics. Balancing the benefits and costs
resulting from the safety and economic factors is playing an increasing role in design
evolution. The purpose of this study was to develop an analytical tool which will
aid in achieving the balance between these opposing constraints.
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The approach taken to determine whether a design modification to reduce
potential doses is justified involves defining a maximum justifiable value for spending
on safety. This can be evaluated from consideration of relevant socio-economic
factors, exposure limits and the actual magnitude of the risk. The expenditure
ceiling then provides a measure of the permissible additional cost of risk reduction.
The methodology requires a base case design. This could be a reactor design
which just meets minimum safety standards, or any other design which already has
some safety features but has some particular safety issue requiring attention. The
costs associated with a proposed design improvement must be evaluated relative to
the base case. The expenditure ceiling, sensitive to the actual level of risk associated
with the base case, can be employed to determine if the spending for the design
change is warranted. Such a tool will prove invaluable to the design decision maker.
Risk studies to date have generally concentrated on potential health impacts
of fusion reactor operation. Another aspect of risk involves economic impacts or
costs associated with fusion reactor operation or reactor accidents. Economic risks
include costs incurred due to the occurrence of an event, or benefits foregone. For
example, under normal plant conditions, all costs associated with plant operation
can be considered economic risks. An objective of the design team would be to
minimize the economic risks associated with plant operation. If two design alterna-
tives are being considered, and the more cost effective option is not implemented,
then a benefit has been foregone and an economic risk has resulted. Subsequent
to an accident, all costs associated with decontamination and repair are considered
economic risks.
In Chapter 2, a procedure is outlined for determining the maximum justified
spending on design changes which would reduce doses incurred during normal plant
operation. Models are presented for assessing costs incurred during plant operation,
plant maintenance and waste handling activities. The change in these costs due
to the implementation of a proposed design change can be evaluated. changes in
15
equipment costs, materials costs, labor costs, health detriment costs, overhead costs,
replacement power costs and waste disposal costs are included. Knowing the change
in costs and the resulting dose reduction, it can be. determined if the design option
is cost effective.
Economic risks of fusion reactor accidents are dealt with in Chapter 3. A
methodology is given for estimating the maximum justified spending on accident
consequence mitigation measures. Models are given for evaluating both onsite and
offsite costs resulting from a particular accident. Onsite costs include replacement
power costs, capital costs, decontamination costs, repair costs, early decommis-
sioning costs and health detriment costs. Offsite costs include health effects costs,
decontamination costs, agricultural product disposal costs, evacuation costs, relo-
cation costs and land interdiction costs. These economic risks can be evaluated, for
the particular accident, with and without the use of the accident consequence mit-
igation measure being examined. The change in costs due to the implementation
of the proposed accident consequence mitigation action can then be determined.
Knowing this change in costs, the resulting dose reduction and the probability of
the accident occurring, it can be determined if the accident consequence reduction
option is cost effective.
The methodology of Chapter 2, for normal plant conditions, is applied to the
low activation STARFIRE design in Chapter 4. The procedure is used to determine
whether or not the dose reduction associated with the change from the reference
STARFIRE design to the low activation design justifies the costs involved.
An application of the methodology of Chapter 3, for accident conditions, is
given in Chapter 5. Four emergency detritiation options for INTOR, each having
different clean up capabilities are evaluated. The assessment is carried out for a
particular accident consisting of a release of 25 g of tritium into the reactor building.
It is determined if the increased costs associated with a shorter clean up time are
warranted.
16
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Finally, conclusions and recommendations concerning the use of the method-
ology in design decision making are outlined in Chapter 6. Results from the ap-
plications of the methodology in this study are summarized.. Areas where possible
improvements to this methodology could be made are identified and discussed.
17
Chapter 2
Cost/Benefit Safety Analysis For Normal Plant Conditions
Normal conditions at a fusion plant are those associated with operation, main-
tenance and waste handling procedures which occur in the absence of unexpected
mishaps. In other words, normal conditions are planned or expected modes of carry-
ing out operation, maintenance and waste handling tasks. In this section, a method
is presented for analyzing the economic risks associated with suggested changes to
fusion reactor designs which would improve the safety of normal operation, main-
tenance, or waste management procedures. It can be determined if the proposed
design change will be cost effective and enhance the overall acceptability of fusion
power.
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2.1 Sources Of Radiation Risk In A Fusion Power Plant
Although detailed fusion power plant designs are not yet available, the con-
ceptual designs allow potential health and safety problems that may arise during
normal operation, maintenance and waste handling procedures to be identified.
First generation fusion reactors will utilize the deuterium-tritium (D-T)
reaction, yielding alpha particles and 14 MeV neutrons as reaction products. Most
of the radiological health and safety concerns associated with fusion reactors arise
from the tritium and the high energy net4ions. These species must be dealt with
regardless of the plasma confinement scheme used. For a given net electrical energy
capacity, the quantity of tritium consumed and the number of neutrons produced
will be essentially independent of the reactor design to within a factor of two [2.1).
Differences in recirculating power fraction (10 to 40 %) ar.d thermal-to-electric ef-
ficiency (30 to 40 %) are primarily responsible for this variation. It has also been
determined that for magnetic fusion devices, the- induced radioactivity from the
high energy neutrons does not vary between confinement schemes by more than a
factor of two, for a fixed structural material-breeder blanket combination [2.1, 2.2].
Consequently, any procedures will likely be more closely affected by cost/benefit
analyses dealing with occupational exposures than by the confinement concept.
It is expected that the major hazard within a fusion power plant will be that
of ionizing radiation, since it is associated with all parts of the onsite fuel cycle.
Major components and support equipment will contain radioactive materials, and
work areas will be in proximity to ionizing radiation hazards. Such sources include
tritium, neutrons and beta-gamma radiation arising from the decay of activation
products.
Table 2.1 summarizes where potentially hazardous radioactive materials may
be encountered in a fusion power plant. The following sections discuss the partic-
ular hazards associated with each of plant operation, plant maintenance and waste
19
Table 2.1: Principal Sources of Radioactivity Encountered at a
Fusion Power Plant
Maintenance Waste Handling
Tritium Tritium recovery
operations
Coolant loops
Activation
Products
Penetrations of
coolant loops
Reactor Hall
Blanket processing
Fuel recycle
Reactor Hall
Steam generator
maintenance
Blanket processing
Blanket and component
processing
Tritium traps
Air filters
Spent resin beds
Blanket and component
processing
Spent resin beds
Neutrons Leakage through
penetrations of the
reactor building
Not present Not present
20
Type Operation
handling in more detail.
2.1.1 Radiation Risk During Plant Operation
During plant operation, all three sources of radiation hazard (tritium, neutrons
and activation products) will be present. Special design considerations and careful
planning of procedures will minimize exposure of plant workers to these radiation
risks.
Tritium causes concern for protection of the occupational work force since it
is associated with many procedures carried out during plant operation. These pro-
cedures include fueling, breeding and fuel reprocessing. In addition, because of its
high mobility, tritium will be found in coolant streams, on the surfaces of compo-
nents which require frequent contact by workers and in other undesirable areas as
a result of permeation. It is probable that all areas which encounter tritium will
possess some form of atmospheric clean up system capable of maintaining accept-
able levels during normal plant operation. Thus, high level exposures may result
only from accidental occurrences or special maintenance procedures.
Neutrons, being a reaction product, become a potential hazard only during
reactor operation. As a result of possible neutron leakage through penetrations of
the reactor structure and the high levels of radioactivity resulting from neutron
activation of structural materials, entry of personnel to the reactor building during
operation will be prohibited. It is unlikely that personnel exposure to neutrons will
occur at locations external to the reactor building due to the shielding effect of
reactor parts and the building walls.
During plant operation, the neutrons released from the reaction will induce
activity in reactor components. The induced activity will increase over time until
a saturation level is achieved for each isotope. Neutron activation products will be
21
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found in highest concentration in the first wall/breeding blanket assembly. Direct
personnel access to areas containing such highly activated components will be pre-
cluded. Exposures of plant workers in other areas will be minimized by the provision
of adequate shielding. Since most of this activity is fixed within solid structural ma-
terials, it should not present a significant radioactive hazard to personnel during
operation.
2.1.2 Radiation Risk During Maintenance Outages
Tritium exposures and radiation from activated components will be of concern
during maintenance outages. Since the fusion reaction is no longer occurring when
the reactor is shutdown, neutrons will not be a hazard.
Although the fuel cycle will not be operative during shutdown, the potential for
exposure to tritium still exists. As a consequence of its high mobility, tritium will be
present on surfaces requiring contact maintenance, in coolant streams and in other
areas where component replacement must be carried out manually. Exposure to
tritium must be maintained at an acceptable level during routine maintenance and
during repair of reactor components and tritium systems. This may be accomplished
through atmospheric cleanup systems and the use of protective clothing for workers.
Activation products present a potential source of exposure during maintenance
operations. The highest activity levels will be found in the first wall/breeding blan-
ket assembly. Periodic replacement of breeding blanket sectors and components
related to fueling, heating, pumping and instrumentation will be necessary. These
operations could result in the exposure of personnel to high levels of radiation.
There exists, also, the possiblilty for the activation of the coolant/breeder itself
(e.g. LiPb) or the transport of activated corrosion products by the coolant to other
areas of the power plant. These areas include other components of the power cycle,
such as the steam generator, pumps, valves and piping. Other sources of radiation
22
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risk include activation of the reactor cover gas and localized hot spots of activated
material resulting from neutron streaming through penetrations. As a consequence
of this, certain procedures which might otherwise allow contact maintenance may
require increased shielding or remote operations. Suspect areas for neutron stream-
ing include wave guides, pumping lines, helium lines and other locations containing
material with a poor capacity for attenuation. Proper procedures and protective
measures must be implemented in order to avoid unnecessary exposures of workers
in these areas.
2.1.3 Radiation Risk During Waste Management Procedures
During the lifetime of a fusion power plant, it will be necessary to handle and
dispose of radioactive wastes. The major hazard will arise from activation products
in reactor components. However, tritium permeation into the components will
provide an additional cause for concern.
In a fusion reactor, the majority of the radioactivity generated will be in the
form of activation products which will be retained in the first wall/blanket structure
of the reactor. Blanket sectors must be periodically replaced. Processing of blanket
materials will be necessary in order to reduce the volume of waste for recycle or
disposal. Recycle of breeder materials will be possible in certain cases [2.3]. It is
unlikely that complete onsite recycle of blanket modules or first walls will be carried
out. Thus, these materials must be prepared for offsite shipment. Preparatory mea-
sures prior to offsite shipment will include decontamination and volume reduction.
Decontamination measures may involve baking out tritium, surface cleansing and
possibly slagging radioactive impurities in molten metal. This last operation would
also serve as a volume reduction measure. It is essential that proper procedures
and protective measures be instituted during these actions.
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A much smaller amount of activity is associated with: (1) processing systems
designed to minimize the activity in plant effluent streams; (2) items used in main-
tenance operations, such as mops, swabs and clothing; and (3) wastes generated
from tritium handling. These low activity wastes may be contaminated with either
tritium and/or activated corrosion products from the coolant systems. Potential for
exposure exists while handling and packaging these wastes for disposal. Attention
must be given to these procedures to ensure minimizing personnel exposure.
2.1.4 Risk Reduction
The preceeding discussion highlights those areas of a fusion plant where risk of
exposure to radiation exists. In order to maximize the overall acceptance of fusion
power, some effort should be devoted to reducing the radiation hazard. In order
to reduce wasting finite societal resources, spending on safety measures should be
directed towards those areas where risk is highest. A cost effective approach to risk
management is required which is in line with relevant socio-economic considerations
and which would allow for increased expenditures in areas of higher levels of risk.
Such a method is presented in the next section.
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2.2 Cost Effective Radiation Risk Management Methodology
The demonstration of an appropriate level of worker protection which is also
economically attractive will influence the commercial acceptance of fusion power.
Hence, it is essential to assess the effectiveness of dose reduction measures in a
given design to determine if the maximum safety benefit is being obtained. To
ascertain whether further dose reduction measures are justified, a suitable method
for cost effective radiation risk management is needed. Such a method, based on
radiation detrimen; optimization measures which were formulated in the modified
(1977) ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) concept, has been developed
at AECL t. The methodology allows for the determination of maximum justifi-
able expenditures for additional reduction in the radiological detriment (both oc-
cupational and public). Factors including economic and social climate, administra-
tive/legal limits and the actual magnitude of the risk are taken into consideration.
Having determined the monetary ceiling on expenditures, a decision can be made as
to whether or not a proposed design modification is necessary and/or cost effective.
If a cost effective dose reduction measure is not implemented, then a risk is taken
in forgoing the expected benefit (dose reduction). Using this approach, obtaining
the maximum benefit per safety dollar invested will be assured.
In order to satisfy the revised ALARA requirements, a method of Cost Effective
Radiation Risk Management (CERRM) has been developed [2.4]. This method is
based on experience with the generic CANDU-PHWR* where an extensive radiation
exposure control program has been implemented at the design level since 1969. This
approach provides the means for comparing risks and assessing the cost effectiveness
of safety expenditures. In this way, the reasonableness of a proposed level of risk
can be ascertained.
t AECL - Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
* CANDU-PHWR - CANada Deuterium Uranium Pressurized Heavy Water
Reactor
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2.2.1 Factors Affecting The Expenditure Ceiling
To determine an acceptable upper bound on safety spending, socio-economic
considerations and exposure limits must be regarded. Further, the upper bound on
expenditures can be assessed by decomposing it into two parts: the occupational
and public components.
The socio-economic factor which plays a role in the occupational component
of the expenditure ceiling is that of the cost of replacement manpower (L,). This
cost will vary from country to country, and regionally within each country. The
regulatory occupational exposure limit per individual (ELM) is 5 rem/year. This
poses a restriction on the utilization of a worker. Replacement manpower cost is an
appropriate means of evaluating an upper bound on dose reduction expenditures
because at, or near, the limiting level of risk, it will be necessary to replace the
current manpower. As part of the evaluation process, the cost of replacing the
labor is compared to that of the dose reduction measure (which, if implemented,
would avoid incurring the replacement manpower cost). Depending on the actual
level of radiation (R) to which workers are exposed, an appropriate decision can be
made.
The degree to which any society can afford to spend on safety measures is de-
pendent to some extent on the lifetime earning potential of the individuals at risk
[2.5]. Wealthier countries, having higher per capita incomes, can spend more on
safety than poorer third world countries, which are more concerned about sustain-
ing their population. The current performance of existing nuclear plants has kept
public exposures to less than a fraction of the regulatory limits (E Im). It is hoped
and anticipated that this record will be carried over to fusion power plants. Hence,
a parameter indicating the willingness of the society to further reduce the exposure
Note that 1 sievert equals 100 rems. Hence, the occupational exposure limit,
ELIM, is 5 x 10-2 Sv/yr.
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detriment would be per capita income (L;). Appropriate values for this param-
eter can be obtained from compilations of statistical information (e.g. Statistical
Abstract of the United States [2.6]).
To establish a relationship between the "value" of a person-sievert and the
risk level, the costing process should consider the human response to the exposure.
Studies have been conducted to assess functional forms of dose-response data [2.7].
It has been found that the dose response curve for harm induced by radiation follows
a linear, no threshold relationship at low dose rates, and a quadratic relationship
at higher dose rates (i.e. response is proportional to the square of the dose) in the
normally encountered range [2.4, 2.7, 2.8]. The conservative approach to incorpo-
rating the effect of dose response would be to use the quadratic relation over the
entire range. Since spending is proportional to the dose incurred, and the dose is
proportional to the square root of the harm induced (i.e. response is proportional
to the square of the dose), an exponent (N) of 0.5 should be incorporated to express
the human response to radiation risk.
2.2.2 Formulae For Evaluating The Ceiling On Expenditures
Having discussed the factors influencing justified expenditures, the formulae for
deriving the ceiling on spending for safety measures will be presented. These have
been adopted from the AECL approach to cost effective radiation risk management
developed for CANDU reactors [2.4].
The ceiling on occupational safety expenditures is given by:
a = L )(R N(2.1)
ELIM ELIM
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where
a= ceiling on occupational safety expenditures ($/person Sv)
L,= labor cost ($/person yr)
ELIM= occupational exposure limit (Sv/yr)
R= actual exposure rate (Sv/yr)
N= exponent chosen to express dose response for harm induced by
radiation (0.5)
The ceiling on public safety expenditures is given by:
L* = (2.2)E*y E*7
where
a*= public ceiling on safety expenditure ($/person Sv)
L*= per capita income ($/person yr)
EZIM= public exposure limit (Sv/yr)
R*= actual public exposure rate (Sv/yr)
Once the expenditure ceiling has been defined, it can be employed as a measure
of the permissible cost of a proposed design improvement.
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2.2.3 The Design Decision Process
To determine if a proposed design change, aimed at improving plant safety,
is economically justified, analyses must be carried out to determine the resulting
dose savings. If the dose reduction measure is aimed at only one group (workers or
public), the appropriate costing formula (for a or &*) should be used. If both groups
are affected, an overall expenditure ceiling (a'), which considers both occupational
and public components, can be evaluated:
a' = Ua + Va* (2.3)
where
a'= overall ceiling on safety expenditures which results in the dose
savings of D, and Dp ($/person Sv)
= fraction of the total dose savings affecting plant workers
V=D,Dr
= fraction of the total dose savings affecting the public
D,= occupational dose savings (person Sv/yr)
D,= public dose savings (person Sv/yr)
DT= total dose savings (person Sv/yr)
Before a proposed design change can be deemed acceptable, the actual cost of
implementation must be evaluated. Since dose savings are expressed on an annual
basis, the cost of the dose reduction measure should also be assessed on an annual
29
l 5
basis. Knowing this cost, and the resulting total dose savings, a value for the cost
of the exposure reduction can be determined:
DT =(2.4)
where
/# = additional spending for the dose reduction measure ($/person Sv)
CT = annualized cost of the dose reduction measure over the plant life-
time ($/yr)
DT = total dose savings (person Sv/yr)
If the additional cost for the benefits obtained (i.e. dose reduction) is less than
the maximum acceptable expenditure for these benefits (a, a* or a' depending on
which group(s) is(are) affected), then the dose reduction measure is justified.
Utilizing this approach to decision making for radiation protection will satisfy
the intent of the ALARA concept and will provide the necessary justification for
spending or not spending on additional methods of dose reduction.
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2.3 Assessing The Total Cost Of A Particular Protective Action
The implementation of a dose reduction measure will result often in increased
costs. Using the methodology outlined in the last section, it can be determined if
the benefit provided by the action (i.e. decreased exposure to radiation), justifies
the increased expenses. In order to assess this, a value for CT, the total cost of
the dose reduction measure, is required. The total cost is comprised of four major
components:
CT = CC + CTO + CTM + CTW (2.5)
where
CT= total annualized cost of the dose reduction action ($/yr)
Cc= annualized capital cost of the dose reduction action ($/yr)
CC = Cci - e'tJ e
(eri= Cc.~ ~ti ert, _ 1) (2.6)
Cc1 = initial capital cost of the dose reduction action ($)
tj= expected plant lifetime remaining after the dose reduction mea-
sure is implemented (yrs)
r= real discount rate
CTO= increase in the total annual operation cost ($/yr)
CTM= increase in the total annual maintenance cost ($/yr)
CTW= increase in the total annual waste handling cost ($/yr)
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The capital cost of the dose reduction measure represents the cost of materials
and installation for those items directly responsible for the dose reduction. For
example, if the dose reduction measure is to install increased shielding over that
employed in a base case design (e.g. a design which just meets regulatory limits for
exposure), then the capital cost would include the additional materials cost for the
shield plus any additional costs for installing a greater amount of shielding. If the
dose reduction measure is to replace a component by another which will reduce the
doses incurred, then the capital cost would be the increase in the initial cost of the
component plus any additional installation costs.
The other contributors to the total cost of the dose reduction measure are
composed of several elements. These elements include the cost of additional mate-
rials and equipment required for carrying out tasks, the change in labor costs for
all affected jobs, the change in health effects costs due to radiation exposure, the
change in overhead costs, the change in replacement power costs and the change
in waste disposal costs. It should be noted that the change in cost can be either
positive or negative. Since several tasks may be affected by the design modifica-
tion, the total change in the cost will include contributions from all tasks which
are affected. As well, it may be necessary to carry out certain tasks several times
during the year. Hence, in determining the change in labor costs and doses incurred
(for health detriment costs), job frequency, in addition to job time and crew size,
must be considered. In some cases, there may be little or no savings in terms of
labor, materials or overhead. The motivation for the design change in these cases
would solely be the avoidance of health detriment. Table 2.2 summarizes the data
required to evaluate a particular dose reduction action.
All cost elements can be incorporated into a general formula which can be used
to assess the total change in operation, maintenance or waste handling costs. It
should be noted that not all cost elements will be required in all cases. Also, the
manner of calculating certain cost elements may be different depending on whether
operation, maintenance or waste handling costs are being considered. These differ-
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Table 2.2: Data Required for Evaluating Radiation Protection Measures
in a Fusion Power Plant
Dose Parameters: Occupational:
Public (if applicable):
Protection and Production Costs:
dose rate
job time
job frequency
crew size
working conditions
size of affected population
Investment Costs
Labor Costs
Overhead Costs
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ences are discussed in the sections to follow. The general formula for estimating the
change in normal operating, maintenance or waste handling costs is:
CT. = CM. + CL, + CH. + COHx + CPx + CDx (2.7)
where
x= subscript indicating either operating (0), maintenance (M) or
waste handling (W) costs
CT.= increase in the total annual operating, maintenance or waste han-
dling costs resulting from the dose reduction measure ($/yr)
CMZ= annualized additional materials and equipment costs for carrying
out all affected tasks ($/yr)
CM, = C Mix (er-1 (2.9)
Cmi_= initial addtional materials and equipment costs ($)
tj= expected remaining plant lifetime (yrs)
r= real discount rate
CL,= increase in annual labor costs for all jobs affected due to the
implementation of the dose reduction measure ($/yr)
(2.9)CL, = ( (Cait fnM - C01t01f01m01 )
C,,j, C.j= old and new crew sizes required to complete task j (persons)
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t07 , t,,j= old and new times required to complete task j (hrs)
foj, fa,= old and new frequencies of carrying out task j (yr')
mo0 , mn5 = old and new rates of worker remuneration for task j
($/person hr)
CHZ= change in annual health detriment due to radiation exposure
($/yr)
CH, = H .DT, (2.10)
H= estimate of the totE.1 (somatic plus genetic) societal detriment
attributable to radiz.tion exposure
= 3,800 $/person Sv (from [2.9], see appendix B)
DT.= total dose savings (person Sv/yr)
Drx = Dxo + Dxp (211)
Dxo= total occupational dose savings (person Sv/yr)
DX0= f Roj(t)Cfodt 
-I (2.12)
Roj(t), Rnj(t)= old and new functions describing how the dose rate varies with
time while carying out task j (Sv/hr)
D2,= total public dose savings (person Sv/yr)
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Rnj(t)C,,jf,,dt
= fo (R0,(t) - R,(t)) P d(2.13)
R 0,(t), Rap(t)= old and new functions describing how the public dose rate varies
with time (Sv/hr)
P= size of affected population (persons)
t.= duration of public exposure resulting from normal operation,
maintenance or waste handling activities (yrs)
CoH.= increase in annual overhead costs resulting from the dose reduc-
tion measure ($/yr)
Cp,= change in the annual replacement power cost resulting from the
dose reduction measure ($/yr) (This can be calculated using a
simple model described in appendix C. Note that this cost com-
ponent is only included when assessing the total change in mainte-
nance costs since maintenance tasks are carried out during down-
time, when replacement power must be purchased.)
CD.= change in the annual waste disposal cost resulting from the dose
reduction measure ($/yr) (This cost component is only relevant
in evaluating the total change in waste handling costs.)
The normal operation, maintenance and waste handling cost contributions are
discussed in more detail in the following sections. Any specific differences for calcu-
lating cost elements (e.g. those related to doses incurred) are outlined. The general
formula presented above can then be applied to assess the total cost.
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2.3.1 Normal Operation Costs
The smooth operation of a fusion power plant will involve many tasks which
are carried out on a regular basis. While performing these tasks, workers may be
exposed to some level of radiation. A particular protective action which would
reduce the exposure to these workers may alter the manner in which specific tasks
are carried out. Such alterations may include a change in job completion time
or the need to use additional or different equipment to accomplish the task. As a
consequence, the dose reduction action may lead to increased operation costs. These
effects are discussed further in the next section. Section 2.3.1.2 then summarizes
all operational cost elements in a simple cost equation.
2.3.1.1 Influence Of A Protective Action On Normal Operation
Procedures And Costs
The exposure received by plant workers is directly dependent on the dose rate
in the area where the required tasks must be carried out and on the time spent
in this area. Any design change which would lead to a decreased dose rate or
job duration would decrease the exposure. To evaluate the cost effectiveness of a
particular protective measure, its effect on plant operations must be outlined. Any
increased expenditures can then be identified.
Two types of situations can be identified when assessing how protective actions
interfere with plant operations. The first type (A) involves jobs in areas where
the dose rate is sufficiently low as to allow the crew (one or more individuals,
depending on task complexity) to work under average productivity conditions, and
without time limits. Such tasks contribute to the collective dose, but do not result
in increased operating costs when compared to a non-nuclear installation (the rate
of carrying out work is unhampered by the radiation hazard). Dose reduction
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measures for "category A" jobs may entail extra expenses including capital costs of
any new equipment or materials needed to complete the tasks, increased labor and
health effects costs if the job must be carried out in a different manner resulting
in a different time for completion, or increased overhead costs (e.g. fuel or electric
power required to perform the task, insurance costs, etc.).
The second type of job (B) concerns areas where the dose rate is sufficiently
high that individual limits force a less productive form of working to be adopted.
Task preparation, the use of multiple crews and reinforced protection of workers
(e.g. protective clothing) all conspire to reduce productivity. The time required to
accomplish a particular job under these conditions is greater than the time required
to complete a similar task in the absence of radiation. Thus labor and health
effects costs are somewhat greater for this second type or "category B" jobs, since
the rate at which work proceeds is somewhat slower. If protective actions are aimed
at substantially reducing either the dose rate or the job time, the operating costs
may be reduced. If the dose rate is decreased by such an amount that the tasks
affected now fall into category A, then a substantial decrease in the job time will
likely result. As with category A jobs, category B jobs may also lead to increased
equipment, materials or overhead costs.
2.3.1.2 Evaluation Of The Change In Normal Operation Costs
The methodology for assessing design changes affecting plant operation requires
obtaining a value for CTO, the increase in the total annual normal operation costs
resulting from the dose reduction measure. This can be assessed using the general
formula (2.7). Included in this cost estimate are the annualized capital cost over the
plant lifetime of any new materials or equipment required to carry out tasks plus
the change in labor costs, annual overhead costs and annual health effects costs.
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The increase in the annual normal operation costs resulting from the imple-
mention of a dose reduction measure is given by:
CTO = CMO + CLO + CHO + COHO (2.14)
The cost components have all been previously defined. In assessing the change
in health effects costs, the dose rates can be assumed constant at all times after the
initial start up of the reactor. Any doses incurred by workers while they are not
performing operations tasks are assumed negligible compared to the doses incurred
while carrying out the job. The duration of public exposure due to normal plant
proceedings is the total time in one year during which the plant is operating (i.e.
availability).
2.3.2 Maintenance Costs
Maintenance procedures are carried out on a regular basis during scheduled
outages. While carrying out these functions, the potential exists for the exposure of
occupational personnel to radiation hazards. Principal reactor parts which must be
replaced regularly will become activated as a consequence of neutron bombardment.
Many of the major reactor and auxiliary components will also become hazardous
due to the presence of activated corrosion products. A proposed design change
may decrease dose rates in areas where maintenance jobs must be carried out and
may also require a modification in the procedure to be followed. Additionally,
the decreased dose rates may allow certain jobs which were originally carried out
remotely to be carried out manually. Hence, the dose reduction measure may lead
to a change in the total cost incurred during a scheduled maintenance outage. These
effects are described in more detail in subsequent sections and are summarized in a
cost equation in section 2.3.2.3. However, a discussion of expected doses incurred
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during maintenance at a fusion power plant is presented first.
2.3.2.1 Discussion Of Expected Doses During Maintenance At A
Fusion Power Plant
Maintenance operations at a fusion power station will encompass maintenance
of the coolant/steam generator system, tritium handling and replacement of the
first wall/blanket structure. Much attention has been given to water cooled fusion
reactor designs. It is expected that the power cycle for a water cooled fusion plant
will be similar to that of a conventional steam plant. Hence, a rough picture of
what to expect from the power conversion components of a fusion power station
can be obtained from the operating experience of fission reactors. Similar occupa-
tional exposure conditions will exist for the steam generator. Handling of the first
wall/blanket structures is somewhat analagous to fuel replacement in fission power
plants, as both operations involve remote handling of large, radioactive objects.
However, significantly larger components will be involved at a fusion plant. Never-
theless, a rough idea of expected doses at a fusion power plant can be obtained.
2.3.2.1.1 Exposures During Maintenance Of The
Coolant/Steam Generator System
The coolant/generation systems for fusion reactors will be similar to fission re-
actors in that each must transfer heat, released in a nuclear reaction, to an electrical
generation system. Three primary potential candidates for fusion reactor coolants
include water, helium and liquid lithium. Thermal conversion efficiencies for fusion
and fission systems are expected to be similar. Hence, for a given coolant, the steam
generators will be roughly the same size for the same output power. Based on the
STARFIRE design [2.10], the surface area of the steam generator dominates the
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total area available for heat transfer, as in fission plants. Thus, the fact that the
fusion reactor has a larger in-reactor surface will result only in small differences
in the levels of activated corrosion products between the two reactors, for a given
set of structural materials and coolant chemistry. Furthermore, small differences
in activation product levels will result from the different neutron spectra found in
fusion and fission reactors.
Current experience with coolant system maintenance in PWRs has been inves-
tigated. Murphy and Kreger [2.11], as reported by Easterly [2.1], have found that
over 75 % of the exposures at a typical PWR occur as a consequence of maintenance
activities during outages. The primary source of exposure has been identified as
the radiation fields associated with the activated corrosion products. About 50 %
of the annual collective dose at a PWR (in the range of 5 person Sv/yr for a work
force of 600 to 700 [2.11]) is estimated to result from procedures performed in the
auxiliary building rather than at the reactor [2.12]. Recent studies have indicated
that radiation fields in a PWR increase with power plant life [2.13, 2.14]. Early in
plant life, Co"8 is the main contributor to the radiation hazard. Later in plant life,
the dominance shifts to Co6 0 [2.13]. This isotope is expected to dominate the dose
contribution from the steam generator [2.12].
Detailed plant designs and maintenance scenarios are not currently available
for fusion coolant systems. However, for water cooled plants, they will probably be
quite similar to current LWR systems. Analyses performed for STARFIRE have in-
dicated similar coolant radiation levels to those in fission reactors (see table 2.3). In
addition, deposited activities in the steam generator tubes (see table 2.4) are similar
[2.15]. Hence, if similar work procedures are employed in fusion coolant/generator
systems for water cooled plants, radiation doses at fusion reactors are expected to
be essentially the same as doses incurred at fission plants.
The need for periodic inspection and maintenance of the steam generator tubes
at fission power plants has arisen as a result of corrosion problems leading to tube
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Table 2.3: Coolant Activity Levels for Water Cooled Power
Reactors (mCi/m 3 ) [2.151
Co 60 Mn 54 Co58 Fe59  Cr 5 1
STARFIRE (fusion) 0.96 2.02 2.64 0.06 3.87
Oconee-1 (fission) 1.2 0.66 10 5.5 3.7
Maine Yankee (fission) 10
Conneticut Yankee (fission) 20
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Table 2.4: Deposited Activity Levels for Water Cooled Power
Reactors (mCi/M 2 ) [2.15]
Co 5 8 Co 6 0 Mn54 Fe59
STARFIRE (fusion)
CHOOZ (fission)
Beznow (fission)
Oconee-1 (fission)
Douglas Point (fission)
Maine Yankee (fission)
Conneticut Yankee (fission)
118 86
97 84
300-400 170-180
625 34
28
2-500 0.5-75
0A5-113
43
2
4
7
152
44
34-39
6.7
failure. High exposure activities generally include those in the vicinity of reactor
coolant piping or in the channel head area of the steam generator. Other activities
in relatively low radiation zones (such as removal of shields, supports, walls and
floors) result in high exposures since a large number of person-hours is involved. In
many instances, retubing is a viable option. In other cases, as a result of the large
amount of downtime and occupational dose problems, some utilities have chosen to
replace the entire steam generator. It is expected that a fusion power plant will re-
quire either retubing or replacement of steam generators as in fission power plants.
Consequently, increased exposure of workers at the station will occur during these
activities. Replacement of the entire steam generator system is postulated to be
necessary near the midpoint of the operational life of the plant. Changeout opera-
tions would be carried out during the same time interval as a blanket replacement
operation.
For a fixed structural material, the radionuclide concentrations due to struc-
trual activation will be unaffected by the choice of coolant. However, release mecha-
nisms of these radionuclides, modes of transport, deposition patterns' and the degree
of corrosion will be strongly dependent on the particular coolant used. For a helium
cooled system, postulated mechanisms of radionuclide release from the piping walls
include direct daughter recoil and bulk neutron sputtering of activated material
[2.16]. It has also been found that the deposition pattern of released radionuclides
is highly dependent on helium flow velocity and pipe diameter [2.16]. Deposition
patterns in the steam generator are predicted to be similar to the water cooled
system, although the actual deposited activities are predicted to be less [2.17]. For
a stainless steel structure, the use of liquid lithium as a coolant will result in the
removal and transport of substantially more corroded material than water. The
corrosion rate of stainless steel in lithium may be 50 to 100 times greater than in
water at operating temperatures. Increased shielding would be required for coolant
system components to avoid higher occupational exposures during maintenance ac-
tivities. However, if the structural material used is vanadium, the corrosion rate by
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lithium is low. This would relax the shielding requirements.
2.3.2.1.2 Exposures Due To Tritium
Because tritium must be bred to fuel a D-T fusion reactor, tritium handling
systems are an integral part of all D-T fusion reactors. The physical characteristics
of tritium dictate that the occupational work force be protected from prolonged
contact with the isotope. The tritium processing building presents the highest po-
tential for exposure. Wherever it is conveyed by pumping, or wherever diffusional
processes result in significant concentrations (e.g. at vacuum pump and coolant
line locations), tritium may be encountered. Reactor de:signs include ventilation
cleanup systems which will be utilized to maintain ambient conditions acceptable
for worker occupancy. Not incorporated into design details are possible radiation
exposures occurring from maintenance procedures and small accidental leaks. Much
of the necessary information will become available after experience is gained at the
Tritium Systems Test Assembly (TSTA) at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This
facility will provide information on normal leak rates, effects of barriers, main-
tenance requirements and accident frequencies which can be utilized to improve
existing designs. In addition, operation of TSTA will provide valuable information
on surface contamination. This is an important contribution to the occupational
dose from reactor components subject to a high level of contact maintenance.
2.3.2.1.3 Exposures During First Wall/Blanket Changeouts
A major maintenance procedure for fusion reactors will be that of first wall/
blanket replacement. This procedure, to a first approximation, will resemble activ-
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ities required in the decommissioning of a fission reactor. Such activities include
breaking of coolant lines and segmenting of large radioactive vessels. It is antici-
pated that extensive use will be made of temporary shielding and remote handling.
It is expected, however, that some non-remote work will be required for fusion re-
actors. Such operations will take place in varying levels of radiation arising from
equipment contaminated with tritium, activation products or activated corrosion
products. Table 2.5 presents a brief summary of the parameters and activities
involved in PWR and fusion reactor dismantling.
2.3.2.2 Influence Of A Protective Action On Maintenance
Procedures And Costs
During maintenance procedures, the potential exists for workers to be ex-
posed to high levels of radiation. These procedures include replacement of the first
wall/blanket structure as well as maintenance of heating and fueling devices, pump-
ing and coolant systems and diagnostic instruments. Since the first wall/blanket
structure will consist of highly activated components, the concept of fully remote
maintenance has been postulated. However, remote maintenance is inherently slow,
and the economic viability of such a plan is questionable. The eventual commer-
cial acceptance of fusion will depend to a large degree on the anticipated amount
of downtime, since outages of significant duration will require the purchase of re-
placement power. Recent studies [2.18, 2.19, 2.20] have indicated that downtime
can be reduced by allowing some contact and/or semi-remote maintenance in areas
where radiation levels and shielding allow. It has been calculated that a total down-
time reduction of 3.6 to 27.4 % can be achieved by maximizing the use of contact
maintenance [2.19].
A particular dose reduction measure may decrease the dose rates in areas where
maintenance is carried out. If the maintenance plan is unaltered, and all tasks
46
Table 2.5: Parameters Related to PWR and Fusion Reactor
Dismantling [2.15]
Weight
(kg)
Specific
Activity
(Ci/kg)
Dose
(person Sv)
PWR
Segmenting pressure yessel
and internals
Removal of pumps and other
support equipment
STARFIRE
Disconnecting of coolant lines and
support equipment
Disconnecting first and second
walls
Reconnecting coolant and support
equipment and preparation for
new blanket assemblies
3 x 10 15
4 x 10 5 150
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1.7
2.6 to 6.0
2.6 to 6.0
2.0
1.3 to 3.0
are carried out in the original mode (i.e. fully remote, semi- remote or contact),
then the total dose incurred by maintenance workers will be reduced. However,
replacing some remote maintenance tasks with contact maintenance will decrease
the downtime and the replacement power costs. Implementation of this option will
increase the dose to workers above that of the original maintenance plan. However,
the cost of replacement power and hence, the cost of the dose reduction measure,
will be reduced. The decrease in cost may offset the increase in the dose incurred,
improving the cost effectiveness of the dose reduction measure.
In addition to the above effect, a dose reduction measure may result in changes
in other costs incurred during maintenance outages. Task durations may be af-
fected, causing changes in labor and health effects costs. Additional equipment and
materials may also be needed if the dose reduction measure requires alterations in
procedures. Overhead costs may also change.
2.3.2.3 Evaluation Of The Change In Maintenance Costs
Assessment of the cost effectiveness of a design change affecting plant mainte-
nance requires obtaining a value for CTM, the increase in the total annual main-
tenance costs resulting from the change. The general formula (2.7) is applicable.
This will include the annualized capital cost, over the plant lifetime, of any newly
required materials or equipment, plus the change in annual labor costs, annual
overhead costs, annual health effects costs and replacement power costs.
The increase in total maintenance costs resulting from the implementation of
a dose reduction measure is given by:
CTM = CMM + CLM + CHM + COHM + CPM (2.15)
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The definitions of these cost components are given following the general cost
equation (2.7). In estimating the annual health detriment cost, consideration of
time varying dose rates must be given since the reactor has been shutdown.
2.3.3 Waste Handling Costs
Waste disposal operations will have some influence on the radiation dose re-
ceived by station workers. Complete onsite recycle of any reactor components, such
as blanket modules, first walls, etc., is considered to be too costly to be carried out
at each reactor facility. However, materials must be prepared to meet acceptance
criteria set forth by the waste management company or agency. Expected doses
incurred during waste handling tasks are discussed in the next section. Following
this, the influence of dose reduction measures on waste handling costs are described.
2.3.3.1 Discussion Of Expected Doses During Waste Handling At A
Fusion Power Plant
Day to day waste management at a power station will consist of replacement
of spent resin beds, air filters and tritium traps. For a water cooled plant, these
operations are basically similar to fission plants, except for the additional require-
ments due to the tritium systems. Relatively small occupational exposures result
from waste management operations at fission plants, giving rise to only 5 to 7 % of
the total occupational dose [2.11].
A major operation at a fusion power station will be the replacement, process-
ing and storage of the first wall/blanket structures. At a fission power station, the
analagous operation would be fuel replacement, since it also involves remote han-
dling of large, radioactive objects. However, larger components requiring a greater
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degree of onsite processing will be involved at a fusion plant. This would imply
that waste handling at fusion plants will present a larger contribution to the total
onsite dose than at fission plants. However, the fact that blanket components are
much colder than spent fuel pins may result in the total dose during waste handling
being nearly the same for both types of plants.
2.3.3.2 Influence Of A Protective Action On Waste Handling
Procedures And Costs
Some degree of worker exposure will occur during waste management opera-
tions. However, the doses received may be reduced as the result of a particular
protective action. The reduction may be due to either handling lower level waste
or modifications in waste handling procedures. Handling of lower level waste repre-
sents an indirect effect of a protective action since the actual dose reduction measure
would involve reactor components (e.g. the use of increased shielding around the
reactor, a slightly different design for components, or different materials could lead
to lower induced activity and hence lower level waste). Increased shielding or a
change in equipment or procedures for waste handling may affect both doses and
costs incurred during these operations. It may be necessary to carry out tasks in
a different manner or using different tools or equipment, leading to a change in
materials and/or labor costs for waste handling. It should be noted that a protec-
tive action involving waste handling procedures or equipment may not be directly
linked to reactor operation or maintenance. Hence, the action may have little or no
effect on operation or maintenance costs. This would be reflected in the operation
and maintenance cost contributions to the total cost of the dose reduction measure
being either very small or non-existant.
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2.3.3.3 Evaluation Of The Change In Waste Handling Costs
In order to assess the total cost of a dose reduction measure, the effect of the
design change on waste handling costs must be determined. A value for CTW,
the increase in total annual waste handling costs resulting from the dose reduction
measure can be obtained from the general formula (equation 2.7). Changes in labor
costs, health detriment costs, overhead costs and equipment and materials costs are
to be included.
The increase in the total waste handling costs resulting from the implementa-
tion of a dose reduction measure can be evaluated using:
CTW = CMW + CLW + CHW + COHW + CDW (2.16)
All cost elements are defined following the general formula (equation 2.7). For
estimating health effects costs, Dw0 and Dwp, the total occupational and public
dose savings during waste handling, are required. Since the reactor components
being handled are no longer being exposed to a constant neutron flux, doses incurred
by plant workers will be time dependent. Since waste handling occurs continuously,
the dose rates to which the public is exposed during these procedures (expected to
be low) can be assumed approximately constant at an average value.
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2.4 Assessing The Cost Effectiveness Of A Particular Protective Action
Now that all cost components have been defined, the total cost of implementing
a dose reduction measure can be evaluated. Before the cost effectiveness of the
protective action can be assessed, the resulting dose reduction must be known. The
total dose reduction (collective dose to workers and/or public) resulting from the
proposed design change is given by:
DT = DTO + DTM + DTW (2.17)
where
DT= total dose reduction resulting from a protective action (person
Sv/yr)
DTO= total dose reduction during normal plant operation resulting from
the protective action (person Sv/yr)
DTM= total dose reduction during maintenance outages resulting from
the protective action (person Sv/yr)
DTW= total dose reduction for waste handling activities resulting from
the protective action (person Sv/yr)
The total occupational dose savings is equal to the sum of the occupational
dose savings during normal operation, maintenance and waste handling procedures.
The total public dose savings can be found in a similar manner. These are then
given by:
D, = Do0 + Dm, + Dwo (2.18)
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D, = Do, + Dmp + Dw (
where
D,, DP= total occupational and public dose savings resulting from the pro-
tective action (person Sv/yr)
Do,, DMo, Dwo=
Dop, Dm,, Dw,=
total occupational dose savings during normal operation, mainte-
nance and waste handling activities resulting from the protective
action (person Sv/yr)
total public dose savings during normal operation, maintenance
and waste handling activities resulting from the protective action
(person Sv/yr)
Knowing this, a value for / can then be computed (see equation 2.4). This
value can then be compared to a' , the maximum justifiable expenditure for the
dose reduction. An acceptable dose reduction measure would have a value of 0 less
than a'. If several alternatives for reducing the :radiation exposure exist:
(1) Obtain a value of 0 for each alternative.
(2) Obtain a value of a' for each alternative. (Note : a and a* will be the same
for each since all alternatives are being assessed for the same initial dose rates
to workers and the public. However, D, and D,, and therefore a', may differ.)
(3) If P exceeds a', the dose reduction measure is unjustified.
(4) If several alternatives result in a value of 3 less than a', the best alternative
has the lowest value of / and therefore will result in the minumum cost per
sievert averted (or the maximum safety benefit per dollar invested).
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2.19)
The design decision process can be illustrated through figure 2.1. The addi-
tional spending for a given dose savings (0) is plotted against the dose savings
achieved (DT). The ceiling on expenditures is shown by the dotted line. In this
example, three alternatives for improving plant safety are to be assessed. Although
alternative C results in the greatest dose reduction, it is unacceptable since the
additional expenditures for this dose reduction exceed the expenditure ceiling. Al-
ternatives A and B are both economically justified; it must be determined which
of these should be chosen. Again, it may appear that since alternative B results
in a larger dose savings, it should be chosen. However, alternative A should be
selected, since it would result in the minimum cost per sievert averted or the max-
imum benefit per safety dollar invested. Alternative A is the most cost effective
option.
54
Figure 2.1: Cost Effectiveness of Design Alternatives
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2.5 An Issue Of Concern: Shielding Versus Downtime
A question often posed is whether there is a net benefit from designing a reactor
with increased shielding so that human access into the reactor floor within a short
time after shutdown is possible, allowing for some maintenance procedures to be
carried out manually or in semi-remote mode. Primarily, the benefit from personnel
access is a reduction in the total downtime, which results in lower replacement power
costs. The penalty incurred is an increase in the capital cost for the additional
shielding. It is desired to minimize both the economic and health risks during
maintenance of a given design. Having this as an objective will ensure that an
optimum maintenance plan is found.
A maintenance plan consists of groupings of specific tasks which must be ac-
complished in a given order within a given time frame. Tasks vary from simple
standard duties (e.g. periodic inspections and replacement of items such as valves)
to extremely complex and time consuming functions (e.g. removing and replacing a
section of the vacuum vessel). The prescribed tasks should include a certain amount
of preventive maintenance, depending on expected failure frequencies and the impor-
tance of the equipment to continued reactor operation. Unscheduled maintenance
will also occur, but it cannot be incorporated into a maintenance plan due to the
uncertainty in occurrence. Unfortunately, only a limited number of maintenance
operations (e.g. replacement of first wall/blanket and shield, maintenance of reactor
cooling, vacuum pumping and fueling systems) are generic to fusion power systems.
Hence, it is not possible to develop a general maintenance plan. However, once
the maintenance operations for a particular design have been defined, a method for
each particular operation must be selected from a hierarchy of available techniques.
These would typically be arranged in order of increasing completion time, equip-
ment cost and the effectiveness of protection from adverse radiation environments.
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A broad range of partially-remote operations can exist between the extremes
of contact and fully-remote. Contact maintenance is described as the use of direct
hands-on or conventional techniques using hand-held and guided tools to repair or
maintain components. Fully-remote operations are those which can be accomplished
without any human assistance within the immediate area of operation. Semi remote
or contact/partially-remote maintenance may be implemented in order to minimize
lost time with fully remote operations.
Varying amounts of contact maintenance may be performed on different com-
ponents depending on the equipment design and task involved. If detailed mainte-
nance information is available, a series of plausible maintenance schemes, varying
between the extremes of maximum remote/minimum contact maintenance to mini-
mum remote/maximum contact maintenance, and the corresponding critical paths,
can be identified. Limited contact maintenance can begin at a suggested maximum
dose rate of 0.1 Sv/hr [2.21]. Calculations can be carried out to determine the
amount of shielding required to reduce the dose rate to this level in time for con-
tact maintenance to begin (the time after shutdown at which contact maintenance
begins depends on the particular maintenance scenario). The degree of hands-on
maintenance possible and the amount of shielding required is strongly dependent
on the technology employed (e.g. neutral beams versus rf heating) and the actual
reactor design.
To determine the most cost effective maintenance scheme, all plausible schemes,
ranging from minimum remote (certain tasks must be carried out remotely) to
completely remote, must be identified. (Note that contact and remote activities
can be carried out in parallel. Generally, tr, the time required to complete all
remote operations, will be greater than tc, the time required to complete all contact
operations.) The dose rate at which limited contact maintenance can begin must
be set (0.1 Sv/hr). For a given scheme in which specific tasks have been defined
as either contact or remote, the time after shutdown at which contact maintenance
begins should be varied, providing several sub-schemes. These different situations
57
are illustrated in figure 2.2.
Once the schemes and subschemes have been identified, the total change in
maintenance, operation and waste handling costs, as well as the increase in the cost
of shielding can be assessed. Each scheme and subscheme will result in a.different
total annualized cost for the dose reduction measure and a different dose incurred
to plant workers. A value of 3 for each scheme can be calculated and compared to
a', the ceiling on dose reduction expenditures. Any scheme having 6 exceeding a'
is not cost effective in terms of dose reduction. For schemes having / less than a' ,
the most cost effective one is that corresponding to the minumum value of /.
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Chapter 3
Cost/Benefit Safety Analysis For Accident Conditions
Accidents can potentially occur during fusion reactor operation. Associated
with these possible events is a range of economic consequences and a certain level of
economic risk. In a recent study, a spectrum of LWR economic risks was presented
[3.1], given by a distribution of event frequency versus cost or severity. A spectrum
of economic risk due to accidents is also expected for fusion reactors and is depicted
in figure 3.1. The distribution is a complementary cumulative frequency distribution
of event costs. It gives the frequency of events which result in costs greater than a
specific magnitude. As can be seen, the expectation of low cost - low severity events
is relatively high, while high cost - severe events are relatively infrequent.
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Figure 3.1: Example of Fusion Reactor Economic Risk Spectrum
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In this section, a methodology for assessing the economic risks of fusion reac-
tor accidents is presented. It has largely been adopted from previous work done
for LWRs by Burke [3.1], with some minor modifications. Having the capability of
estimating the total economic risk associated with a particular accident scenario,
it is then possible to evaluate the cost effectiveness of suggested accident conse-
quence mitigation proposals. A proposed methodology for an analysis such as this
is outlined in this chapter.
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3.1 Fusion Reactor Accidents
In the following section, fusion reactor accidents are categorized in a fashion
appropriate for analyzing the economic consequences. A brief discussion of potential
fusion reactor accidents is also given.
3.1.1 Categorization Of Fusion Reactor Accidents
The events comprising the LWR risk spectrum have been divided into three
event categories, based on sEverity or cost [3.1]. This approach has also been taken
in this study. The category divisions are shown in figure 3.2. It should be noted
that no events during plant construction or decommissioning are considered. The
category divisions are based on the costs resulting from an event. An exact dollar
value for the division between categories cannot be provided at this time. However,
the flexibility of the methodology allows this shortcoming to be overcome.
Category I accidents are small consequence events which include all forced
outages not resulting in first wall damage or significant plant contamination. No
offsite health impacts or property damage result. Events in this category may be
due to operator errors, plant system failures, component failures, external events or
maintenance requirements. These events are unscheduled, in contrast to scheduled
maintenance outages. They result in an unplanned period of zero power production
from the plant. Hence, a significant cost incurred will be that of replacement power.
Medium consequence events are placed in category I. This category is defined
to include auxiliary system failures, divertor failures, hydrogen fires and accidents
which result in first wall damage without breach of the vacuum vessel (possibly due
to plasma instabilities and disturbances, minor plasma disruptions, loss of coolant
or coolant flow, cryogenic failures, or magnet failures). The outcome of these oc-
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Figure 3.2: Event Categories for Estimation of Economic Risk
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currences may be substantial equipment damage, and there may be some release of
radioactive material to the environment. There is a need for a plant decontamina-
tion effort subsequent to the event, followed by either repair or decommissioning of
the plant. Some offsite health impacts or property damage costs may result from
these events. Plant outages could last many years if the plant is repaired, or may
be permanent if decommissioning is undertaken.
Large consequence accidents are very low probability occurrences. These are
placed in category III. Included are rupture of coolant or tritium processing lines,
lithium fires, hydrogen explosions and all events resulting in severe first wall dam-
age where the vacuum vessel is breached (e.g. vessel melt-through, possibly due
to major plasma disruptions, magnet malfunctions, loss o. coolant or coolant flow,
or auxiliary system failures). Such events are costly in that significant damage to
the plant results. Hence, there will be a large capital investment loss. A signifi-
cant quantity of radioactive material may be released to the environment. Offsite
public health impacts and property damage may occur. Plant decontamination and
cleanup is required before plant repair or decommissioning can take place.
3.1.2 Discussion Of Potential Fusion Reactor Accidents
Section 2.1 outlined sources of radiation risk in a fusion power plant. In this
section, potential release mechanisms are briefly described. Further details can be
found in references 3.2 to 3.7.
Many major components of fusion reactor systems will handle significant quan-
tities of tritium. Components vulnerable to tritium release under accident or failure
events include: blanket and blanket processing systems, recycled fuel processing sys-
tem, fuel storage system, coolant and atmospheric cleanup systems, vacuum pumps
and fuel injectors. In addition to tritium, it will be necessary to deal with activated
materials. The level of activation will depend on proximity to the plasma, material
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composition, neutron flux and spectrum at the component's location and the total
operation time.
Potential mechanisms by which a portion of the radioactive inventory of a
fusion reactor can be released have been postulated. These include magnet system
accidents, plasma disruptions, coolant system failures, auxiliary system failures,
fires and explosions.
To achieve the necessary magnetic fields, without excessive power consump-
tion, fusion reactor designs have generally employed large superconducting magnet
systems. Magnet accidents may occur as a result of arcing across current leads or
conductor rupture. Arcing could lead to conductor vaporization and the need to
replace the entire magnet. The most severe damage would ensue the simultaneous
ruptures of the entire winding and casing at two different locations, after which
missile generation might occur. Coolant lines or tritium processing lines could be
disturbed or broken, resulting in the release of radioactive material.
Plasma disturbances which are of concern include the sudden loss of plasma
and thermal excursions. The first of these involves gross MHD movement of the
plasma towards the reactor walls. If a major disruption should occur in a tokamak,
a large fraction of the plasma thermal energy may be deposited over a small area
of the first wall. Local ablation and melting could result, with the release of ac-
tivation products. Thermal excursions are possible since the fusion reaction cross
section increases more rapidly with temperature than energy loss mechanisms. A
rapid increase in plasma temperature, and therefore fusion power output, would
occur. Thermal excursions could develop as the result of a failure in the system
controlling the fusion power level. Since the fusion cross section increases rapidly
with temperature, power output could increase severalfold within a short period.
This could lead to ablation and melting of the first wall, with subsequent release of
radioactivity. Additionally, magnetic consequences of plasma disruptions may lead
to significant structural damage (e.g. warping of the vacuum vessel).
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Heat from the first wall/blanket region is removed by the primary coolant
system. Loss of coolant or loss of coolant flow accidents may result in large temper-
ature increases due to the decay heat from the activated structure. This can cause
first wall/blanket mechanical failure and possible release of radioactive material.
Other coolant/power disturbances resulting from overpower transients or plasma
disruptions could also lead to thermal mechanical failures and subsequent release
of activated material.
Liquid helium will be used in the vacuum and fuel handling cryopumps and
to maintain the superconducting coils below the critical temperature. In the event
of a coil or helium pipe break, the liquid helium will escape and flash into a two
phase mixture, extracting heat from the reactor structures. This will induce thermal
strains in the structures and represents a potential cause for failure of the reactor.
In addition, loss of helium will drive the superconductor into the normal state,
possibly melting the coils, further aggravating the previously described effect.
Hydrogen explosions can occur under certain conditions. This is of concern
since large quantities of hydrogen isotopes will be present onsite. The actual out-
come of a hydrogen explosion will be a strong function of the total amount of
hydrogen present (hence, the materials used in the design), the building geometry
and volume and the atmosphere within the building.
Auxiliary systems store hazardous quantities of energy which could serve to
initiate radioactive releases. Chief areas of concern are plasma heating systems,
fueling equipment, the vacuum chamber and pumps, divertors, direct convertors,
high voltages and eddy currents. Neutral beams may be used for plasma heating
and end-plug maintenance. Concern arises in cases where beams are energized in
the absence of a plasma. This would result in damage to the first wall and possible
release of activation products. Radiofrequency heating of the plasma requires a
large amount of power, thus requiring special precautions. Fueling equipment may
allow explosive concentrations of hydrogen to exist and must therefore be regarded
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as a potential hazard. Vacuum chamber failure could allow for infiltration of air and
perhaps the creation of explosive mixtures within the reactor. In addition, vacuum
chamber failure could heat the cryopumps, causing them to release their inventories
of deuterium,.tritium and helium.
Divertors are intentionally designed to intercept magnetic flux lines. Hence,
the divertor is intimately connected to part of the plasma volume. An increase in
the neutral and impurity content of the "scrape-off" region of the plasma would
occur in a divertor failure, and an MHD plasma disruption could be initiated.
The chemical energy released from chemical reactions involving lithium is the
greatest potential source of energy in a reactor utilizing lithium as the breeder/
coolant. This presents a mechanism for release of large quantities of activation
products. Liquid lithium is capable of generating large quantities of heat upon
reaction with air, concrete or water. This could lead to volatilization and release
of activated materials. In addition, an inventory of tritium will exist in the liquid
metali which would be released as the lithium was reacting. Lithium is required,
in some form, for breeding tritium, but a less reactive form than the liquid metal
could greatly alleviate chemical safety concerns.
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3.2 Categorization Of Economic Consequences
It is appropriate to discuss the accident economic consequences on the basis of
location and the organiiation impacted by the occurrence. Accident costs can be
classified as either onsite or offsite costs. Onsite costs occur at onsite locations or
are those losses directly affecting the plant licensee, the fusion power industry, or
the electric utility industry. Offsite costs include those losses occurring at offsite
locations. These two classes of economic consequences are not completely indepen-
dent, for some costs may first affect the plant licensee who subsequently transfers
the cost to consumers at offsite locations. Present worth discounting should be used
to express these costs since using present dollars when discussing future cash flows
is less subject to misinterpretation.
Onsite and offsite cost elements are discussed further below. Those elements
contributing to the total economic risk of each reactor accident category are sum-
marized in table.3.1.
3.2.1 Onsite Economic Consequences
This category encompasses cost elements which directly affect the plant li-
censee, the fusion power industry, or the electric utility, or occur at onsite locations.
Onsite consequences include replacement power costs, plant decontamination costs,
plant repair costs, plant capital costs, early decommissioning costs, plant worker
health impact costs, fusion power industry costs, electric utility business impacts,
and litigation costs.
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3.2.2 Offsite Economic Consequences
Costs directly affecting the public or which occur at offsite locations are con-
sidered as offsite costs. Cost components associated With countermeasures taken
to reduce radiation exposure to the public, costs of radiation induced health effects
and health care costs incurred by the population living in the affected offsite area,
offsite property damage or losses occurring as an outcome of an event, and indirect
secondary costs which may occur outside the contaminated area at offsite locations
are included in the offsite economic risk. More specifically, offsite costs encompass
population evacuation and temporary relocation costs, property decontamination
costs, land area interdiction and permanent relocation costs, agricultural product
disposal costs, population health effect and health care costs, secondary economic
effects costs and offsite litigation costs.
3.2.3 Accident Risk Reduction
In fusion reactor design, attention must be given to those areas where the
potential for accident occurrence exists. Some degree of accident consequence mit-
igation must be incorporated into the design. To avoid wasting resources, a cost
effective approach to accident risk reduction is needed. A method for accomplishing
this, similar to that presented in Chapter 2 is given in the next section.
75
Table 3.1: Important Cost Contributions for Fusion Reactor Accidents
Accident Category
Cost Component Type I Type II Type III
Onsite Costs:
Replacement Power, Cp + + +
Plant Decontamination, CD + +
Plant Repair, CR + +
Plant Decommissioning, CAD 
-+
Capital Investment, Cci +
Health Effects, C * * *
Fusion Power Industry Costs - * *
Electric Utility Business Costs * *
Litigation Costs * * *
Offsite Costs:
Health Effects, CHo + +
Land and Property Decontamination, Cd ++ ++
Population Relocation, Cr ++ ++
Agricultural Product Disposal, Cad, Cdd - ** **
Population Evacuation, CE + +
Emergency Phase Relocation, CEP ++ ++
Intermediate Phase Relocation, Cjp - + +
Land Interdiction, C1  - ++ ++
Secondary Effects Costs -* *
Litigation Costs * *
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+ may contribute to total economic risk of reactor accident
- does not contribute to total economic risk of accident
an option exists between including this component (if the situation dictates
that it should be included) and another alternative (indicated by -/+)
* contribution to total economic risk is negligible
* estimate is not included in this study
++ may contribute to total economic risk if the dose rate exceeds a certain level
** may contribute to total economic risk if the accident occurs during the growing
season
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3.3 Cost Effective Accident Risk Management Methodology
When assessing proposals for reducing accident consequences, a similar ap-
proach to that for reducing risk during normal plant operation can be taken. The
ceiling on occupational expenditures for accident consequence reduction is given by:
aa =(3.1)
E LIM ELIM
where
aa= ceiling on occupational expenc.itures for the reduction of accident
consequences ($/person Sv)
L,= labor cost ($/person yr)
ELIM= occupational exposure limit (Sv/yr)
Ra= maximum occupational exposure rate after the accident occur-
rence (Sv/yr)
N= exponent indicating the dose response for harm induced by radi-
ation (0.5)
A ceiling on public safety expenditures can similarly be defined:
(EaL*) R*a) (3.2)'* = E (E*(.2
where
aa= ceiling on public expenditures for the reduction of accident con-
sequences ($/person Sv)
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L;= per capita income ($/person yr)
E*IM= public exposure limit (Sv/yr)
R*= maximum public exposure rate after the accident occurrence
(Sv/yr)
A question may rise as to what should be the correct limiting exposure rate
in an accident situation. On a routine basis, the limiting rate for occupational
exposure is known to be 0.05 Sv/yr (5 rem/yr). Assuming an individual to work
40 hours per week, 50 weeks per year, this would allow continuous exposure to a
dose rate of 2.5 x 10- Sv/h, without exceeding the annual limit. If it is thought
to be unacceptable to exceed the exposure limits for normal conditions, even in
the event of an accident, then the above exposure limit should be used. However,
it is permitted for an individual to incur a dose of 0.25 Sv (25 rem) in an off-
normal situation, provided this does not cause the individual to exceed his total
accumulated lifetime doset [3.8, 3.9]. The time during which this dose is incurred is
not of concern; it is the total dose which is important. If the duration of exposure
during potential accidents can be postulated, then dividing 0.25 Sv by the exposure
time would give a more appropriate limit for the exposure rate. Since the duration
of exposure would likely not be large, the limiting exposure rate would tend to
be higher than for normal situations. This would have the effect of lowering the
expenditure ceiling.
The ceiling on expenditures represents the permissible cost of a proposed ac-
cident consequence mitigation scheme. To determine if the proposed scheme is
justified, analyses must be carried out to assess the expected dose reductions in the
event of a postulated accident (compared to the dose which would be incurred if
no attempt was made to decrease the accident consequences). If the dose reduction
t The total accumlated lifetime dose is given by (N-18) x 0.05 Sv, N = individual's
age.
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measure is aimed at only one group (workers or public), the appropriate costing
formula (for a, or a;) should be used. If both groups are affected, an overall ex-
penditure ceiling (a'), which considers both occupational and public components,
can be evaluated:
aa=Uaaa + Vaaa (3.3)
where
= overall ceiling on expenditures for the reduction of accident con-
sequences which will result in the dose savings of Da, and Dap
($/person Sv)
Ua DaTr
fraction of the total dose savings for a given accident scenario due
to worker exposure
fraction of the total dose savings for a given accident scenario due
to worker exposure
Dao= occupational dose savings during a given accident scenario when
an accident consequence reduction measure has been used
(person Sv)
Dp= public dose savings during a given accident scenario when an acci-
dent consequence reduction measure has been used
(person Sv)
Dar= total dose savings during a given accident scenario when an acci-
dent consequence reduction measure has been used (person Sv)
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Before a given accident consequence reduction proposal can be evaluated in
terms of cost effectiveness, the actual increase in costs associated with the proposal
must be evaluated. These costs can be evaluated in one of two ways: (1) relative
to the case where no mitigation actions are taken, or (2) relative to a base case, if
several alternatives are being compared. The base case would be that alternative
having the minimum capital cost. The assessment must be performed from the
perspective of a particular accident scenario, which may only occur with a certain
probability. In determining the total costs for a dose reduction scheme, this prob-
ability must be somehow incorporated. A proposed method for accomplishing this
is presented in the next section. Since the dose will only be incurred if the accident
does in fact occur, the dose must be multiplied by the probability of the accident
occurring to determine the health risk. Knowing the economic risk for the proposal
and the savings in health risk resulting from the use of a particular consequence
reduction measure, a value for the total cost of an accident consequence reduction
proposal can be evaluated:
Ia ( CaT (3.4)
D.T - P
where
/8= actual additional spending for the accident consequence reduction
proposal for a particular accidental occurrence ($/person Sv)
CaT= increase in costs for an accident consequence reduction proposal
over the costs which would be incurred if no consequence reduc-
tion scheme was used or over the costs which would be incurred
for the base case (see section 3.4) ($)
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DaT= total dose reduction resulting from the use of the accident con-
sequence reduction proposal from that which would be incurred
if no consequence reduction scheme was used or from that which
would be incurred for the base case (person Sv)
p= probability, over the plant lifetime, of the given accident occur-
ring
As with normal plant operation, if the additional cost for the benefits obtained
is less than what is justified (aa, a* or a'), then the proposal is cost effective.
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3.4 Assessing The Total Cost Of An Accident Consequence
Mitigation Action
The implementation of an accident consequence reduction measure will result
in increased costs. Using the methodology presented in section 3.3, it can be deter-
mined if the resulting decrease in the expected exposure justifies the expenditure.
In order for this to be assessed, a value for CaT, the total cost of the accident
consequence reduction measure is required. This cost is comprised of two compo-
nents: the capital cost and the costs incurred subsequent to the accident. Since
the accident related costs will only result if the accident does actually occur, they
should be multiplied by the probability of occurrence of the accident to determine
the appropriate economic risk. Hence, the total cost is given by:
CaT= CaC+P-Ca (3.5)
where
CaT= total increase in costs resulting from the use of the accident conse-
quence reduction measure over the costs which would be incurred
if no reduction scheme was used (or over the base case costs) ($)
CaC= capital cost of the accident consequence reduction measure ($)
Ca= change in the accident related costs compared to the case where
no accident consequence reduction measure has been used (or
compared to the base case) ($)
p= probability, over the plant lifetime, of the given accident occur-
ring
The capital cost of an accident consequence mitigation action represents the
cost of materials and installation for those items directly responsible for reducing
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the accident consequences. If it has already been determined that a consequence
reduction scheme of some sort is definitely required, then the capital cost component
would represent the increase in capital cost for a particular alternative over the
minimum cost alternative being assessed (base case). (Similarly, the value for DaT,
would be the expected reduction in dose, for a postulated accident, for a particular
alternative, from the case where the minimum cost alternative (base case) was
employed.)
Several cost elements may contribute to the accident related costs, depending
on the severity of the accident. These cost components were previously summarized
in table 3.1 and are discussed further in the next section.
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3.5 Economic Risks From Small Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
In this section, models are presented for estimating the economic consequences
of cateogory I fusion reactor accidents. The models are based on those developed in
a recent study for LWR events [3.1] and have been adapted for fusion applications.
3.5.1 Onsite Economic Risks From Small Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
Onsite cost components for category I events include power production cost
increases, plant -repair costs and worker health effect and health care costs. Only
unscheduled outages are dealt with so that an estimate of the economic risk asso-
ciated with abnormal occurrences can be obtained.
3.5.1.1 Replacement Power Costs
The most significant contribution to onsite costs of category I events probably
arises from the cost of replacement power due to plant outage time. Events not
resulting in outage time contribute minimally to the total economic risk associated
with the plant. It is assumed that the option to purchase replacement power during
the outage is chosen and that no other methods for compensating for the lost
generating capacity are implemented. This may result in an overestimate of the
cost associated with the event, especially for shorter duration outages as often may
be the case for category I events.
The simplified model presented in appendix C can be employed to estimate the
replacement power cost during the outage. Assuming that no significant escalation
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in real power production cost increases occurs over the short time duration of each
outage, the replacement power cost is given by:
C (=C- F . etdt
= GCF)[1 - e ]rt (3.6)
where
Cp= present value of the production cost increase over the outage
period ($)
G= electrical generation rating of the reactor (MWe)
C= actual capacity factor of the plant had the outage not occurred
C'= average capacity factor of the plant, obtained from operating data
td= outage duration (yrs)
F= unit production cost increase of outage ($/MWe yr)
r= real societal discount rate
As was discussed in section 2.5, a major issue to be resolved regarding sched-
uled maintenance was whether there is a net benefit from designing the reactor
for human access into the reactor floor within a short time after shutdown so that
some maintenance operations can be carried out manually or semi-remotely. The
additional cost of shielding to allow earlier access leads to a decrease in reactor
downtime and therefore replacement power costs. If causes of unscheduled outages
and the required operations to return the plant to working order can be postulated,
then the procedure outlined in section 2.5 can be employed to determine the op-
timal scheme to follow subsequent to an event. This will not be possible for all
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unscheduled outages since it is highly unlikely that all possible events can be ac-
counted for. However, this procedure would be quite useful for those events which
can be identified, since a plan would be ready if the event occurred. Knowing the
costs involved for a particular scheme, the expected probability of occurrence of
the event and the dose incurred, a value for 0,, can be obtained. The alternatives
can be compared and the most cost effective plan to follow during the unscheduled
outage can be selected. Such unscheduled outages can be kept to a minimum by
incorporating preventive actions into maintenance plans.
3.5.1.2 Plant Repair Costs
Certain plant components may be damaged during an accident and require
repair before the plant can return to operation. Since it is desired to assess the
economic consequences of a particular event, only marginal repair costs should be
included in the analysis. This excludes any repair costs which would have been
borne if the accident had not occurred.
The cost for plant repair will depend on the particular accident and the com-
ponents damaged. Often, replacement parts for repairs have relatively small costs.
It maybe difficult to quantify the magnitude of the plant repair costs since the dis-
tinction between normal plant maintenance and repairs resulting from the accident
may not be clear. The normal plant operation crew may be able to complete the
repairs in many instances, so that outside contractors are not required.
Analyses of plant repair costs for LWR outages have shown these costs to be
small compared to the replacement power cost incurred during the outage [3.1].
As a lower bound, plant repair costs were considered negligible in comparison with
replacement power. Based on historical plant operational data and insurance prop-
erty damage data, the upper bound on plant repair costs was found to be 20 %
of replacement power cost. A value of $1,000 per hour of outage was used as the
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best estimate for repair costs in analyses of small consequence accidents [3.1]. Since
the capital cost associated with fusion reactors is expected to be larger than that
associated with LWRs, repair costs may be higher. (Note that higher modularity
may make repair/replacement costs less. However, due to lack of information at
this time, this consideration was not incorporated and the estimate for plant repair
costs was based solely on capital costs.) In Chapter 4, it will be shown that the
capital cost of the STARFIRE plant can be estimated at 3.85 billion 1984 dollars
[3.101. Burke assumes a value of 3.08 billion 1984 dollars (updated from reference
3.1) as the capital cost of a new fission plant. Applying the ratio of capital costs
directly, a value of $1,250 per hour of outage was obtained as the best estimate for
repair costs in small consequence fusion reactor accidents. The present value of the
cost to society due to plant repairs from a category I accident (taken from Burke's
work [3.1]) is:
CR= R - e-"dt (3.7)
0
where
CR= present value of the plant repair cost ($)
td= outage duration (days)
Rp= plant repair cost per day of outage ( 30,000 $/day or 1,250 $/hr)
r= real societal discount rate
3.5.1.3 Worker Health Effects And Health Care Costs
Worker health impacts may occur as a consequence of any accident at a fusion
plant. However, since category I events result in no significant plant contamination,
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plant worker health effects are expected to be extremely rare. Any effects would be
from exposure to very low levels of radiation for a short period of time. The cost of
any effects (Cm), then, would be small. It is expected that other costs related to
the outage would dominate the total cost. Hence, worker health effects for category
I events can be considered negligible.
3.5.1.4 Summary Of Onsite Impacts Of Small Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
Estimates for onsite costs of small consequence events can be obtained using
the simple replacement power cost and plant repair cost models. Plant repair costs
are expected to make only a small contribution to the total outage costs. Hence,
the uncertainty in repair cost estimates are relatively unimportant. Since during
short outages other options exist for compensating for the lost generation capacity,
the replacement power model may lead to an overestimate of the total cost of the
outage (i.e. it may not be necessary to purchase replacement power). In addition,
projecting costs to future years creates more uncertainty especially regarding the
availability of excess generating capacity to produce replacement power and the
costs of fuels. More detailed plant-specific analyses could greatly reduce the uncer-
tainties associated with replacement power cost estimates. This would result from
consideration of utility replacement power agreements, load variations and excess
generating capacities which might exist.
Category I events and any event leading to a period over which no power is
produced, can result in significant societal costs. Priority should be given to pre-
venting these outages and reducing the ensuing losses. Substantial savings maybe
realized from a well organized plant maintenance program. Furthermore, a reduc-
tion in occurrence of these events will reduce plant transients, which place demands
on systems. A reduction in transient induced accidents, and therefore the total
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public health risk and economic risk posed by the operation of the plant will result.
3.5.2 Offsite Economic Risks From Small Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
Since small consequence fusion reactor accidents do not result in significant
releases of radioactivity, there are no resulting offsite health impacts or property
effects. Hence, there is no offsite cost component contributing to the total cost of
the outage.
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3.6 Economic Risks From Medium Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
Models for estimating the economic consequences of category II fusion reactor
accidents are described in this section. As for category I events, they are based on
models developed for LWR accidents [3.1).
In view of recent fusion reactor accident studies [3.5, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13], plausible
events appear to result in no significant releases of radioactive materials to the
environment. Consequently, no offsite health or property damage costs are likely
to be incurred. If this is so, economic risks of fusion reactor events can then be
assessed using the onsite models.
3.6.1 Onsite Economic Risks From Medium Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
Onsite cost components for category II events include replacement power costs,
plant repair costs and decontamination/clean up costs. In addition, fusion power
industry costs, electric utility business costs and onsite litigation costs may be
important for this category of event.
3.6.1.1 Replacement Power Costs
The cost of replacement power due to plant outage time will likely be a major
contributor .to the total outage cost. The simple replacement power cost model
can be employed. For these events, however, outage durations may be such that
allowance for real power production cost increases must be made. The replacement
power cost is given by (see appendix C):
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Cp = ) d Fo -e- )dt
= (GCFo) 1 - e-(r)t] (3.8)
C/ r-- g
where
Cp= present value of the power procuction cost increase over the out-
age duration ($)
G= electrical generation rating of the reactor (MWe)
C= actual capacity factor of the plant had the outage not occurred
C'= average capacity factor of the plant, obtained from operating data
Fo= powerproduction cost increase at time zero ($/MWe)
td= outage duration (yrs)
r= real societal discount rate
g= real escalation rate of replacement power costs (yr~1 )
3.6.1.2 Plant Decontamination Costs
Subsequent to a type II event, it may be necessary to decontaminate areas
of the fusion plant which have become contaminated. Decontamination costs will
include the cost of removal and disposal of any radioactive wastes, labor costs,
decontamination equipment operating costs and the health detriment costs due
to radiation exposure. These cost components are not individually considered in
Burke's model, but are specifically accounted for here.
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There are definite economic advantages to completing the cleanup program in
a minimal time period. However, this may not always be possible due to problems
encountered in financing cleanup operations and from regulatory concerns. In addi-
tion, there will be the cost of bringing the plant to, and maintaining the plant in, a
stabilized condition throughtout the decontamination period. It is anticipated that
this will result in only small additional costs.
Before decontamination can be carried out, an actual cleanup program must
be defined. The specific tasks, their duration, the required crew size and the point
in time at which the tasks should be carried out must be specified. The decontami-
nation program can be subdivided into phases or periods during which similar tasks
are carried out. The cost incurred for decontamination during any particular phase
is given by:
Cd, = j (Cw + CLm + Co, + CH,) e--(rg)t (3.9)
where
Cdn= decontamination cost during phase n of the decontamination pro-
gram ($)
t,= duration of phase n of the decontamination program (yrs)
Cwn= cost of radioactive waste removal and disposal during phase n of
the decontamination program ($/yr)
CL,= cost of labor to carry out tasks during phase n of the decontam-
ination program ($/yr)
CO,= cost to operate any equipment required during phase n of the
decontamination program ($/yr)
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CH,= health detriment cost due to radiation exposure during phase n
of the decontamination program ($/yr)
CHn = H - DDn (3.10)
H= estimate of the total societal detriment attributable to radiation
exposure
= 3,800 $/person Sv
DD== dose incurred during phase n of the decontamination operations
(person Sv/yr)
DD, = Rj,(t)Cjnfjndt (3.11)
t,j= time after event occurrence at which task j begins (hr)
t1 3 = time after event occurrence at which task j is completed (hr)
R1s(t)= function describing how the dose rate varies with time while car-
rying out task j (Sv/hr)
Cj,,= crew size for task j (persons)
fyn= frequency of carrying out task j (yr- 1 )
r= real societal discount rate
g= real escalation rate of costs (yr-1)
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The costs for each phase of the decontamination program must be added to
obtain a total cost for decontamination:
m
CD = Cdn - e-t"pn + Ct (3.12)
n=1
where
CD= present value of the total cost of the decontamination program
($)
m= total number of phases required to complete the clean up program
Cdn= decontamination cost during phase n of the program ($)
tp,= time after occurrence of the event at which phase n of the decon-
tamination program begins (yrs)
Cat= present value of plant stabilization costs ($)
Cat = I Caa -(r -g)dt (3.13)
td= outage duration (including the repair period) (yrs)
C,a= annual cost to maintain the plant in a stable condition ($/yr)
r= real societal discount rate
g= real escalation rate of costs (yr-1)
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3.6.1.3 Plant Repair Costs
It is expected that plant repair costs will be significant in relation to replace-
ment power costs. Plant repair costs will only be incurred if the option of decom-
missioning is not selected. Repair costs will be dependent on the actual extent of
the damage. In this study, Burke's model [3.1] has been modified to include the
replacement cost of any damaged components, the labor to replace these compo-
nents and the cost of health detriment due to any worker exposure during the repair
job. Labor and health detriment costs will be incurred continuously over the re-
pair period, while materials costs occur only once (assumed at the beginning of the
repair period). Since repair cannot begin until decontamination is completed, an
additional factor to include the effect of discounting must be applied to obtain the
present value of the plant repair costs (i.e. at the beginning of the outage). Hence,
for category II events, repair costs are given by:
CR = CMR + j (CLR + CHR) ertdt ertd (3.14)
where
CR= present value of repair costs ($)
CMR= cost of replacement materials or components ($)
tR= time to complete repair job (days)
CLR= labor cost to perform repair job ($/day)
CLR = Cjmj (3.15)
Ci= crew size for task j of the repair job (persons)
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mj= rate of worker remuneration for task j of the job ($/person day)
CHR= health detriment due to radiation exposure while performing re-
pair job ($/day)
CHR = H -DR (3.16)
H= estimate of the total societal detriment attributable to radiation
exposure
= 3,800 $/person Sv
DR= dose incurred during plant repair (person Sv/day)
DR = j R(t) Cjfdt (3.17)
ty= time required to complete task j of the repair job (hr)
Rj(t)= function describing how the dose rate varies with time while car-
rying out task j (Sv/hr)
Ci= crew size for task j of the repair job (persons)
fj= frequency of task j (days- 1 )
t d= time to perform the repair operations (yrs)
r= real societal discount rate
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3.6.1.4 Worker Health Effects And Health Care Costs
As a consequence of a category II accident, there is an increased potential for
worker health effects because of the radioactive material released within the plant.
Accidents in this category do not result in large releases of radioactive material to
the environment. Hence, any health effect costs will likely not be large. In areas
of the plant where serious system failures have occurred, plant workers may also
sustain injuries from causes other than radiation. However, the impact of this cost
would be small in comparison to other accident costs.
Health detriment costs due to exposure of workers to radiation in post-accident
operations have been included in the costs of the various activities. (If an overall
value for onsite health effects costs (CHm) is required, it can be obtained by summing
the health detriment costs incurred during the various activities subsequent to the
accident.) Estimations of the costs of radiation exposure are based on the average
cos't of one case of cancer and the expected costs resulting from genetic effects in
the offspring (first generation) of exposed individuals. A cautious estimate, taken
from Voilleque and Pavlick [3.15], updated to current dollars is 3,800 $/person Sv
(see appendix B).
3.6.1.5 Fusion Power Industry Costs
Burke [3.13 discusses the influence of reactor accidents on the fission power
industry. It is expected that similar effects may be observed in the fusion power
industry subsequent to a fusion reactor accident. These costs are not included in
this study, but a condensed version of Burke's discussion is given below.
Fusion reactor accidents could potentially impact policy decisions or risk per-
ceptions, leading to the rapid shutdown, phasing out or slowed growth of the fusion
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power industry. Forced shutdown of all or many operating plants may possibly re-
sult from society overreacting to the event. This would effectively eliminate fusion
power as an alternative for electricity generation.
The exclusion of fusion power would considerably reduce the reserve margin
(total installed capacity minus the peak load), and some areas might not be able to
meet load requirements. Forced shutdown would markedly decrease the reliability of
electrical power supply. Furthermore, the need to replace the lost power generation
capacity with power generated from non-economy sources would result in much
higher cost electric power. In order to supply this replacement power, it would also
be necessary for sufficient replacement capacity and interconnections to exist.
Reduced growth of the fusion industry subsequent to an accident could result
from increasing opposition from society or from regulatory bodies. If consumption
of electricity was on the rise at the time of the accident, and the fusion industry was
not permitted to grow at a rate commensurate with this, it would then be necessary
to rely on more expensive'sources.' This represents a real cost to society.
In addition, the value of stocks and bonds issued by a particular utility may
show some devaluation after an accident. This is likely due to the uncertainty of
future actions related to the industry.
3.6.1.6 Electric Utility Business Costs
Burke [3.1] also describes electric utility business costs arising from reactor ac-
cidents. Again, a similar effect subsequent to fusion reactor accidents is anticipated.
These costs are not included in the present economic model, but, a brief outline of
Burke's discussion follows.
99
Increased "business costs" to a plant licensee or electric utility include increased
costs for borrowing capital and for continuing to provide adequate electricity to ser-
vice areas. These costs may be a consequence of altered risk perceptions in financial
markets in combination with the need for the plant licensee to replace the income
once generated by the operating plant. Business costs occur in direct response to
an increase in the cost of borrowing or as a result of limited access to financial
markets. The increased borrowing costs orginate from altered perceptions of risk
in investing in a specific utility, leading to a higher demanded return on capital.
Limited access to financial markets may be a consequence of the plant licensee's
loss of income. This, in turn, results in insufficient coverage of current financial
commitments. The increased borrowing costs may be due to correct information
provided by an accident or by mis information or falsely perceived risks. The cor-
rect or improved information regarding the accident will lead to a redistribution of
benefits within society, causing the value of an investment in fusion power utilities
to be altered. Misconceived informatior regarding fusion power risks results in true
societal losses in that existing and future construction and maintenance programs
may be significantly altered due to cas. flow limitations.
It is difficult to assess the exact effect of the business costs resulting after
an accident. The actual distribution, magnitude and specific characteristics which
influence the ultimate cost need further investigation. Obviously, the electric utility
industry and fusion plant licensees will be quite concerned with these potential
costs since the stature of companies in financial markets may be greatly influenced.
Business costs are important and should be considered in estimating the financial
risk associated with a particular accident.
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3.6.1.7 Onsite Litigation Costs
As discussed by Burke [3.1], severe accidents at a fission power plant may
involve issues of liability and compensation. This will likely be true for fusion power
plants as well. Most legal awards for damages directly resulting from the accident
are transfer payments within society and do not lead to additional net societal costs.
Compensation payments for "pain and suffering" do represent societal costs, but
are not expected to be large.
Individuals carrying out litigation procedures must be paid a fee for their time
and efforts. This does represent a cost to society. Fees demanded by lawyers are
high. However, litigation costs are unlikely to be significant in comparison with
other costs associated with accident.
3.6.1.8 Summary Of Onsite Economic Impacts Of Medium,
Consequence Fusion Reactor Accidents
The onsite consequences of medium consequence events can be estimated using
the models presented in this section. The option of decommissioning after cleanup
instead of plant repair is also included. Estimates can be obtained for replacement
power costs, decontamination costs, plant repair or decommissioning costs and plant
capital investment losses. The cost of worker health effects incurred during the
accident are assumed small and are neglected, but effects incurred during subsequent
operations are accounted for. Fusion power industry costs, electric utility and plant
licensee business costs and onsite litigation costs are anticipated to be small from
the societal perspective, but may be important to these specific groups.
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3.6.2 Offsite Economic Risks From Medium Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
Category II events may result in releases of radioactivity to areas external to the
site. It may be necessary to consider health effects costs or property damage costs.
These costs may include evacuation (highly unlikely), relocation, decontamination,
land interdiction, agricultural product disposal, health effects, secondary effects
and litigation costs. Since it may also be necessary to include these costs when
determining offsite economic risks associated with a type III event, proposed models
for their evaluation are presented and discussed in section 3.7.2, which deals with
category III occurrences.
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3.7 Economic Risks From Large Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
This section presents models for assessing the economic consequences of cat-
egory III fusion reactor accidents. These models have been built upon models
developed for LWR accidents in previous studies 13.1, 3.16].
3.7.1 Onsite Economic Risks From Large Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
Onsite costs include replacement power costs, decontamination costs and health
effects costs. Category III events may not allow for the option of plant repair. Early
decommissioning may be the most cost effective action to undertake. A large capital
investment loss may result. In addition, fusion power industry costs, electric utility
costs and litigation costs will contribute to the onsite economic risk.
If permanent reactor shutdown follows a category III accident, replacement
power costs will be incurred until the plant's productive capacity can be replaced
(estimated at 6 years [3.10]). This cost can be calculated using equation 3.8 from
section 3.6.1.1.
Decontamination costs can be calculated in the same manner as described
in section 3.6.1.2. A possibly large contribution to the cleanup cost will result
from working in highly radioactive environments. As well as affecting the dose
incurred by workers, it is expected that task durations, and hence labor costs, will
be augmented as a consequence of working in such environments. Light water fission
reactor experience has revealed that each person-hour spent in a high radiation
environment requires an additional 10 to 100 person-hours in preparation and in
carrying out regulatory activities. It is probable, then, that decontamination costs
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for category III events will be somewhat greater than for category II events. The
actual cleanup costs will depend, to a large degree, on the state of the facility after
the accident.
Significant injuries or fatalities among workers may result from a severe accident
at a power plant. Failure of the vacuum vessel and the release of activated material
to the environment could significantly contaminate equipment and expose workers
in many plant areas. Although the effects are potentially serious, the cost arising
from health impacts will be relatively small.
Electric utitity and plant licensee business costs after severe events are impor-
tant and should be included in decision making. Fusion power industry costs and
onsite litigation costs to society are expected to be small. They may, however, be
of importance to particular groups, especially in the case of societal overreaction.
3.7.1.1 Plant Decommissioning Costs
In severe accidents, damage may be so extensive that decommissioning is the
only alternative. This results in real costs because the money for decommissioning
must be outlayed earlier than anticipated. The magnitude of this cost will depend
on the time during the life of the reactor at which decommissioning occurs.
Decommissioning of fusion reactors is not forseen as being too difficult an op-
eration. Disassembly and removal of the reactor will be facilitated by the built-in
maintenance capabilities of fusion reactors. This will allow for remote removal of
any reactor component or structure. Since fusion plants are designed modularly,
massive components can be disassembled to sizes appropriate for shipment. It is ex-
pected that most of the reactor disassembly and packaging of radioactive materials
and parts can be carried out by the normal operating crew. The STARFIRE study
[3.101 has indicated that this procedure could be performed in an 18 month period.
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Concurrent with these activities, turbine, cryogenic and electrical systems could
be dismantled. Subsequent to this, decontamination of the reactor hall, the hot
cell and the tritium processing facilities would occur. These actions would require
approximately twelve to sixteen months, leaving the facility in the "green grass"
state.
The cost of accelerated decommissioning can be found knowing the decom-
missioning cost at the end of plant life. Assuming that the decommissioning cost
incurred after plant decontamination will not be significantly different from the end
of life cost, the cost of accelerated decommissioning as given by Burke [3.1] is:
CAD = S (1 - e-(t1 p-tD) ) (3.18)
where
CAD= cost due to accelerated decommissioning ($)
S= end of life decommissioning cost (includes labor costs, health
detriment costs and the cost of radioactive waste removal and
disposal) ($)
tp1 = expected plant lifetime (yrs)
tD= time at which decommissioning starts, measured from the start
of commercial operation of the plant (yrs)
r= real societal discount rate
Implicitly accounted for in this formula is the time required for plant decon-
tamination, which must be carried out before decommissioning can begin. The cost
due to accelerated decommissioning will be greater the earlier in plant life the acci-
dent occurs. However, this cost will likely be small relative to other costs resulting
from the event. Additionally, those areas of the fusion reactor most vulnerable to
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severe damage (e.g. first wall/blanket) are of modular design and are replaced on
a regular basis. Hence, decommissioning may be avoided if the damage resulting
from an accident is localized to such regions.
3.7.1.2 Capital Investment Loss
Severe reactor accidents may result in such severe plant damage that a signif-
icant capital investment loss occurs. If the entire capital investment in the plant
or plant components is not recovered at the time of the accident, the unrecovered
capital represents an investment loss. If the plant must be shutdown sooner than
originally planned, the capital costs necessary to replace the electrical generation
capacity of the plant and the cost of replacement power must be included in the
net cost to society of a permanent shutdown.
The unrecovered capital cost can be calculated by first determining the depre-
ciated value of the plant or the destroyed plant components at the time of the event
which results in premature permanent shutdown. The remaining book value rep-
resents the capital investment loss. Using the sinking fund method for calculating
depreciation (as recommended in reference 3.14), this loss would be given by:
CBV = - ( (3.19)(+ r)t"-
where
CDV= book value of the initial investment at the time of the severe
accident ($)
I,= initial capital investment ($)
r= real societal discount rate
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ta= time of occurrence of the severe accident (years after initial in-
vestment)
tpl= plant lifetime (yrs)
Since this represents an accelerated depreciation schedule (to allow for earlier
capital depreciation tax deductions), and assuming the plant to have no salvage
value, it is possible that the depreciated capital value may be zero.
The total capital cost incurred in replacing the destroyed plant or plant compo-
nents should include design and construcion cost as well as materials costs. These
costs should be assessed at the time of occurrence of the severe event.
If the plant must be decommissioned, the cost of replacement power will be
incurred for a period of 6 years [3.10], in which time a new plant can be built to
replace the generation capacity of the shutdown plant. This can be calculated as
outlined in appendix C. Burke [3.1] included the cost of replacement power, which
must be supplied while a new reactor is being built, as part of the capital investment
loss. In this study, it was kept as a separate cost component (Cp). In this way, the
possibility of double counting replacement power costs when assessing the total cost
of a reactor accident is avoided. If the total capital investment loss is desired, then
the cost of replacement power during the construction of new generating capacity
can be added to the other capital investment loss components just discussed.
The total capital investment loss after a severe accident, not including the
replacement power cost, is given by:
CI = CBV + CNP (3.20)
where
Cci= capital investment loss resulting from the severe accident ($)
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C.BV= book value of the initial investment at the time of the severe
accident ($)
CNP= capital investment of the new plant components to replace those
destroyed or of the new plant built to replace the productive
capacity of the shutdown plant ($)
3.7.2 Offsite Economic Risks From Large Consequence Fusion
Reactor Accidents
The incorporation of safEty considerations into designs at the conceptual level
has been the practice of the fusion community. In this way, the environmental
and safety advantages inherent in fusion may be fully realized. Because of this
philosophy, offsite impacts of fusion reactor events are expected to be small.
The first wall/blanket and shield regions of a fusion reactor are major sources
of radioactivity that could potentially be released during an accident and give rise
to offsite impacts. The large majority of the activation products are locked into the
structural material and are not intimately a part of the heat source, as in a fission
reactor. Consequently, they are not foreseen to be of concern in terms of public
safety, except in the very unlikely event of vaporization of the structure due to a
very large energy release. Liquid lithium fires have been identified as posing a threat
to first wall integrity 3.11]. Some fraction of the structural activity of a fusion device
could be volatilized and released to the environment in the event of a lithium fire
[3.5, 3.7, 3.12, 3.17]. However, because of the inherent features of the fire, and the
oxidation rate of steel, this threat is not capable of mobilizing a significant fraction
of the first wall and hence may not lead to serious public exposures [3.5, 3.11).
Furthermore, employing a less active form of lithium would eliminate this concern
[3.12, 3.13]. First wall damage or melting may result subsequent to a loss-of-coolant
accident. A large fraction of this material would have to somehow be released to
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the environment to produce any offsite health effects [3.13].
The degree of offsite impact can be minimized by decisions made at the de-
sign level. It may be possible to design a fusion reactor system which precludes
volatilization and release of induced activity from containment [3.5]. Once poten-
tial safety problems have been identified, design efforts can be concentrated so as
to reduce the hazard 13.13].
A major consideration in reducing the hazard is that of materials choice. Piet
[3.13] has carried out an extensive safety analysis of candidate materials for the
fusion reactor breeder, coolant and structural material. He has indicated that, with
the appropriate choice of materials, radioactive inventories can be minimized. Other
studies [3.18, 3.19] have also investigated the influence of materials selection on
induced activity and have reinforced the importance of this issue to fusion reactor
safety. Elemental and isotopic tailoring of materials has been indentified as an
approach for further reducing activity levels in fusion reactors [3.20, 3.21, 3.22].
Fusion reactors are expected to be safer than fission reactors [3.23]. The risk of
fusion reactor accidents will probably be less than that of LWRs [3.111. It has been
concluded that the consequences of an estimated maximum possible release from
a properly designed fusion reactor are substantially less than the maximum LWR
accident consequences [3.5, 3.24]. Thus, offsite economic impacts of fusion reactor
events should be correspondingly reduced, and may even be negligible.
In this section, the models for assessing offsite economic consequences of fusion
reactor accidents are presented. It is essentially a summary of Burke's work [3.1],
with the incorporation of minor changes. Although offsite impacts are expected
to be small or non-existant, the necessary models for their assessment have been
included for the sake of completeness.
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3.7.2.1 Discussion Of Terms And Model Application
With a type III reactor event, a large release of radioactivity to the environment
may have occurred. Consequently, offsite accident costs are generally associated
with population protective measures. These costs include radiation-induced human
health effects, land and property decontamination, agricultural product disposal,
population evacuation, temporary or permanent relocation, and land condemnation
(or interdiction). Other economic impacts include litigation costs and secondary
economic effects which occur outside directly contaminate. areas.
It is necessary to clarify terms used to describe offsite emergency responses to
reactor accidents. These definitions are taken from Burke's study [3.11, and are sim-
ilar to those used in the Reactor Safety Study [3.16]. "Decontamination" concerns
the process of cleanup and restoration of land in an affected area by reducing dose
rates through the implementation of techniques which remove surface deposited ra-
dionuclides. "Agricultural product disposal" costs arise from the disposal of crops
which have become contaminated. These disposal costs will continue to contribute
to the total economic risk until projected population doses from ingestion are ac-
ceptable. "Evacuation" describes the immediate movement of a population out of
an area. It may be implemented before any radioactive release, as a precautionary
measure. "Temporary relocation" refers to the movement of individuals from an
area which has been classified as unsafe subsequent to the release of radioactive
materials, based on measured levels of radiation. "Permanent relocation" costs in-
clude lost income, productivity and moving costs incurred while a population is
relocating from a region which has been acclaimed condemned. The prohibition of
inhabitation or use of an area of land for any extended period of time, as a means
of long term exposure reduction is known as "land interdiction".
Burke [3.1] has developed an offsite cost model for estimating the economic
consequences of protective actions and radiation-induced health effects after severe
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LWR accidents. Although the radionuclides will be different for fusion reactors,
the acute offsite doses could approach those associated with the most hazardous
fission products released in severe fission reactor accidents 13.71. Therefore, a similar
approach to population protective measures could be envisioned for fusion reactor
accidents.
Acute doses are incurred within a short time span after the radioactive material
has been released to the environment. Exposure pathways include groundshine,
cloudshine and inhalation of radionuclides which may be deposited by or contained
in a cloud of radioactive material passing by an area. Sheltering, possibly followed
by short term relocation or evacuation (not a likely choice for fusion) are effective
measures in reducing acute exposures.
Chronic doses occur over longer periods of time. This may result from ground-
shine exposure or from contaminated milk or food ingestion. Land decontamination
and agricultural product disposal may avoid doses being incurred via this pathway.
Modelling of offsite protective measure implementation for severe LWR events
has been performed by Burke [3.1]. Although the radionuclides involved will be
different, a similar analysis is applicable to fusion reactor accidents.
Evacuation of individuals may begin after the start of an accident sequence,
but before any release of radioactive material to the environment. If a release takes
place, teams will begin collecting dose rate information from surface-deposited nu-
clides in affected areas. This activity will begin within hours of a significant ra-
dioactive release. This period, as described by Burke [3.11, is known as the "emer-
gency phase". If projected long term individual doses during this time exceed a
pre-established criterion, temporary relocation of individuals, in addition to those
already evacuated will ensue. Evacuation will probably not be a necessary consid-
eration for fusion.
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As more information is collected, doses in affected areas may decrease below
dose limits and the return of evacuees would follow. Dose rates in other areas may
still prohibit re-entry. This time period, in which more dose rate information is
obtained has been defined as the "intermediate phase". Monitoring of milk and
crops will also take place at this time to assess the need for agricultural product
disposal.
After dose rates in affected areas have been accurately assessed, a long term
dose to individuals from surface deposited nuclides can be projected. Areas requiring
decontamination or interdiction can be determined. If decontamination operations
in a particular area will be unsuccessful at reducing dose rates to acceptable levels,
this area should be condemned. If decontamination efforts are expected to be
successful, costs will be incurred from the actual decontamination operations, from
doses to workers and from relocating the population.
The staged implementation of protective measures is considered to be a realistic
scheme to follow in the post accident time period. The duration of specific protective
measures is consistent with the expected variation of dose rates with time after the
accident. It should be noted that certain stages of this process may not be necessary
(e.g. evacuation).
3.7.2.2 Discussion Of The Offsite Economic Models
The appropriate models for assessing the offsite economic consequences of se-
vere fusion reactor events are summarized in table 3.5. Details of the model develop-
ment, as applied to LWRs, can be found in Burke's dissertation [3.1]. In this section,
key aspects of the model are highlighted and the adaptations either to improve the
model or to make it more appropriate for fusion applications are discussed.
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3.7.2.2.1 Health Effects And Health Care Costs
The occurrence of a category III accident at a fusion power plant may result in
exposing the public and offsite decontamination workers to radioactive materials.
As a result, a cost will be incurred due to medical treatment for health effects and
lost income during illness and after death of individuals. The cost of radiation
induced health effects to the public can be estimated using equation 3.21. This
estimate represents purely economic costs and does not include any reflection of
individual preferences for avoidance of pain, suffering or anguish. Decontamination
worker health effects costs are given by equation 3.22. If an overall value for offsite
health effects costs (CH,) is required, it can be obtained by summing the public
and offsite decontamination worker health effects costs.
3.7.2.2.2 Land And Property Decontamination Costs
Burke [3.1] discusses decontamination cost estimates, obtained from a detailed
review of decontamination costs and effectiveness performed at Sandia National
Laboratory (SNL). The cost of the decontamination program is found to depend
on the level of the decontamination effort. Estimates can be obtained for either
farmland or residential, business and public property. The effectiveness of decon-
tamination techniques are dependent on the specific radionuclides, particle sizes and
the chemical forms of the deposited materials.
Decontamination costs in farm areas can be estimated based on low and high
level efforts. Low level effort costs can be predicted from the costs to plow grassland
and cropland areas and reseed all grassland areas. High level efforts involve costs
for deep ploughing of grassland, and scraping and burial of cropland ( in order not
to degrade the quality of the cropland surface soil). Table 3.2 displays farmland
decontamination costs and effectiveness values. Three levels of effort are given, each
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Table 3.2: Decontamination Cost and Effectiveness Values
for Farm Areas [3.1]
Dose Rate Reduc-
tion Factor After
Decontamination
(f)
3
15
20
Approximate
Costs
($/acre)
(DFf)
160
440
480
Fraction of
Cost for
Paid Labor
(FLf)
0.30
0.35
0.35
Worker Dose Reduc-
tion Fraction (Estimated
Worker Dose/Dose From
Continuous Exposure)
(WFf)
0.10
0.25
0.33
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Table 3.3: Decontamination Cost and Effectiveness Values
for Non-farm Areas [3.1]
Dose Rate Reduc-
tion Factor After
Decontamination
f)
3
15
20
Approximate
Costs
($/person)
(DRf)
2600
6900
7400
Fraction of
Cost for
Paid Labor
(RLf)
0.7
0 .5
0.5
Worker Dose Reduc-
tion Factor (Estimated
Worker Dose/Dose From
Continuous Exposure)
(WIRf)
0.33
0.33
0.33
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having a specific decontamination effectiveness (i.e. dose rate reduction factor), cost
estimate, labor cost fraction and worker dose reduction factor (ratio of estimated
worker dose to the total dose from constant exposure to surface deposited radionu-
clides during the decontamination period). The worker dose reduction factor is
estimated based on shielding which may be furnished by tractors and other heavy
equipment used in farmland decontamination operations.
Non-farmland decontamination costs have been estimated on a per capita ba-
sis. The Reactor Safety Study (RSS) economic consequence model, as well as the
SNL review, has taken this approach. Estimates obtained on a per capita basis
are appropriate since it is expected that tangible assets in an area are roughly pro-
portional to the population in the area and decontamination costs are expected to
be proportional to -he tangible assets in an area requiring cleanup. More detailed
cost analyses woul& be difficult due to the large uncertainties in reactor accident
radionuclide release processes, atmospheric transport and deposition, decontamina-
tion effectiveness and actual decontamination costs. Table 3.3 presents non-farm
area decontamination costs -and effectiveness factors. The decontamination cost
estimates have been weighted using national average statistics to account for the
many different methods possible for decontamination of residential, commercial, in-
dustrial and public land use areas. Each level of decontamination effort will employ
a combination of different techniques.
To estimate the total cost of a decontamination program in an area, farm costs,
for the appropriate decontamination factor, must be weighted by the affected farm
acreage, and non-farm costs, for the appropriate decontamination factor, must be
weighted by the affected population. The total cost is given by equation 3.23.
A labor cost component is included and can be calculated using equation 3.24.
Estimated paid labor fractions for farm and non-farm areas are given in tables 3.2
and 3.3. These values have been obtained from studies carried out at SNL which
are discussed by Burke [3.1].
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Since it is anticipated that cleanup efforts would begin as quickly as possible
after the accident has occurred, decontamination costs are not discounted. Delaying
decontamination operations may appear beneficial, since this would allow for the
decay and weathering of radionuclides. However, migration of these species and
fixation onto surfaces would lead to more difficult and costly procedures.
Doses incurred by workers during a decontamination endeavor can be found.
Burke [3.1] estimates the total person-years of effort for the decontamination pro-
gram using equation 3.25. Knowing the total person years of effort, the number
of decontamination workers required to complete the program within a specified
amount of time can be found using equation 3.26. To evaluate the doses incurred
by workers during the decontamination program, the time spent in contaminated
areas and possible shielding effects of equipment, should be accounted for. The
total dose incurred is given by equation 3.27.
Worker doses in farm areas are expected to be slightly reduced from non-
farm areas for the same level of contamination (see tables 3.2 and 3.3) because the
machinery used in cleanup adds distance and provides shielding between radioactive
materials and workers. Worker protective measures would ensure that beta doses
from radionuclides deposited directly on the skin and from inhalation of resuspended
radionuclides are eliminated. In non-farm areas, no dose reduction is afforded by
machinery shielding since most of the decontamination effort will be carried out
manually. The dose ratios for workers in non farm areas are estimated assuming
eight hours of work per day, beginning each day in an area yet to be decontaminated.
If acceptable dose rates are not maintained during decontamination operations,
temporary relocation of the population in certain areas may be warranted. The cost
of relocating the population is described by equation 3.28.
Although costs of the decontamination effort have only been discussed here, it
must also be recognized that a large scale decontamination effort may stimulate the
economy somewhat. This would occur as a result of increased activity in certain
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industrial sectors due to the labor, building materials and equipment needs of the
effort.
3.7.2.2.3 Agricultural Disposal Costs
Crop contamination after a severe fusion reactor accident could result by either
direct deposition of radionuclides on the crops or by incorporation into the vegeta-
tion by absorption from the soil. Hence, an individual may be exposed by directly
eating contaminated crops. In order to avoid co:isuming contaminated goods, af-
fected crops must be disposed of. Cost estimates for these procedures are based on
the Reactor Safety Study [3.16], as presented by Burke [3.1].
If radionuclides are deposited on crops durinig the growing season, it will be
necessary to dispose of the harvest. It is expectec. that crops will be disposed of in
all areas requiring long term protective actions. If the accident occurs outside the
growing season, it will be unnecessary to dispose of any crops. The crop disposal
cost can be estimated using equation 3.29.
3.7.2.2.4 Population Evacuation Costs
Immediate evacuation costs, as given by equation 3.30 in table 3.5, include the
cost, per individual, of food, housing and transportation, using either commercial
or mass care facilities. The cost to supply supervising personnel for the evacuation
process has also been considered. Hans and Sell [3.25] have estimated these evacu-
ation costs. Upated values are given in table 3.4. Military pay indexes have been
used to estimate the cost to supply evacuation supervisory personnel. It is assumed
that 80 % of the evacuated population use commercial care facilities (restaurants,
motels and private vehicles) and 20 % use mass care facilities [3.161. These as-
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sumptions lead to an average daily evacuation cost per individual of approximately
$24.60.
Lost personal and corporate income during the evacuation period should be
included in the evacuation costs. This cost component accounts for lost wages of(it
does not include interest, dividends or transfer payments) and corporate income
and profits during the evacuation period. Variations in regional incomes can be
accounted for. The national average personal income (excluding dividends, interest
and transfer payments) plus corporate profits and interest has been estimated as
$27 per person day [3.16, 3.251.
Short duration evacuation periods (one to three days) may not involve costs for
lost income and productivity. This is possible if the economy is sufficiently flexible so
that lost productivity, wages and profits can be largely recovered through increased
activity after the evacuation period terminates.
It has been shown that a large fraction of the first wall would have to reach
the public in order for health effects to result, and an even larger fraction would
have to reach the public in order for evacuation to be justified [3.13, 3.26]. The
likelihood of such a threat existing is not great. Thus, evacuation will likely never
be required.
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Table 3.4: Costs of Evacuation per Evacuee Day [3.251
Commercial Care Facililties:
Lodging
Food
Transportation (private)
$17.75
$5.40
$2A5
$25.60/evacuee day
Mass Care Facilities:
Lodging
Food
Transportation (mass)
$7.25
$3.80
$1.35
$12.40/evacuee day
Evacuation Personnel (2 % of total number of evacuees)
Compensation
Food, Lodging and
Transportation
$60.00/day
Same as evacuees
Total weighted Cost (E) (Based on 80 % commercial care, 20 % mass care facilties):
$24.60/evacuee day
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3.7.2.2.5 Emergency Phase Relocation Costs
The emergency phase relocation time period includes the time required for
measurement of groundshine doses, the time to compare these doses to the safe
level criterion and the time required to temporarily relocate the population in areas
where levels are unacceptable. If these individuals have already been evacuated,
before any release of material, it would only be necessary to extend the duration of
their stay outside the area. Emergency phase relocation costs include food, lodging,
transportation and income losses, as given by equation 3.31 in table 3.5. It should be
noted that wage and income losses may be recoverable for short duration emergency
phase relocation periods.
3.7.2.2.6 Intermediate Phase Relocation Costs
The intermediate phase relocation time period includes the time required for
obtaining more detailed dose rate information, the time to make decisions on
whether or not long term protective actions are necessary and the time needed
for the relocated population to return to safe areas. Intermediate phase relocation
costs are estimated in a similar fashion to emergency phase relocation costs, using
equation 3.32. The intermediate phase relocation period is assumed not to overlap
with the emergency phase relocation (tIIP > t2EP). It is likely that by the time the
intermediate phase relocation has been implemented, the duration of the temporary
relocation will have been long enough to result in income losses.
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3.7.2.2.7 Land Interdiction Costs
In some areas, decontamination by the maximum achievable factor may not be
sufficient to reduce individual doses to acceptable levels. If this is the case, land
interdiction must be implemented as a population protective measure. Permanent
relocation of the population originally inhabiting the area of concern will be carried
out. It is possible that after decay, weathering and future decontamination efforts,
the population would return to the affected area. Discounting must be utilized
in the estimation of land interdiction costs, since costs may be incurred over a
considerable length of time. Also, the fact that some portion of the initial value
of the property may be recovered if the area can be used in the future must be
accounted for.
The cost of land interdiction can be estimated using Burke's approach [3.11,
which deals with the concept of wealth. Wealth is comprised of the total present
value of land and other natural resources, tangible assets, inventory stocks and the
societal productivity of an area. Further details concerning this concept are found
in Burke's discussion, as well as in references 3.27 and 3.28.
The wealth contained in farm areas can be estimated using equation 3.33.
Market values for farmland and structures can be obtained using the 1978 census
of agriculture [3.29], updated to the current year.
The total tangible wealth in a residential, business or public area can be ob-
tained from average national wealth estimates. Since wealth is an indication of
income producing capacity, the national average should be weighted by region-
specific personal income statistics to obtain the appropriate value for the tangible
wealth of an affected region. This would account for areas with higher incomes hav-
ing more tangible wealth amd more potential for creating wealth than areas with
lower incomes. The wealth contained in residential, business and public properties
is given by equation 3.34.
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Since the period of interdiction may be lengthy, estimates of wealth must ac-
count for depreciation. Buildings and structures in an interdicted area would de-
preciate at a more rapid rate than the land due to lack of upkeep [3.161. However,
it is likely that some portion of the initial value of the property will be recovered
at the termination of the interdiction period. Burke [3.1] assesses the cost of land
interdiction in an area by subtracting this reclaimed value from the initial present
value of the region's wealth, as indicated in equation 3.35.
The duration of land interdiction is dependent on the time required for ra-
dioactive decay, weathering and decontamination efforts to reduce the integrated
long term population dose to an acceptable level. Beyond 30 years of interdiction,
the entire wealth of a region is assumed to be lost.
3.7.2.2.8 Secondary Impacts
Burke [3.1] describes possible secondary impacts of fission reactor accidents. It
is probable that similar effects will occur subsequent to a fusion reactor accident.
These effects are highlighted below.
Population protective measures could result in secondary costs or ripple effects.
These effects are expected to be small relative to the direct costs of the protective
measures. It is likely that these costs would be further reduced due to the flexibility
in the economy, which has been observed subsequent to most disasters [3.1].
These effects include an increase in the price of affected crops or dairy products,
land devaluation or increased labor costs due to population emigration. This last
item would directly affect a region's productivity. The magnitude of the impact
depends on the actual size of the area being analyzed. In addition, a societal cost
in one region may be balanced by a benefit in another region, resulting in a small
net cost to society.
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One further secondary impact following a reactor shutdown is an increase in
the cost of electricity in the affected region. This may be transmitted through the
economy affecting prices, employment, incomes and productivity in a region. The
net societal effects are again expected to be small, due to a cancellation of costs
and benefits in different regions.
These impacts have not been included in this study. Since the costs are ex-
pected to be small, it was felt unnecessary to pursue the level of detail required to
estimate the secondary risks.
3.7.2.2.9 Offsite Litigation Costs
Since the population in the immediate vicinity of the fusion plant has been
unwillingly exposed to radiation, it is expected that some degree of compensation
will be sought. This will result in litigation costs. The cost of the litigation process
will likely be large for individual parties, but the cost to society will likely be small.
Hence, these costs were not included in this study.
124
Table 3.5: Summary of Offsite Cost Components
Public Health Effects m :
CHP = H, Dpop
Decontamination Worker Health Effectsm:
CHW = H -DDW
Decontamination Program1 :
Cd = (Ff -A -DF) + (Pd - DRf) + Cdl
Decontamination Labor1:
Cd = (Ff -A -DFJ - FLf) +(Pd DRf - RLf)
Decontamination Program Completion Time1 :
Tmy = (Cdl)CI
Number of Decontamination Workers1 :
Nw = ()"
tD
M modified form of Burke's model
I taken directly Burke's work [3.1]
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(3.21)
(3.22)
(3.23)
(3.24)
(3.25)
(3.26)
Decontamination Worker Dosel:
DDW=DDw = D r)(FC - A - DFf - FLf -WFf)+ (Pd - DRf - RLf. -WRf)C(3 -.t7
(3.27)
/
Population Relocation During Decontamination':
Cr = Pr (E + I - Rrj) tD 365
Crop Disposalm:
Cd = Ff - A - Fp-f Z
Population Evacuation':
CE = PE ' tE (E + I -R,j)
Emergency Phase Relocation m :
CEP = [PE (t2EP - tE) + PEP (t2EP - tlEP)] (E + I - Ri)
Intermediate Phase Relocation':
CIP = PIP (t 21P - tlip) (E + I - Rnj)
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(3.28)
(3.29)
(3.30)
(3.31)
(3.32)
Farm Area Wealth1:
Wf = Ff - A - Fv -RVJ
Residential, Business and Public Property Wealth 1 :
Wr = Pi -R, - RV
Land Interdiction':
C1 = (Wf + Wr) - ert{ Wf [(1.0 - If) + If (1.0 - S)j
S= rtz 
_
= erk -1 )
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(3.33)
(3.34)
(3.35)
(3.36)
+Wr, [(1.0 - I,) + Ir (1.0 - $)]I
List of Variables for Table 3.5:
CE= cost of evacuation ($)
PE= size of initially evacuated population (persons)
tE= duration of the evacuation (days)
E= cost of food, lodging and transportation for each evacuee ($/person day)
I= national average per capita and corporate income ($/person day)
Rri= ratio of region specific to national average personal incomes
CEP= emergency phase population relocation cost($)
t 1EP= time at the start of the emergency phase relocation in areas where no evacuation
has occurred (days from the accident occurrence)
t2EP= time at the end of the emergency phase relocation (days from the accident
occurrence)
PEP= number of persons which must be relocated in addition to those previously
evacuated (persons)
Cjp= intermediate phase relocation cost ($)
Pjp= size of affected population during the intermediate phase (personsl
t ijP= time at the start of the intermediate phase relocation (days from the accident
occurrence)
t 21P= time at the end of the intermediate phase relocation (days from the accident
occurrence)
Cd= cost of the decontamination program ($)
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Ff= fraction of the region which is farmland
A= total area to be decontaminated (acres)
DFf= cost to decontaminate farmland by a factor of f ($/acre)
Pd= population of area affected by the decontamination program (persons)
DRf= cost to decontaminate residential, business and public property by a factor of f
($/person)
Cdl= labor cost for the decontamination program ($)
FLj= fraction of the farm decontamination cost, for the appropriate decontamination
factor, which is estimated to be paid labor
RLf= fraction of the residential, business and public property decontamination cost,
for the appropriate decontamination factor, which is estimated to be paid labor
Tmy= total person-years of effort required to decontaminate an area (person yr)
Cag= average cost of decontamination labor ($/person yr)
N,= number of decontamination workers required to complete the program within
a specified amount of time (persons)
tD= specified amount of time to complete the decontamination effort (yrs)
DDW= total dose incurred by the decontamination workers due to exposure to surface
deposited radionuclides (person Sv)
D,= dose which would be incurred by an individual from constant exposure to sur-
face deposited radionuclides for the entire decontamination period (Sv)
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ZWFf= ratio of decontamination worker dose, for an appropriate level of decontamina-
tion effort, in farm areas, to the dose which would be incurred by an individual
from constant exposure during the decontamination period
WRf= ratio of decontamination worker dose, for an appropriate level of decontamina-
tion effort, in residential, business and public areas, to the dose which would be
incurred by an individual from constant exposure during the decontamination
period
C,= cost of relocating a population from an area during the decontamination period
($)
P,= size of population to be relocated during decontamination operations (persons)
Wj= total farm wealth (prior to reactor accident) in an area from farmland and
associated structures ($)
F,= average national market value of farmland and structures in the area ($/acre)
RVf= ratio of region specific to national average market value of farmland and struc-
tures in the area
W,= total residential, business and public wealth in an area (prior to reactor acci-
dent) ($)
Pi= total number of persons affected by the reactor accident (persons)
R,= average national per capita tangible wealth (farmland and structures) in the
area ($/person)
RV,= ratio of region specific to nation average personal incomes in the area
C1 = present value of the total cost due to land interdiction ($)
If= fraction of farm wealth in improvements in the affected area
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S.
I,= fraction of non-farm wealth in improvements in the affected area
tj= duration of the interdiction period (yrs)
s= sinking fund depreciation factor
k= useful life of depreciating assets (yrs)
Ced= cost of crop disposal ($)
Fp= average annual farm production (sales) for the area ($/acre)
fc= fraction of farm sales from crops
Z= seasonal factor
= 1.0 during growing season
= 0.0 outside growing season
CHP= total health effects cost due to exposure of the public to radiation ($)
H= estimate of the total societal detriment due to radiation exposure
= 3,800 $/person Sv
D,= projected long term dose to the affected population (person Sv)
CHW= total health effects cost 4ue to exposure of offsite decontamination workers ($)
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3.8 Assessing The Cost Effectiveness Of An Accident
Consequence Mitigation Action
With all cost components defined, the total cost of implementing a particular
accident consequence mitigation measure can be evaluated. Before the cost effec-
tiveness can be determined, the resulting dose reduction must be known, and is
given by:
DT = ADD + ADR + ADAD + ADDW + Dap (3.38)
where
DaT= total dose savings during a given accident scenario when an ac-
cident consequence miitigation proposal has been implemented
(person Sv)
ADD= change in the dose incurred during onsite plant decontamination
procedures (person Sv)
ADR= change in the dose incurred during plant repair procedures
(person Sv)
ADAD= change in the dose incurred during accelerated decommissioning
operations (person Sv)
ADDW= change in the total dose incurred by decontamination workers at
offsite locations (person Sv)
Dap= public dose savings (difference in Dp,0 with and without the use
of an accident consequence reduction action) (person Sv)
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It should be noted that some of the contributions to the total dose may not be
relevant to certain accident scenarios (e.g. Dp and ADDw result from offsite con-
siderations). Also, Do referred to in section 3.3, would consist of all contributions
to worker exposure (i.e. ADD, ADR, DAD and ADDW).
Knowing this, a value for 8,a can be computed (see equation 3.4). This can
then be compared to a'. If several alternatives are being compared, the alternative
having the minimum value of Oa should be selected, as long as it is less than a'.
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Chapter 4
Assessment Of The Cost Effectiveness Of The Low
Activation STARFIRE Design
The use of low activation materials, including graphite, silicon carbide and
aluminum alloys, for the structural components of fusion reactors has been proposed
to reduce the problems and hazards associated with activation. Some effort has been
given to- a design study for a low activation tokamak fusion reactor based on the
STARFIRE design [4.1]. In this section, the costs associated with changing to the
low activation STARFIRE design from the reference design are estimated. The
methodology developed in Chapter 2 is then applied to assess the cost effectiveness
of the design change.
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4.1 Description Of The Reference STARFIRE Design
The STARFIRE study was a comprehensive conceptual design of a 1200 MWe
fusion power plant in which the tokamak reactor and all subsystems were described.
The objective was to produce a safe, economically attractive design, having minimal
environmental impact. The design was developed assuming STARFIRE was the
tenth commercial plant constructed from a standardized design.
It was the intent of the STARFIRE project to give particular attention to
enhancing reactor maintainability and improving plant availability. Remote main-
tenance of all equipment within the reactor building was accounted for. However,
personnel entry into the reactor building is also possible. A plant availability of
75 % was the design goal. This was estimated as a realistic objective on the basis
of a maintainable design and a first wall life of at least six years. Some features
aimed at improving reactor maintainability and increasing plant availability in-
clude steady-state operation with current drive, optimized modular design and a
limiter/vacuum system for impurity control and exhaust.
A major effort was devoted to safety and environmental considerations for
STARFIRE. A solid tritium breeder, LiAIO 2 , was selected. A particular safety
advantage of this choice is its chemical stability. The tritium bred in this solid
breeding material will be extracted and the new fuel will be introduced to the
plasma chamber by gas puffing through two gas ports. Safety and environmental
considerations are evident in the limiter/vacuum system which was designed to
maximize tritium burnup and to minimize the vulnerable tritium inventory in the
fueling and pumping systems. Provision of adequate shielding in addition to the
remote maintenance capabilities will minimize radiation exposure of personnel. An
additional safety feature is the beryllium coating on the first wall and limiter which
will provide an inherent plasma shutdown mechanism in the event that the metal
surface exceeds 900 'C.
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Pressurized water was selected as the coolant. Important aspects associated
with this choice include acceptable neutronics performance, accommodation of first
wall heat fluxes and minimal recirculating power. The steam cycle and conventional
materials used in the STARFIRE heat transport and energy conversion system make
it a state of-the-art technology.
The stuctural material selected for STARFIRE was PCA (Prime Candidate
Alloy), a titanium modified austenitic stainless steel. Principal advantages of this
material include low swelling and high irradiated ductility. A major disadvantage
of employing PCA is the high induced activity which results subsequent to reactor
operation.
The STARFIRE blanket is divided into large sectors to allow for replacement
with a minimum number of maintenance actions. Twenty-four toroidal sectors of
two different sizes will be used, permitting installation between adjacent toroidal
field coils. Simplification of the overall blanket installation was accomplished by
mounting the limiter, rf duct and ECRH duct on the sector for removal as a unit.
The limiter consists of 96 elements forming a nearly continuous toroidal ring at
the outer midplane of the blanket. Four limiter elements will be mounted on each
blanket sector in front of a slot through the blanket which provides a pathway for
the particles leaving the chamber. Twelve rf ducts and twenty-four ECRH ducts
will be mounted on each blanket sector, between toroidal field coils.
The magnet systems are required to confine the plasma as well as provide a
stable equilibrium configuration and some current initiation. All magnets, except
for a few control coils carrying small currents, will be superconducting. The toroidal
field (TF) and poloidal field (PF) coils will consist of a copper stabilizer and NbTi
superconductor, except for the inner turns of the TF coils which will require Nb 3 Sn
as the superconductor to provide fields in excess of 9 T. In order to maintain the
coils in the superconducting range, they will be bath-cooled by pool boiling liquid
helium at 4.2 K. Each conductor will be contained within a stainless steel structure.
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The preceeding discussion has highlighted some features of the reference STAR-
FIRE design. Further details can be found in the STARFIRE design report [4.2].
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4.2 Description Of The Low Activation STARFIRE Design
The advantages of using low activation materials to overcome the problems
associated with activated structures have been identified. For the low activation
STARFIRE design, radioactive inventories have been projected to be reduced by a
factor of one million within a short time after shutdown. This will relieve safety
concerns arising from the need to contain large quantities of radioactive material.
Post shutdown radiation fields will be correspondingly reduced, allowing direct per-
sonnel access to most regions of the plant. Problems associated with decay heat,
leading to meltdown situations, will essentially be eliminated. In addition, it will
be possible to store radioactive waste materials in surface facilities, avoiding many
potential waste disposal problems.
An investigation has been undertaken in which the nuclear design aspects of
using materials such as silicon carbide and aluminum alloys for fusion reactor first
wall, blanket and shield applications was explored [4.31. A design study was carried
out for a low activation tokamak fusion reactor based on STARFIRE [4.11. A fusion
reactor design was developed in which low activation materials were substituted for
the major components of the first wall, blanket, limiter, shield and toroidal field
coils. The major features of the reference STARFIRE design were not changed
and the basic plasma parameters and functional requirements of STARFIRE were
retained in the low activation design. However, detailed component designs were
altered to best utilize the properties of the low activation materials.
The first wall will consist of a simple helium cooled' SiC tube-bank which will
be independently mounted from the blanket module. For an inlet temperature of
400 *C, an exit coolant temperature of 500 *C will be achievable without exceeding
design constraints.
Each blanket module will consist of Li 2O breeding material and re-entrant
coolant thimbles contained in an outer ceramic SiC box. A flow of gas at low
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pressure over the Li 2 0 will allow the bred tritium to be collected. The ceramic SiC
box will be mechanically attached to a SiC fiber reinforced aluminum composite
plenum which will be joined to an aluminum framework forming the vacuum vessel.
Beryllium will be used in the inboard region of the module to maintain the breeding
ratio greater than 1.1.
The limiter is a toroidal belt centered around the midplane on the outer side
of the plasma chamber. It will basically consist of tube assemblies and a header,
and will employ water as the coolant. The material used for the limiter will be a
SiC fiber reinforced aluminum composite. This has been found to be suitable for
applications in the temperature range of interest.
The shield serves to protect the reactor components, especially the supercon-
ducting toroidal field coils, from radiation damage and to reduce radiation exposure
to plant personnel. A low activation material is desirable for this component since
it can become activated as well, and contribute to shutdown dose rates. The out-
board shield in the low activation design will be composed of SiC and B4 C. Due
to space limitations in the inboard region, a tungsten shield will be employed here.
This will both optimize performance and minimize the cost. The high levels of ra-
dioactivity and accompanying decay dose rate associated with the use of tungsten
are accommodated by the concept of a removable and storable shield component.
The tungsten shield will be inserted during normal operation to function as an ef-
ficient neutron and gamma ray attenuator. At shutdown, the tungsten shield will
be removed and stored in a shielded area until it is required for reuse.
To allow for maximum personnel access to the region exterior to the blanket
and shield, the superconducting toroidal field coils must be composed of low ac-
tivation materials. In the low activation design, high purity aluminum has been
substituted for the copper stabilizer and a SiC fiber reinforced aluminum compos-
ite will be used to replace the SS316 structure. A graphite fiber/polyimide comp-
osite will be used for the helium vessel and glass/epoxy will be used for the coil
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case. A suitable low activation insulator with good radiation damage resistance is
a polyimide/A12 0 3 composite. No low activation alternate exists for the NbTi and
Nb3 Sn superconductors, but their activation can be tolerated as they comprise only
4 % of the toroidal field coil volume.
The low activation tokamak design realizes the advantages of low residual ra-
dioactivity and appears technically feasible in that the fundamental nuclear design
requirements of adequate tritium production and acceptable shielding of the su-
perconducting magnets are satisfied. For greater detail on the status of the low
activation fusion reactor design concept, references 4.1, and 4.3 through 4.11 should
be consulted.
145
4.3 Assessment Of The Cost Effectiveness Of The Low
Activation STARFIRE Design
In this section, the methodology presented in Chapter 2 will be illustrated. The
cost effectiveness of the low activation STARFIRE design will be assessed. Since the
change to low activation materials will most directly affect doses incurred by plant
workers, the ceiling on safety expenditures will be defined based on occupational
exposures (public exposures, which are expected to be small to begin with, will not
be considered). Knowing the ceiling on safety spending, it will be determined if the
change to the low activation design is justified.
4.3.1 Ceiling On Safety Expenditures For Design Changes
To STARFIRE
The procedure for assessing the cost effectiveness of design changes has been
outlined in Chapter 2. Using this approach, a maximum value for spending on
design changes for STARFIRE (a), aimed at improved safety, can be found.
The ceiling on safety expenditures is defined by equation 2.1. The most difficult
parameter to specify in this case is R, the actual dose rate to which plant workers
are exposed. Since the switch to low activation materials will affect many areas
of the plant where there are varying levels of radiation, the occupational dose rate
cannot be accurately represented by the value at one location. In addition, there
is no actual operating experience for fusion reactors. Hence, no data base to draw
from exists.
In order to overcome these difficulties, information from fission reactor oper-
ating experience was used to estimate exposures at different areas of the fusion
plant. Knowing the estimated number of person-hours spent annually at a certain
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dose rate, an overall representative occupational exposure rate for STARFIRE was
obtained using the fractional time spent in each area.
Easterly [4.12] has tried to estimate the occupational exposures at a fusion
power station. The estimates and judgements were based for the most part on
STARFIRE. Since this is a conceptual design, which is not fully engineered, very
few specific numbers were estimated with certainty. Nevertheless, a rough idea of
expected exposures was provided.
A major contributor to the total dose incurred at a fusion power plant will re-
sult from tasks performed on the coolant/steam generator system. The STARFIRE
design team selected pressurized water as the coolant [4.2]. The coolant/generating
system will therefore be similar to that of Pressurized Water Fission Reactors
(PWRs). Hence, current technology can describe the system design. Operation
and maintenance of the system in a similar manner to PWRs would be an appro-
priate assumption. Expected exposures from fusion coolant systems during reactor
operation and maintenance were discussed in section 2.3. It was pointed out that
the activity within the coolant system to which personnel are exposed, will be quite
similar for STARFIRE and various LWR fission reactors (see table 2.3). Further-
more, the calculated activity deposited in the steam generator tubes of STARFIRE
was comparable to measured values in several fission reactors (see table 2.4). For
similar work procedures involving the coolant/generator system, radiation doses at
a fusion plant are expected to be essentially the same as at fission plants. Hence, the
estimated exposure for steam generator related procedures for a 1200 MWe water
cooled fusion reactor, after several years of operation employing current practices,
is approximately 6.0 person Sv per year [4.13].
Easterly [4.12] has given an estimate for the radiation field in the primary
system piping of a PWR. His value for the exposure rate is 1.5 x 103 Sv/h. Since
this radiation dose is dominated by Co 5 8 and Co 6 0 , and the expected levels of these
nuclides for STARFIRE are similar to fission reactors (see tables 2.3 and 2.4), this
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value should be representative of the expected exposure rate at the fusion plant.
Knowing an estimate of the dose rate and the total cumulative dose incurred, an
estimate of the total person-hours spent on activities in this radiation field can be
obtained. This was valued at 4,000 person-hours.
Some degree of personnel exposure will result from contact maintenance carried
out in the vicinity of the plasma chamber. Extensive diagnostic and other support
equipment will be located adjacent to the reactor, and it is unlikely that all main-
tenance on this equipment can be carried out remotely. The STARFIRE reactor
shielding was designed to reduce the radiation dose to the level of a few millirem
per hour or less, one day after shutdown. At these levels, plant personnel could
work up to 40 hours per week within the reactor containment during an outage
period. Tasks performed would not include any work within the outboard shield
or on components associated with penetrations (e.g. fueling devices) since these
would be more highly activated than the components protected by the outboard
shield due to the higher neutron fluxes to which they are exposed. Nevertheless,
access to the toroidal field coils, cryogenic systems and other components external
to the outboard shield appears feasible.
In order to obtain an estimate of the total dose incurred during maintenance
tasks carried out in the vicinity of the plasma chamber, use was made of a total
reactor maintenance assessment provided in the STARFIRE report [4.21. A listing
of expected maintenance tasks and estimates of the time required to carry out these
tasks were provided. Using these numbers, an estimate of 1,000 person-hours for the
total time spent on contact maintenance of reactor equipment beyond the outboard
shield was obtained. An estimate of the dose rate encountered in these areas during
maintenance outages was found to be approximately 3.0 x 10-8 Sv/h [4.11]. This
estimate is less than a value obtained from another source [4,14] for the dose from
background radiation. It was therefore thought appropriate to use the higher value
of 1.5 x 10-7 Sv/h for the dose rate encountered during these activities.
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A major operation carried out during fusion plant outages will be that of first
wall and blanket replacement. Some contribution to the total cumulative dose
incurred at the plant is expected as a result of these procedures. Operations associ-
ated with this activity include disconnecting coolant lines and support equipment,
disconnecting first and second walls, preparation and installation of new blanket
assemblies and reconnecting coolant and support equipment. Dismantling the reac-
tor and replacing first wall and blanket structures resembles some of the activities
involved in decommissioning a fission reactor (e.g. breaking coolant lines and seg-
menting large radioactive vessels). Easterly [4.12] states that during the dismantling
of fission reactors, shielding is normally provided to reduce the exposure rate to 5
to 10 x 10-5 Sv/h. It is anticipated that similar amounts of shielding will be used
during the operations carried out for blanket replacements. However, since the spe-
cific activity of the materials being handled is ten times that encountered during
PWR dismantling (see table 2.5), it is likely that the shielding for fusion reactor
activities will not reduce the dose rate to the same degree. Hence, ten times the
average exposure rate encountered during fission reactor dismantling, or approxi-
mately 7.5 x 10-1 Sv/h was thought to be an appropriate estimate of the dose rate
encountered during blanket changeouts (a direct ratio of specific activities was ap-
plied, since for both STARFIRE and PWRs, the penetrating radiations arise from
the activation of steels 14.13]). This dose rate would allow a previously unexposed
person to work for 16 hours without exceeding the ICRP quarterly exposure limit
of 1.25 x 10-2 Sv. This should not pose a limitation on the activities of regular
plant employees since it is expected that contract workers will be hired to carry out
the first wall and blanket replacements. The expected duration of these procedures
is 240 person-hours [4.2].
Tritium handling systems will be an integral part of all D-T reactors, since
tritium is required for fuel. Exposure of plant personnel to tritium will add to the
total dose incurred at the plant. The STARFIRE reactor was designed to maintain
a breathing atmosphere in habitable locations at a level below 5 x 10-6 Ci/m 3 .
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At this limit, the dose rate would be 1.3 x 10' Sv/h. Since tritium is quite
mobile, it will be found in most locations throughout the plant. Hence, workers
carrying out maintenance of any sort will encounter tritium. Using the reactor
maintenance assessment provided in the STARFIRE report [4.2], an estimate of
1,049 person-hours of annual contact maintenance, where exposure to tritium was
thought possible, was obtained.
Waste handling is another area where the potential for exposure to radia-
tion exists. Complete onsite recycle of reactor components such as blanket mod-
ules, first walls, etc., will likely not be carried out. However, preparatory mea-
sures prior to shipment offsite may be required. Most of the waste management
activities will consist of daily replacement of spent resin beds, air filters, tritium
traps etc., and will involve most of the activities carried out at fission plants.
The operations at fission plants result in relatively small occupational exposures
and have been reported to give rise to 5 to 7 % of the total occupational dose.
Easterly 14.12] expects fusion power plant waste operations to result in a simi-
lar occupational exposure and from his estimated range, an intermediate value of
0.65 person Sv was chosen for the total cumulative dose. Assuming 10 % of the
plant workers (65 persons, see next paragraph) to be continually involved in waste
handling, an average dose rate of 5.0 x 106 Sv/h was obtained for these activities.
The STARFIRE study [4.2] included an estimate of personnel requirements
and personnel distribution. The total given for operation and maintenance per-
sonnel was 101 persons. Easterly [4.12] perceives this estimate to be somewhat
low. He states that, on average, fission power plants employ approximately 250
workers. Since fusion reactors will be much more complicated than fission reac-
tors, requiring operation and maintenance of numerous auxiliary systems (such
as heating, fueling, confinement, cryogenic and fuel purification), it is likely that
fusion plants will employ many more workers than fission plants. He estimates
a total fusion plant staff of at least 1,000 persons. Approximately two-thirds of
these, or 650 people, would actually be performing plant maintenance tasks (as
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in the STARFIRE estimate [4.2]). Assuming each person works 40 hours per
week, 50 weeks per year, the total amount of time spent by operation and main-
tenance personnel at the power station will be 1.3 x 106 person-hours. An addi-
tional 240 person-hours [4.2] each year would be spent by outside workers on the
plant site during blanket changeouts. This gives a total of 1,300,240 person-hours
spent in measurable radiation fields. Of this, 136,048 person-hours has been ac-
counted for in operation, maintenance and waste handling tasks carried out by the
plant workers. This leaves a difference of 1,163,952 person-hours, which can be as-
sumed to be spent in comparatively low radiation fields. For the present purposes,
1.5 x 10-7 Sv/h, the level of background radiation [4.14], will be used as an estimate
of this dose rate.
Knowing estimates of the dose rates encountered in different areas of the plant,
and the approximate number of person-hours spent in these areas, an overall esti-
mate of the dose rate (R) was found. A summary of the expected exposure rates
encountered at a fusion plant is given in table 4.1. A weighting procedure, using
the fraction of total person-hours spent at a given exposure, resulted in a value of
5.4 x 10-6 Sv/h for the overall average exposure rate at the STARFIRE plant.
Before the ceiling on safety spending can be specified, the cost of replacement
labor must be provided. A value of 57,000 $/yr was obtained for the average annual
salary per staff member from the STARFIRE report [4.2] (updated to current dollars
using price indexes [4.15]). Knowing that the ICRP occupational exposure limit is
5.0 x 102 Sv/yr or 2.5 x 10-5 Sv/h (for 40 hours per week, 50 weeks per year), a
value for a was calculated. Using equation 2.1, the maximum justified spending for
safety on STARFIRE was found to be $529,824 per person Sv averted.
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Table 4.1: Estimates of Exposure Rates and Times Spent in Radiation
Fields at the STARFIRE Plant
Exposure Rate
Estimate
(Sv/h)
Annual Time Spent
at Estimated
Exposure Rate
(person-hours)
Fractional Time
Spent at Estim-
ated Exposure
Rate
Coolant/Steam Generator
Maintenance
Contact Maintenance of
Reactor Equipment
First Wall and Blanket
Replacement
General Maintenance Tritium
Exposures
Waste Handling
Other
1.5 x 10-3
1.5 x 10-7
7.5 x 10- 4
1.3 x 10-6
5.0 x 10-6
1.5 x 10-7
4,000
1,000
240
1,049
130,000
1,163,952
Total 1,300,240+
The weighted average occupational exposure rate is:
R = 5.4 x 10-6 Sv/h
0.00308
0.00077
0.00018
0.00081
0.09998
0.89518
1.00000
152
Activity
+ based on 650 regular plant workers, 40 hours per week, 50 weeks per year, and assumes
outside workers are brought in for blanket changeouts.
4.3.2 Cost Of The Change To The Low Activation STARFIRE Design
As described in section 2.3, the total cost of implementing a dose reduction mea-
sure consists of four components: the incremental capital cost of the dose reduction
measure, and the change in each of operation, maintenance and waste handling
costs. Due to the lack of detailed information on the low activation STARFIRE
design at this time, it was not possible to assess all of the economic implications.
However, an attempt was made to obtain a best estimate for each of the cost com-
ponents.
4.3.2.1 Incremental Capital Cost Of The Low
Activation STARFIRE Design
Capital cost refers to the total expense of constructing the facility and placing
the facility into operation. In analyzing the cost effectiveness of a dose reduction
measure, only incremental capital costs over those which would be incurred in the
reference design, need be considered.
The major capital cost accounts that should be used in estimating costs are
given in table 4.2. These were taken from the DOE Fusion Reactor Design Studies
- Standard Accounts for Cost Estimates [4.16]. Costs affected by the design change,
costs which are expected to be affected but are not accounted for due to lack of
design detail, and costs which are expected to be unaffected by the design change
are indicated.
Capital costs are comprised of direct, indirect and time related costs. Direct
costs are directly associated with some phase of construction or startup and are pri-
marily composed of material, equipment and labor costs. The basic purchase price,
as well as expenses associated with testing and shipment to the site are included.
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Formally, the research and developmental costs should also be included. However,
this information is not available at this time, and this cost has been omitted. As will
be seen later, the methodology being applied can provide an estimate of the justified
research and development expenditures. The contribution from labor to the total
capital cost should include total payroll costs for construction, installation, preop-
erational testing and plant site inspections. A contingency allowance is included as
part of the direct capital cost to account for unforeseen or unpredictable expenses
incurred during construction and startup. A spare parts allowance is also needed to
account for the purchase cost and inventorying cost of the initial inventory of spare
parts required on site.
Indirect costs result from the support activities required to accomplish direct
cost activities. These include construction facilities, equipment and services, engi-
neering and construction management services, taxes, insurance, staff training and
plant startup. Additionally, miscellaneous expenses incurred by the facility owner
during construction and startup, such as licensing fees, legal fees, public relations
programs etc., contribute to the indirect costs.
Time related costs are a consequence of the opportunity cost associated with
money and the changes which occur in the purchasing power of the dollar over the
period of time required for plant design, construction and startup. Time related
costs are comprised of interest during construction and escalation (inflation) during
construction.
The effort to date on the low activation STARFIRE design does not provide
sufficient information for all affected costs to be estimated. It is expected that
the cost of plant structures and site facilities will be affected. Since the inventory
of activation products for the low activation design will consist of nuclides having
much shorter half lives and different decay characteristics, the basic building struc-
tures will likely have more relaxed design requirements. Since the first wall will be
cooled by helium in the low activation design, in place of pressurized water as in
154
the reference design, some changes in the turbine plant equipment and associated
systems are anticipated. Sufficient information is not currently available to assess
the change in capital costs associated with these items. Of the direct costs, only an
estimate of the reactor plant equipment cost could be obtained, and is indicated in
table 4.2. There is some skepticism as to the accuracy of the price of silicon carbide
used in obtaining this cost. According to the low activation STARFIRE design
study [4.5, 4.11], an installed cost of 30 $/kg for silicon carbide components will
lead to a significant reduction in the cost of reactor plant equipment. However, the
feeling that 30 $/kg is too low for the installed cost of silicon carbide components
has been expressed [4.17, 4.18]. (Note that this feeling is not shared by those at G
A Technologies.) Upon further investigation of this issue, an estimate of 315 $/kg
as the current day installed cost of a high purity, complex shaped silicon carbide
component was found [4.19]. Although the components required for first wall con-
struction may not be complex shapes or require grinding to close tolerance [4.20],
the use of 315 $/kg would serve as an upper limit for this study. It should be noted
that a cost reduction by a factor of two or three may be possible if a large demand
(as would be the case in a mature fusion economy) allowed manufacturing process
scale-ups and efficiencies [4.20]. An intermediate value for the cost of silicon carbide
components of 110 $/kg was also used in this study. This price corresponds roughly
to the expected reduced installed price of high purity complex shaped components
in a mature fusion economy. The cost effectiveness of the low activation design was
assessed using each of the low, intermediate and high values for the cost of silicon
carbide. In this way, the uncertainty in cost was accounted for and the sensitivity
of the analysis to the cost of silicon carbide was illustrated.
The capital costs associated with each estimate of the installed cost of silicon
carbide are indicated in table 4.2. The spare parts allowance for those components
affected by the change to the low activation design was taken as 2 % of the direct
cost of the installed equipment [4.16]. A further allowance has been included as part
of the total unaffected direct costs for those components which are not affected by
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Notes:
t RD - Reference STARFIRE Design
LAD - Low Activation STARFIRE Design
* expected to be unaffected by the change to the low activation design; cost is
included in the total unaffected costs
* expected to be affected to some degree by the change to the low activation
design, but the effect cannot be accounted for at this time due to the lack of
detailed information; cost is included in the total unaffected costs
+ expected to be affected by the change to the low activation design; and attempt
is made to account for the change in cost
V cost is included in the total unaffected costs
a cost data from reference 4.11, updated to current dollars by price indexing [4.15]
(represents fabrication and installation costs of relevant reactor components
[4.21])
b allowance due to affected direct costs; a further contribution to the allowance
is included as part of the total unaffected costs
C cost data from reference 4.2, updated to current dollars by price indexing [4.15]
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the design change. The recommended contingency allowance of 15 % of the cost of
the installed equipment was used [4.16]. Again, an additional contingency allowance
for unaffected plant equipment was included as part of the total unaffected direct
costs. Indirect costs were estimated using the indirect cost percentages employed
in the reference STARFIRE design economic analysis [4.2]. Time related costs
were obtained using relationships provided in the DOE costing guidelines [4.16],
using a six year construction period [4.2]. Possible reductions in costs due to easier
liscensing, fewer regulatory delays and faster construction can be envisioned for the
low activation design. However, lack of information prevented these factors from
being incorporated into the present cost estimate. Values, in current dollars, for the
reference and low activation STARFIRE designs are given in table 4.2. The total
capital cost for each design is also given. Calculations have indicated that changing
to the low activation design will lead to a reduction of 292 M$ in the total capital
cost, or an annual reduction over the plant lifetime of 19.3 M$/yr, if the cost of
silicon carbide is taken as 30 $/kg. This figure alone provides inpetus for further
development of the low activation concept. However, if the installed cost of silicon
carbide is 110 $/kg, an increase in the total capital cost of 116 M$, or 7.6 M$/yr
over the 30 year plant lifetime, will result. For the case where the installed cost of
silicon carbide components is 315 $/kg, the increase in the plant capital cost will be
1,162 M$ or 76.7 M$/yr. It was necessary to investigate these last two cases further
before it could be determined if the increased expenditure is justified.
4.3.2.2 Change In Normal Operation Costs For The Low
Activation STARFIRE Design
Normal operation costs consist of routine day to day expenditures incurred
while the reactor is operating. This includes the cost of materials, labor and over-
head (e.g. support services, administrative costs, etc.). An additional cost element
which must be considered is the health detriment due to radiation exposure. Ap-
159
plying the CERRM methodology of Chapter 2 requires that only incremental costs
be considered. In this section, the incremental costs associated with normal plant
operation resulting from switching to the low activation STARFIRE design will be
estimated.
In section 2.3.1.2, a formula was given for estimating the change in normal
operation costs. Four cost elements were identified: the change in materials, labor,
overhead and health detrimen; costs. Unfortunately, the lack of detailed information
for the present application of this methodology has prohibited estimating all of these
cost elements individually. A less detailed approach, more consistent with the level
of the design effort, was used to estimate several of the components at one time.
The DOE costing guidelines [4.16] suggest that annual operating and mainte-
nance costs be estimated as 2 % of the total direct and indirect capital cost. This
would include materials, labor and overhead costs for both normal operation and
maintenance. Since the STARFIRE reference design has an availability of 75 %, it
was assumed that three-quarters of this estimate, or 1.5 % of the total direct and
indirect capital cost, would represent the materials, labor and overhead costs during
normal plant operation (note that since it is the total cost which is of concern, the
accuracy of the actual division between operation and maintenance costs is not im-
portant). Similarly, since the low activation STARFIRE design was found to have
an availability of 76 % (see section 4.3.2.3), 1.52 %o of the total direct and indirect
capital cost would represent the materials, labor and overhead costs for this design.
The costs associated with the reference design and each of the three cases for the
low activation design are given in table 4.5.
It was necessary to obtain estimates for health detriment costs for each design.
This required obtaining a value for doses incurred to plant workers during normal
plant operation.
While the fusion reaction is occurring, the large flux of high energy neutrons
and the associated capture gamma rays will preclude access to the plasma chamber
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and surrounding regions. Hence, human exposures to neutrons will probably be
rare and have not been considered.
Exposures to tritium will occur during reactor operation since it is transported
through many areas of the plant. Due to its permeation characteristics, tritium
may also be found in plant components not directly associated with the fuel cy-
cle. Potential for exposure exists due to the possibility of leakage of contaminated
coolant as well as from work on tritium processing or tritium bearing components
requiring attention during plant operation. Assuming similar contamination levels,
the quantity of tritium escaping will be approximately the same for both the refer-
ence and low activation STARFIRE designs. If the plant atmosphere in both cases
is maintained at the same tritium level by clean up systems, then it is expected that
the total dose incurred by both tritium and nontritium workers during normal plant
operation and maintenance will be the same. Since the reference STARFIRE design
has an availability of 75 %, it was assumed that three-quarters of the total tritium
dose will be incurred during plant operation. The low activation STARFIRE design
has increased availability, and the dose incurred from tritium during plant operation
will be correspondingly higher. The estimates for these exposures are given in table
4.6.
The radioactivity associated with reactor materials during operation has been
shown to be the same order of magnitude for the reference and low activation
STARFIRE designs [4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.11] (although the radioactivity is much
lower subsequent to reactor shutdown in the low activation design). It was assumed
that similar amounts of shielding will be provided in both cases (i.e. no change in
materials costs), and that this shielding will effectively eliminate exposure to decay
gammas emitted directly by the activated structure during normal operation.
Some of the activated structural material will be carried by the coolant through-
out the heat transport system. For the water-cooled reference design, in addition
to this, corroded materials from those areas of the heat transport system external
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to the blanket will eventually be carried through the reactor and be exposed to
the neutron flux. Consequently, these materials may become activated and may be
deposited, along with the corroded activated structural material, in some different
area of the plant. Most of the mobile activation products for the helium-cooled low
activation design will result from sputtering and other physical processes within
the blanket. The transport of out-of-blanket materials to the reactor region and
their subsequent activation is not expected to occur to a large extent. Exposure
to the radiation fields created by these deposited materials will be possible if work
must be performed on any part of the coolant/steam generator system. Estimates
for exposures while carrying out procedures on the coolant/steam generator system
during normal plant operation and maintenance outages 'or both reactor designs
are given in table 4.6. It is expected that the fraction of this dose incurred while
the reactor is operating will be small. Because of this, and since it is the total dose
incurred which is of interest, an attempt was not made to subdivide the dose due
to activated corrosion products into the normal operation and maintenance com-
ponents. The dose given in table 4.6 for the coolant/steam generator system then
represents the total dose incurred during operation and maintenance.
The total costs for normal operation for each reactor design are given in table
4.5. As can be seen, health detriment costs are small in comparison with materials,
labor and overhead costs. The change in costs associated with the use of the low
activation materials in place of the reference materials, for all three estimates of the
installed cost of-silicon carbide, are also given.
4.3.2.3 Change In Maintenance Costs For The Low
Activation STARFIRE Design
Maintenance tasks are those carried out during downtime. Included in the total
maintenance costs are materials, labor, overhead, health detriment and replacement
162
power costs incurred while the reactor is not operating. In this section, the change
in these costs resulting from using the low activation STARFIRE design will be
estimated.
Section 2.3.2.3 presented a formula for estimating the change in maintenance
costs. As with the normal operation costs, the lack of detailed information pre-
vented each cost component from being estimated individually. However, the same
approach as in the last section has been taken, and several components have been
estimated at one time.
As recommended in the DOE costing guidelines [4.16], the annual materials,
labor and overhead costs for normal operation and maintenance can be taken as-
2 % of the total direct and indirect capital cost. Since, for the reference design,
25 % of the year is taken for downtime, an estimate of these costs can be found
using 0.5 % of the total direct and indirect capital cost. Since implementing the
low activation design will result in slightly improved availibility (as shown further
in this discussion), only 24 % of the year is accounted for as downtime. This results
in an estimate for annual materials, labor and overhead costs for maintenance being
0.48 % of the total direct and indirect capital cost. Not included in the above esti-
mate is the cost of the annual reactor first wall module replacement. This is treated
separately since it represents such a major cost contribution. This cost includes
all major materials required to rebuild or replace one-sixth of the reactor first wall
components, as well as labor costs incurred in disassembling the reactor, moving the
irradiated components to storage cells, moving rebuilt components to the reactor
and reassembling the reactor. The materials component of this cost will include
the wall, wall modifier, neutron multiplier, breeder, reflector, structure, limiter and
a portion of the rf and ECRH ducts. An estimate of this cost was obtained using
life-of-unit requirements calculated in a previous study [4.5] (updated to current
dollars using price indexes [4.15]) and the assumption of a 30 year lifetime. The
annual replacement costs for each reactor design are summarized in table 4.3. Since
the prices used in estimating the annual replacement costs were installed costs, this
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would account for the associated labor. Additionally, some materials can be recycled
after a cool down period. These include Zr.5 Pb3 and LiAIO 2 for the reference design,
and possibly Li 2O for the low activation design. However, the annual savings from
recycle is expected to be offset by the extra handling, storage and refabrication
preparation costs, and no cost benefit is foreseen. The total annual materials, labor
and overhead costs, including the additional costs incurred for replacing the blanket
modules, are given in table 4.5 for both designs.
In order to determine health detriment costs associated with each design, val-
ues for doses incurred during maintenance were required. Maintenance activities
considered in obtaining the dose estimate were any activities where exposure to
tritium may occur, maintenance of the coolant/steam generator system, contact
maintenance of reactor equipment and first wall/blanket changeouts.
As with plant operation, tritium exposures during maintenance may occur in
many areas of the plant. Since maintenance procedures were taken to be those tasks
carried out during. downtime, 25 % of the total tritium exposures for the reference
design and 24 % of the total tritium exposures for the low activation design were
assumed to be incurred during maintenance. The dose estimates are summarized
in table 4.6. Note that the total dose from tritium exposures during operation and
maintenance is the same for both designs. No effect on the total tritium exposures
is foreseen in switching to the low activation materials.
For the water cooled reference design, a large fraction of the total dose incurred
during outages will result from maintenance of the coolant/steam generator system.
The use of helium coolant and low activation materials will significantly reduce doses
incurred during coolant/steam generator maintenance. The activity resulting in the
low activation materials will generally be due to short lived nuclides which almost
all decay away within one day-after shutdown [4.6]. Beyond this time, doses will be
dominated by the activity due to the impurity elements found in these materials.
The chief impurity is iron. Although aluminum will result in long term activity
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(due to A12 7(n,2n)A 26 , where Al 26 has a half life of 7.3 x 105 years), it is expected
to contribute much less to the total activity and resulting biological dose rate than
the iron impurity [4.6]. Hence, biological dose rate calculations have focused on the
iron impurity, at a level of 1 appm. Bickford [4.22] has estimated the radiation field
at the steam generator for a helium cooled reactor employing a steel structure to be
10-3 Sv/h (100 mrem/h). The low activation design will employ a silicon carbide
structure with an iron level of 104 %, while the steel structure on which Bickford
bases his dose rate estimate contains 64.4 % iron (SS316). Based on activity levels
for steels given by Easterly [4.12], the fraction of the total deposited activity in the
coolant system caused by iron was estimated for the reference design. Knowing this,
an estimate of 4.72 x 10-6 person Sv for the dose incurred during coolant/steam
generator maintenance of the low activation design was obtained. This is negligible
compared to 6.0 person Sv, the dose incurred during coolant/steam generator main-
tenance of the reference design (see section 4.3.1). Hence, the dose savings during
these activities for the switch to the low activation design will be 6.0 person Sv.
During downtime, some degree of contact maintenance of reactor equipment
will be necessary. An estimate of the dose incurred during these activities for the
reference design was obtained. Using the maintenance downtime estimates (both
scheduled and unscheduled) provided in the STARFIRE report [4.2], along with
a representative dose rate behind the shield [4.11], the total dose incurred during
contact maintenance of reactor equipment was determined (see table 4.6). (The dose
rate used was 3.0 x 10-' Sv/h, which is the value given at two weeks after shutdown
for the reference STARFIRE design [4.11]. Since the activity in the reference design
does not decrease to a large degree even within one year [4.11], the value for the
dose rate at the two week point was thought to adequately represent the dose rate
during the entire outage.) For the low activation design, a direct benefit of the
reduced structural activity is the fact that personnel access to a larger fraction of
the plant is possible. The most important region for gaining access to is just behind
the blanket. A complex array of coolant headers and piping, vacuum ducts and
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instrumentation, having high maintenance requirements, will exist here. The use of
low activation materials will reduce the dose rate from a level where no personnel
access is permitted (10 Sv/h) to a level where a worker could spend five hours per
week and not exceed the ICRP dose limit. Accessibility to this region will prove
valuable in that some jobs, formerly carried out entirely remotely, can be assisted by
contact maintenance, resulting in considerable savings in replacement power costs.
Using the STARFIRE downtime estimates, a revised maintenance schedule for
the reactor equipment of the low activation design was formulated. The degree of
remote maintenance would be determined by a trade-off between operating costs
for remote maintenance and human occupational exposure costs. With the limited
information available for the low activation design, this could not be accurately
determined. However, an attempt to revise STARFIRE's maintenance schedule
for the low activation design was made. Activities in which assistance by con-
tact maintenance was thought possible were identified. It was then assumed that
30 %t of each task could be carried out manually. Finally, it was assumed that a
time savings of 30 %I would result for that part of the task performed manually.
With these assumptions in mind, a total time savings of 3.25 days for these tasks
was estimated (see appendix D). Assuming that all tasks considered were on the
critical path, the total downtime would be reduced by 3.25 days. This resulted in
an availability of 76 % for the low activation design.
The tasks carried out manually for the reference design were also assumed to
be carried out manually for the low activation design. However, the dose incurred
during these activities would be reduced for the low activation design since the
dose rate to which workers are exposed at these locations is expected to decrease to
1.0 x 10-8 Sv/h (maximum estimate for the dose rate at two weeks after shutdown).
The increased contact maintenance for tasks performed just behind the blanket
t These percentages are rough estimates based on information contained in ref-
erences 4.23 and 4.24.
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would result in exposure to a dose rate of 2.1 x 10' Sv/h. (For the low activation
design, the dose rates were based on the iron impurity. Since the main nuclides
produced from this impurity are Fe"5 and Mn 4 [4.5], with half lives of 2.7 years and
313 days respectively, which would not decay to a great extent during the outage, it
was felt that the value at two weeks after shutdown would be a reasonable estimate
of the dose rate during the entire period. Note that although the formula (2.12) has
specified a time dependent dose rate for calculating the dose incurred, the limited
information has provided only a single constant value for this case. This increased
exposure will result in the total cumulative dose incurred during these maintenance
activities to be larger for the low activation design than for the reference design by
approximately 4.9 x 10-2 person Sv. It will be determined, as part of this analysis,
whether or not the savings in downtime resulting from this increased exposure is
justified. The actual values for dose estimates for each design are summarized in
table 4.6.
Replacement of the first wall and blanket will lead to the exposure of personnel.
The dose rate encountered during blanket changeouts was estimated at 7.5 x 104
Sv/h for the reference design (see section 4.3.1). Consequently, contract workers
will likely be employed at these times to avoid exceeding exposure limits for plant
workers (1.25 x 10-2 Sv per worker per calendar quarter). Since dose rates inside
the plasma chamber (to which workers will be exposed during blanket changeouts,
once the shield is opened) are a factor of 106 lower for the low activation design
than for the reference design, the total dose incurred during replacement of the first
wall and blanket for the low activation design will be correspondingly reduced. For
a total exposure time of 240 person-hours, the estimated cumulative dose during
these operations for the reference STARFIRE design was 0.18 person Sv. Thus, an
appropriate estimate of the total dose incurred during first wall/blanket changeouts
for the low activation design was taken as 1.8 x 10- person Sv.
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The total dose incurred during plant maintenance was found by summing the
estimated doses during all activities. Table 4.6 gives the values for each reactor
design and shows that a total dose savings of 6.13 person Sv will be possible in
switching to the low activation design. The health detriment costs for each design
are given in table 4.5. The use of the low activation design will result in an annual
health detriment cost savings of $23,294.
A further implication of the decreased activity of the low activation design
will be the reduced requirements on remote maintenance equipment. Substitution
of low activation materials will result in a considerable reduction in component
masses (the material volumes are approximately equal but due to the lower densi-
ties of aluminum and silicon carbide, the total mass will be reduced by more than
50 % [4.5]). Since much lower mass components will be handled, the load capacity
requirements of the maintenance equipment will be reduced. It is expected that this
will result in a reduced capital cost for maintenance equipment and a reduced cost
for replacement parts for the maintenance equipment. Also, the lower structural
activation levels will result in a less severe remote handling environment. This will
lead to a reduction in equipment degradation, which in turn will lead to a less fre-
quent need for replacement of affected components. As well, the reduced demands
on remote maintenance equipment will lead to fewer delays from breakdowns and
non-routine faults in the equipment, leading to improved chances of satisfying avail-
ability goals. Unfortunately, these effects cannot be quantified at this time and no
adjustment to the costs involved has been incorporated.
Finally, the change in replacement power costs associated with using low activa-
tion materials must be considered. As stated previously, the reduction in downtime
has been estimated at 3.25 days for the low activation design. Using the replace-
ment power cost estimation model described in appendix C, and assuming that the
plant will be located in the SPP National Electric Reliability Council region (mid
United States), the savings in replacement power costs will amount to 1.9 million
dollars annually.
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The total cost incurred during maintenance for each reactor design is given in
table 4.5. As can be seen, health detriment costs are negligible compared to the
other cost components.
4.3.2.4 Change In Waste Handling Costs For The Low
Activation STARFIRE Design
During the lifetime of a fusion power plant, it will be necessary to handle
and dispose of radioactive wastes. Costs associated with waste handling include
the cost of materials and equipment required to carry out waste operations, labor
costs, overhead costs, health detriment costs and the actual cost of disposing of the
contaminated materials. The change in these costs resulting from the use of low
activation materials will be estimated in this section.
In section 2.3.3.3, a formula was presented which can be used to estimate the
change in waste handling costs. Insufficient information has prevented each cost
element from being individually evaluated. As with the other cases, the materi-
als, labor and overhead cost elements have been estimated together. The health
detriment and disposal costs have been estimated individually.
The DOE costing guidelines [4.16] recommend that the annual materials, la-
bor and overhead costs for operation and maintenance be estimated as 2 % of the
total direct and indirect cost. To estimate the materials, labor and overhead costs
associated with waste handling, it was assumed that these costs would be propor-
tional to the number of workers in that area. It was previously estimated that
10 % of the plant workers would be employed in waste handling operations. Hence,
it is expected that 0.2 % of the total direct and indirect cost would account for
the materials, labor and overhead costs incurred during waste handling. The corre-
sponding values for the reference and low activation STARFIRE designs are listed
in table 4.5.
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The majority of waste handling at a fusion power station will deal with daily
operations such as: (1) wastes from various processing systems designed to mini-
mize radioactivity in plant effluent streams; (2) mops, swabs, clothing and other
miscellaneous items used in various plant operation and maintenance tasks; and
(3) wastes generated from tritium handling procedures. The relatively small vol-
ume of waste created during these activities will be low level waste, being either
contaminated with tritium and/or activated corrosion products from the coolant
systems. A much larger volume of waste will be due to the first wall/blanket struc-
ture, which will contain the bulk of the induced radioactivity. The quantities of
these wastes expected from plant operation are discussed below.
In order to minimize routine releases of radioactive materials from a fusion
plant, liquid and gaseous effluent streams from radioactive waste treatment sys-
tems will be passed through chemical and mechanical process equipment which
will retain most of the radioactivity. The major streams to be purified will be the
coolant streams. For the water cooled reference STARFIRE reactor, this will lead
to the generation of wet and dry low activity wastes. Such wastes will be generated
continuously from operations to purify the primary and secondary coolants, from
cleaning water used in the blanket sector storage pool and from cleaning airborne
discharges. These operations will generate ion exchange resins, liquid phase and
gas phase filters, reverse osmosis packages and filter sludges. It is expected that
the reference STARFIRE reactor will produce a similar volume of this type of low
activity waste to a PWR, since both the design of and the radioactivity contained
in the coolants and coolant clean up systems are similar. The annual production
of low activity waste from PWRs has been estimated at 640 m 3 /GWe-year [4.13].
From this figure, Cannon [4.13] has estimated a value of 900 m3 /GWe-year as
the volume of low activity wastes from the routine operations of a water cooled
fusion reactor. A more conservative value (approximately a 50 % increase) was se-
lected to ensure that the actual volume of waste generated was not underestimated.
For the 1200 MWe reference STARFIRE reactor, this corresponds to a volume of
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1,080 m3 of low level waste produced each year.
The low activation STARFIRE design will employ helium as the coolant. Con-
sequently, waste volumes derived from coolant clean up streams and miscellaneous
maintenance operations will differ from those for a water cooled reactor. In a water
cooled reactor, more than 90 % of the radioactivity in the liquid waste processing
streams arises directly from the primary coolant [4.13]. Different mechanisms of
radioactivity generation and transport occur for the helium cooled system, and a
smaller volume of solidified concentrates, filters, sludges, resins etc. will be associ-
ated with the process streams. The total volume of low activity wastes from the
helium cooled reactor has been estimated by Cannon [4.13] to be about one half
tlat for the water cooled reference reactor, or 450 m 3/GWe-year. Since the reactor
has been designed to produce 1200 MWe, the annual volume of low level waste
generated will be 540 in
Tritiated wastes will be generated in both liquid and solid form. Liquid wastes
will include tritiated water, cleaning solvents, and oil. Solid wastes will be derived
from blanket sectors, replaced auxiliary components, depleted catalysts, molecular
sieve beds and other miscellaneous wastes (e.g. paper, rags, tools, clothes, etc.).
Many reactor components which must be replaced will be contaminated with tri-
tium. Decontamination of this equipment will generate effluent which must be
processed prior to release to the environment. Additionally, any components con-
taining significant quantities of activation products (for the reference design only)
will be stored under water in a waste handling pool. Any residual tritium on the
equipment will contaminate the pool water. It is expected that the volume of waste
generated from tritium handling and processing will not be largely affected by the
coolant used. Hence, volumes of waste produced from tritium processing for the
reference and low activation designs will be similar. Cannon [4.13] has indicated
that 30 m 3/yr.of additional low activity solid waste would be an appropriate es-
timate. The reference design will also generate storage pool wastes, estimated at
100 m3 /yr [4.13]. The low activation design will have no need for a water stor-
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age pool since the level of afterheat associated with the blanket modules (being
primarily composed of ceramic material) will be very low [4.21].
The volume of low activity wastes generated at the reference STARFIRE plant
(not including the storage pool wastes) is expected to be 1,110 m 3 each year. Based
on the use of 0.2 m3 drums (55 gal), 5,550 drums of waste per year would require
disposal. For the low activation STARFIRE plant, approximately 570 m3 of waste
would be generated annually, and 2,850 drums would need to be disposed of. The
cost of the disposal drums would be included in the cost of materials for waste
handling (i.e. included in the 0.2 % of the total direct and indirect capital cost used
as the estimate for materials, labor and overhead costs during waste operations). To
estimate the shipping and disposal costs, it was assumed that shallow-land burial
was acceptable and that a licensed facility would be located 640 km [4.13, 4.25]
from the fusion power plant. Cannon [4.13] has stated that based on the curie
content of the waste, 14 drums of the low level waste can be transported in each
shipment. 'This implies 397 shipments- per year for the reference design and 204
shipments per year for the low'activation design. The wastes generated from the
low activation design may contain a smaller quantitiy of radioactivity, allowing for
a greater number of drums to be transported per shipment. This would reduce
the number of shipments per year. However, due to uncertainties in the actual
reduction in activity, this possibility was not accounted for in the cost estimate.
The reference plant is expected to produce an additional 100 m3 of storage pool
wastes, which could be placed in 500 drums. The curie content of this waste will
be very low, allowing for the transport of 50 drums per shipment. This would then
require ten additional waste shipments per year for the reference reactor design.
Shipping charges, using a truck with two drivers, were taken as $0.82/km,
plus a fuel surcharge of 15 % of the basic charge (from reference 4.25, updated to
current dollars using price indexes [4.15]). The cost per shipment was then $605.
This resulted in an annual shipping cost for low level wastes of $246,235 for the
reference STARFIRE design and $123,420 for the low activation design.
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The disposal cost for low level wastes in a shallow land burial site is 229 $/m 3
(from reference 4.26, updated to current dollars using price indexes [4.151). The
total volume of low level waste from the reference reactor will be 1,210 m, resulting
in a disposal cost of $277,090. The total annual shipping and disposal costs for the
reference design will amount to $523,325. For the 570 m3 of low level waste from
the low activation plant, the disposal cost will be $130,530. The total of shipping
and disposal charges was found to be $253,950. These costs are summarized in table
4.5.
Waste handling operations for activated structures are expected to be domi-
nated by the replacement of the first wall/blanket sectors. Handling, processing
and storing blanket segments will involve more complex operations than low activ-
ity wastes, essentially due to the much greater volume, weight, activity levels and
processing requirements which must be dealt with. Due to the large mass and high
levels of radioactivity associated with these components, it is anticipated that the
majority of these operations wIll be carried out remotely.
In a fusion reactor, more than 98 % of the generated activity will be retained
as activation products in the first wall and blanket structure of the reactor. The
use of low activation materials in the blanket structure can significantly alter the
induced radioactivity and hence, the final disposition of the reactor wastes. It has
been shown that at shutdown, the low activation design contains approximately
three times less radioactivity than the reference design [4.6]. The majority of the
induced radionuclides will be short-lived. Consequently, at one day after shutdown,
the radioactivitiy concentration of the low activation design blanket structure will
be six orders of magnitude less than the concentration at shutdown. Beyond this
time, the radioactivity in the low activation design will be dominated by the iron
impurity. The reduction in. radioactivity and the rapid decay associated with the
low activation materials significantly impact radioactive waste generation and waste
management procedures. Additionally, the masses of components in the low activa-
tion design will be much less than the masses of the corresponding components in
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the reference design. This will reduce the load capacity requirements of waste han-
dling equipment. The lower radioactivity and afterheat levels will ease the storage
and packaging procedures for the waste. The ensuing reduction in costs associated
with these benefits are difficult to quantify at this time. However, neglecting to
consider them will provide a conservative estimate of the reduction in cost of waste
handling for the change to the low activation design.
An assessment of the disposal classifications of the first wall/blanket radioactive
wastes of the reference and low activation designs has been performed [4.5]. Waste
from the low activation design will be eligible for shallow-land burial. The LiAIO 2
and graphite waste from the reference design will be suitable for near-surface burial.
The Zr 5 Pb3 requires deeper burial or can be disposed of in a shallow facility with
an accompanying engineered structural barrier. The PCA will be highly activated
and will require geologic storage. The masses and disposal classifications for wastes
generated annually from the reference and low activation reactors are given in table
4.4,
Annual disposal costs for blanket sector wastes for each design have been esti-
mated. Cannon [4.13] has stated that the 48 drums (0.89 m 3 each) of PCA waste
from the reference STARFIRE reactor can be shipped in a cask similar to the type
used for the transport of spent LWR fuel. Four drums can be transported in each
shipment, requiring 12 shipments annually. Because of the radiation level and signif-
icant heat generation rate, this waste will not be acceptable for shallow-land burial.
It was assumed for the purposes of this study, that this waste would be disposed of
in a geological repository located 1,600 km from the fusion plant. The previously
stated shipping cost information along with a value of 450,634 $/m 3 for disposal
(from reference 4.26, updated to current dollars using price indexes [4.15]) resulted
in an estimate of 19.3 M$ for the annual shipping and disposal costs of this waste.
The rest of the waste associated with the reference design can be disposed of in a
shallow-land disposal site. Cannon [4.13] has stated that the Zr 5Pb 3 would require
23 shipments annually, 4 drums (0.2 m3 size) being shipped in each instance. The
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Table 4.4: Radioactive Waste Classification for the Reference and
Low Activation STARFIRE Designs
Material Mass Number of Disposal
(MT/yr) Drums Class
Reference Design:
PCA 71 48 D
Zr 5 Pb3  55 90 C
LiAlO 2  100 375 A
Graphite 27 115 A
Low Activation Design:
Al 3 12 A
SiC and Li 2 O 141 123 A
Graphite 28 115 A
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Disposal Classes:
A: Shallow-land burial with minimum requirements on waste form and packaging
(cost ~ 229$/m 3 [4.26]).
B: Shallow-land burial, but waste form must be stabilized and packaged so that
it does not degrade for 150 years.
C: Shallow-land burial with waste form requirements of class B and special mea-
sures at the disposal facility, such as deeper burial or engineered structural
barriers (cost - 379$/m 3 [4.26]).
D: Wastes excluded from shallow-land burial; requires geologic storage (cost
- 450, 634$/m314.26]).
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graphite will be placed in 115 drums (0.2 m 3 size) and disposed of in 3 shipments.
The lithium aluminate will require 9 shipments annually to dispose of the 375 drums
(0.2 m 3 size). The annual cost to transport this waste to the shallow burial site
will be $21,175; the disposal costs will amount to $29,416. The total cost to dispose
of the first wall/blanket wastes from the reference STARFIRE design were found
to be 19.3 M$. The total waste disposal cost for the reference STARFIRE design,
including the disposal of all low level waste and the high level PCA waste, will be
approximately 19.8 M$ (see table 4.5).
The need to dispose of high activity waste will be eliminated with the low
activation design. The levels of activity in these wastes will be low. Hence, minimal
precautions will be needed during shipment. It is estimated that all the waste
associated the the low activation design can be shipped to the disposal site in no
more than 9 trips annually. Shipping costs were estimated at $5,445 and disposal
costs were estimated at $16,717. The total disposal cost for first wall/blanket waste
from the low activation design will be $22,162. Including the contribution of the low
level waste from stream clean up resulted in a total waste disposal cost of $276,112
(see table 4.5).
Evaluation of the health detriment costs for each design required values for
doses incurred during waste handling operations. As discussed earlier, it is expected
that relatively small doses will be incurred during waste management operations.
In section 4.3.1, an estimate of 0.65 person Sv was given for the total cumulative
dose incurred at the reference STARFIRE plant. This will mainly be due to the
daily waste handling tasks. The waste from first wall/blanket changeouts is ex-
pected to be handled remotely and processed offsite. Hence, a small contribution
to the dose incurred is anticipated. Neglecting this dose will provide a conservative
estimate of the dose savings since the dose incurred during these operations for
the low activation design will be less than that for the reference design. At the
low activation STARFIRE plant, the volume of daily waste handled is expected to
be approximately one-half that of the reference STARFIRE plant. The dose in-
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curred will be proportional to the volume of waste and the level of activity handled.
Cannon [4.131 has estimated the radionuclide concentration in these wastes for a
helium-cooled standard design to be diminished by two orders of magnitude. It is
expected that the use of low activation materials in conjunction with the helium
coolant will further reduce this dose. Since the activity levels of these wastes is not
well known, this reduction was not specifically accounted for. However, neglecting
this further reduction should not lead to erroneous conclusions since the estimate
of the dose incurred for the helium-cooled design is already significantly below the
reference design. Hence, an estimate of the dose incurred would be 3.25 x 10'
person Sv.
A savings in the dose incurred during the transport of plant wastes to the
disposal site will result from the use of the low activation design. Doses incurred
during shipment of wastes from the reference plant are expected to be compa-
rable to that for LWRs. Transport of high activity PCA waste is analagous to
the transport of irradiated fuel; transport of low activity wastes is analagous to
the transport of solid waste generated at LWRs. Values for the doses incurred
can be estimated using information given by Cannon [4.13]. The annual dose in-
curred during shipment of wastes from the reference plant was assessed at 5 x 102
person Sv. Since the number of shipments per year is roughly half, and only low
activity wastes will be transported from the low activation plant, the annual dose
incurred during the shipment of waste was estimated as 1 x 10-2 person Sv. (Note
that this only includes a reduction in the activation of the wastes resulting from
the use of helium as the coolant; the effect of the low activation materials on the
activity of the waste is not accounted for.)
The total dose incurred during waste handling operations is given in table 4.6.
Health detriment costs and the total cost associated with waste handling are given
in table 4.5. Again, health detriment costs appear to be negligible in comparison
to the other costs.
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4.3.2.5 Conclusions Regarding The Cost Effectiveness Of The Low
Activation Design
The previous sections have discussed the capital, operating, maintenance and
waste handling costs associated with the reference and low activation STARFIRE
designs. Table 4.5 summarizes the annual cost contributions for the reference
STARFIRE design and the low activation STARFIRE design over a range of prices
for silicon carbide components. A pictoral representation of the annual costs as-
sociated with each design is given in figure 4.1. It is evident that the capital cost
component is dominant for all cases, while the waste handling costs contribute the
least. From figure 4.1, it appears that the reference and low activation STARFIRE
designs result in nearly identical annual costs if the installed cost of silicon carbide
components is approximately 110 $/kg. Small increases in the annual capital, oper-
ating and maintenance costs for the low activation design are offset by the reduction
in waste handling costs, keeping the total cost nearly the same as for the reference
design.
The methodology of Chapter 2 requires that a value be obtained for # in
order for the cost effectiveness of a dose reduction measure to be assessed. This
represents the actual spending on the dose reduction. The change in total costs
associated with the modification to the low activation design are given in table 4.5.
An annual savings of 45.1 M$ is foreseen in switching to the low activation design if
the installed cost of silicon carbide components is 30 $/kg. Accompanying this cost
savings is an annual dose savings of 6.82 person Sv. Hence, the reduction in the
dose incurred is achieved with an actual savings in expenditures. With these facts,
the low activation design appears very attractive. However, if the installed cost of
silicon carbide components is 110 $/kg, an increase in costs of 0.1 M$ is foreseen.
If the installed cost of silicon carbide components is 315 $/kg, the increase in costs
accompanying the change to the low activation design is 115.3 M$. The resulting
reduction in dose for these two cases is still 6.82 person Sv.
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The ceiling on safety expenditures (a) was calculated as 529,824 $/person Sv
in section 4.3.2.1. Using equation (2.4), a value of -6.61 M$/person Sv was obtained
for the actual spending on the dose reduction measure (3) for the 30 $/kg case. If
the cost of silicon carbide is 110 $/kg, the actual spending on dose reduction is
0.015 M$/person Sv (14,663 $/person Sv), while if the cost is 315 $/kg, the spending
is 16.9 M$/person Sv.
For the lower bound estimate of 30 $/kg as the installed cost of silicon carbide,
a negative value for / was obtained. This does not render the analysis invalid, but
indicates that if this price is attainable, the low activation materials design option
should definitely be pursued.
The cost of silicon carbide used in this study did not include a research and
development component. The justified spending on research and development was
estimated using:
(CT +CRD) (4.1)
D7,
where
CRD= the justified annual spending on research and development of low
activation materials ($/yr)
and the other parameters have been previously defined. Using the appropriate
values for these parameters for a silicon carbide cost of 30 $/kg allowed the jus-
tified spending on research for the development of low activation materials to be
ascertained. The resulting value for CRD was 48.7 M$/yr. Thus, during the life
of the plant it would be justified to spend 48.7 M$ annually on the research and
development of low activation materials.
Since fusion power has not yet been demonstrated, it would be more useful to
know the justified research and development expenditures at the current point in
time. Assuming that the cost of 30 $/kg will be achievable once fusion power is
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realized on a commercial scale and that this will occur 30 years from now, the jus-
tified annual spending on the research and development of low activation materials
is 10.9 M$/yr. For an accelerated research program, it would be justified to spend
38.2 M$/yr during each of the next five years, or 21.5 M$/yr during each of the
next ten years for the development of low activation materials (see figure 4.3).
Since the value of 6 obtained when the cost of silicon carbide was assumed to
be 110 $/kg was less than a , the use of low activation materials is justified. The
margin between a and 3 was used to indicate the justified spending on research
and development for low activation materials. Applying equation 4.1, an estimate
of 3.51 M$/yr for CRD was obtained. If the cost of silicon carbide 30 years from now
is actually 110 $/kg, then the justified annual spending on research and development
of low activation materials up until this time is 0.78 M$/yr. Alternately, it would be
justified to spend 2.75 M$/yr over the next five years or 1.55 M$/yr over the next
ten years on the research and development of low actvation materials (see figure
4.3).
Examining the case of the upper bound cost estimate for the price of sili-
con carbide lead to the conclusion that if the cost of silicon carbide is as high as
315 $/kg 30 years from now, then it would be unjustified to employ the low actvation
design.
The sensitivity of the total annual costs of the low activation design to the
price of silicon carbide is illustrated in figure 4.2. This also indicates the variation
of P with the cost of silicon carbide since 0 is proportional to the total annual
cost. It appears that a linear relationship exists between the installed cost of silicon
carbide components and the resulting total annual cost. The cost of silicon carbide
for which 6 is equal to a represents the point where the low activation design is
just cost effective. Using the value of 529,824 $/person Sv for 0 (i.e. equating it to
a) and 6.82 person Sv for DT, gives a change in annual costs, or CT, of 3.6 M$/yr.
Adding this to the total annual cost for the reference design of 399.1 M$/yr (see
182
table 4.5) gives an annual cost of 402.7 M$/yr. The maximum annual cost for which
the low actvation design would be cost effective is then 402.7 M$/yr. Applying the
equation given in figure 4.2, a maximum installed cost for silicon carbide components
of 116 $/kg was obtained. This would not allow for any research and development
costs. Before a more definite conclusion on the cost effectiveness of low activation
materials can be drawn, a more accurate estimate for the cost of silicon carbide is
required. If, once more detailed studies are performed, a projected cost of silicon
carbide less than 116 $/kg is obtained, then the low activation design effort should
be augmented.
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Figure 4.1: Annual Cost Contributions for the Reference and
Low Activation STARFIRE Designs
Waste Handling
7.0 M$/yr
Waste Handling
24.9 M$/yr
Maintenance
81.8 M$/yr
Operation
38.3 MS/yr
Capital Cost
254.1 M$/yr
Waste Handling
5.0 M$/yr
Maintenance
78.3 MS/yr
Operation
35.9 MS/yr
Capital Cost
234.8 M$/yr
Waste Handling
5.6 M$/yr
Maintenance
91.9 MS/yr
Operation
40.0 M$/yr
Capital Cost
261.7 M$/yr
Maintenance
126.1 M$/yr
Operation
50.6 M$/yr
Capital Cost
330.7 M$/yr
I J. I J
Reference
Design
Total Cost
399.1 M$/yr
0 30 $/kg
Total Cost
354.0 M$/yr
Low Activation Design
@ 110 S/kg
Total Cost
399.2 M$/yr
a 315 $/kg
Total Cost
514.4 M$/yr
184
I I
Figure 4.2: Total Annual Cost for the Low Activation STARFIRE
Design versus Installed Cost of Silicon Carbide Components
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Figure 4.3: Possible Financial Plans for Low Activation Materials
Research and Development
Silicon Carbide @ 30 $/kg
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Table 4.6: Estimates of Annual Doses Incurred During Plant Operation,
Maintenance and Waste Handling
Reason for Incurring Dose Cumulative Dose Incurred (person Sv/yr)
RD LAD Dose Savings
Tritium exposures during plant
operation (- DTO)
Tritium exposures during plant
maintenance
1.02 x 10-3
3.41 x 10~4
1.03 x 10-3
3.27 x 10~4
-1.0 x 10-1
+1.4 x 10-5
Total tritium exposures 1.36 x 10~3
Coolant/steam generator system
maintenance (including any
doses during operation)
6.0
1.36 x 10-3
4.72 x 10-6
Contact maintenance of reactor 2.99 x 10-5 4.90 x 10-2 -4.90 x 10-2
equipment
First wall/blanket
replacement
Total dose during maintenance
(including a small contrib-
ution from coolant/steam
generator exposures during
operation) (- DTM)
0.18
6.18
1.8 x 10-7
4.93 x 10-2
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0
+6.0
+0.18
+6.13
Cumulative Dose Incurred (person Sv/yr)
RD LAD Dose Savings
Handling of daily plant wastes
(low level)
0.65 3.3 x 10-3
Shipment of wastes
Total during waste handling
(not including dose from
first wall/blanket
processing) (DTW)
5.() x 10-2
0.70
1.0 x 10-2
1.33 x 10-2
+4.0 x 10-2
+0.69
Total dose 6.88 6.37 x 10~2
(DT)
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+0.65
+6.82
Reason for Incurring Dose
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Chapter 5
Assessment Of The Cost Effectiveness Of Emergency
Detritiation Systems for INTOR
Tritium control is a major concern for D-T fueled fusion reactors. In the event
of an accidental release of a relatively large quantity of tritium, some provision must
be made for returning the hall atmosphere to acceptable tritium levels. The major
economic issues are the capital and operating costs associated with a given system
capability. In this section, several emergency detritiaion systems for INTOR are
examined. The purpose of this chapter is to determine which system is most cost
effective.
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5.1 Description Of The Detritiation Systems
An air detritiation system is composed of several parts: a blower, an air pre-
heater, a catalytic reactor after cooler and a water removal system. The emergency
systems are identical to those used during normal plant operation, and are required
to increase the total tritium removal capability during an accident situation.
The emergency systems considered were all assumed to be of the same design,
and varied only in their processing capacity. The approach of using several smaller
t.nits as opposed to a single larger system for emergency situations was adopted.
Each system would be composed of units having a capacity of 140 m 3 /min. Such
units have been designed but not yet built at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory [5.11.
Using the smaller units in this assessment would avoid uncertainties arising from
s:aling up from existing technology. Other potential problems, associated with
manufacturing, handling and installation of large sized equipment and the possi-
bility of inefficient flow behavior through larger diameter reactor and dryer beds,
would be avoided. Several smaller units provide system flexibility and redundant
capabilities in the event that one of the units fail.
The emergency detritiation systems were evaluated for a given accidental re-
lease of tritium. The source term was considered to be the cryopumps, from which
a release of 25 g (2.4 x 105 Ci) of tritium was assumed to occur. This accident
can be categorized as a type II event. Although some radioactivity has been re-
leased, it is expected to be well contained in the reactor building. Hence, no offsite
consequences will result. For the purpose of this analysis, the release was assumed
to occur instantaneously, to consist entirely of elemental tritium and to disperse
rapidly within the reactor building resulting in an immediate uniform concentra-
tion. A previous study [5.11 concluded that it did not appear economically justified
to maintain the reactor building at a level below 50 pCi/m'. Hence, this value
was adopted as the tritium concentration to which the reactor building must be
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returned.
Four clean up options were examined for the 25 g release, consisting of three,
two, one or no detritiation units. All systems were assumed to remove tritium at an
efficiency of 90 %. The reactor building volume into which the tritium is released was
taken to be 50,000 m 3 . The capital cost associated with reactor building detritiation
includes the cost of the detritiation system, the cost of the building to contain the
system and the cost of the tritiated water recovery unit. Approximate capital
costs associated with each clean up option were taken from reference 5.1 and are
summarized in table 5.1. As expected, the shortest clean up time, requiring the
largest number of clean up units results in the highest capital cost. A shorter clean
up time would correspond to an improved reactor availability and a reduced period
of potential worker exposure. Hence, it was necessary to determine if these benefits
outweighed the increased cost.
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Table-5.1: Detritiation Options Capital Costs [5.1]
Clean t.p
Option
A
B
C
D
Number of Capital Cost
Units (M$)
0
1
2
3
0.0
21.0
25.5
30.0
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5.2 Assessment Of The Cost Effectiveness Of The
Emergency Detritiation Systems
The methodology of Chapter 3 will be illustrated in this section. The cost
effectiveness of the proposed detritiation systems will be assessed. The relevant
economic risks associated with each system will be evaluated. Since the detritiation
systems will affect doses incurred by plant workers, the ceiling on safety expendi-
tures will be defined based on occupational exposures. Knowing the radiation dose
incurred employing each system, the most cost effective alternative will be selected.
5.2.1 Ceiling On Expenditures For The Accident Being Studied
The cost effectiveness of a particular option for reducing accident consequences
can be assessed using the procedure outlined in Chapter 3. A maximum value for
spending on accident consequence mitigation (a,) can be found.
The ceiling on expenditures was given by equation 3.1 in section 3.3. The value
used for R, the actual exposure rate, should be the maximum dose rate, immediately
after the accident occurrence, since this is the maximum dose rate to which there
is a potential for exposure. Assuming that the 25 g of tritium is released in the
form of HT, and applying a dose conversion factor of 7.717 x 10- 7 sv/in [5.2], the
dose rate immediately after the release has occurred would be 3.70 x 10~6 Sv/min,
for a reactor building volume of 50,000 m3 . Note that this dose rate exceeds the
exposure limit for normal conditions of 9.51 x 10-8 Sv/min (0.05 Sv/yr).
In calculating aa, labor costs were assumed to be 57,000 $/person yr, as for
normal plant operation. Using this value and the previously mentioned dose rate,
a value for a, was obtained. This was found to be 7.11 x 106 $/person Sv.
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Comparison with currently employed spending limits in the fission power in-
dustry placed this value on the high end of the scale. Vivian [5.3] has surveyed
national and international organizations to assess current trends on spending for
radiation protection [5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7]. Values ranged from tens of thousands of
dollars per person sievert to millions of dollars per person sievert. In one instance,
a recommended spending limit if $10 per person sievert for individual doses in the
range from 5 x 104 to 5 x 10-3 Sv was given. In the present study, the release
of 25 g of tritium could lead to doses for unprotected workers (i.e. no bubble suits
worn) greater than 5 x 10-3 (doses taken from table 5.5, increased by a factor of
100 for unprotected workers). Increasing the spending limit to allow for this possi-
bile increased exposure would lead to values of the same order of magnitude as the
value determined in this study. Vivian [5.3] also quoted another source which gave
a justified spending limit of $2.5 x 106 per person sievert [5.6, 5.71. This estimate
was just slightly below the value calculated here.
The numbers quoted above refer to normal plant conditions. It has been sug-
gested that when individual doses approach the dose limit, it may be appropriate
to arbitrarily increase the accepted spending on safety by an order of magnitude
[5.8]. In this way, further impetus for dose reduction would be provided. Since
the possibility of exceeding dose limits subsequent to an accident is greater than in
normal situations, the appropriate expenditure ceiling for accident situations can
be taken to be an order of magnitude higher than under normal conditions. This
would place the expenditure ceiling calculated here in agreement with other values.
Furthermore, some uncertainty in the value of the expenditure ceiling could arise
from the exposure limit used in the calculation. The exposure limit chosen for this
case was that used for normal conditions. If the total dose limit of 0.25 Sv was em-
ployed, then an exposure limit in the area of 0.03 Sv/hr would result (for a worker
continually exposed for an eight hour shift). This would considerably reduce the
expenditure ceiling. However, it was felt that exposure of a worker to this extreme
was unnecessary. Use of the exposure limit for normal conditions was felt to be
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suitable in this case.
5.2.2 Health Effects Costs
Subsequent to the accidental release of 25 g of tritium from the cryopumps,
it will be necessary to implement a cleanup and repair program. This will involve
worker entry into the reactor hall and hence, worker exposure. In this assessment, it
has been assumed that worker entry will be prohibited until the tritium concentra-
tion has been reduced to below 500 pCi/m 3 . At this time, workers wearing bubble
suits and supplied air may enter to perform clean up tasks. A protection factor of
100 against tritium can be provided by wearing these suits 15.11.
One further consideration is that of worker exposure due to induced structural
activity. The reactor has been designed to allow personnel entry into the reactor
building at a minimum of 24 hours subsequent to shutdown. The delay of entry will
allow the induced gamma background to decay to an acceptable level for personnel
access. This stipulation only comes into play when assessing option D, since for
the other systems, it is the tritium concentration which controls the time of worker
entry (for option D, the tritium level falls below 500 pCi/m 3 before 24 hours has
passed). The gamma dose rate was assumed constant at 2.5 x 10~5 Sv/hr (2.5
mrem/hr), the value expected 24 hours after shutdown. Since the time periods
of concern are shortly after shutdown (< 3 days), assuming that this dose rate is
constant should not introduce a large error.
Since the tritium transported in the fueling system will be in its elemental
form, it was assumed that the release consisted entirely of HT. Tritium activity
levels were based on a clean up system efficiency of 90 %, a decay half life of
12.3 years and a conversion half life to HTO of 6.5 years [5.4]. The quantity of
HTO present is an important consideration since it is a much more hazardous form
of tritium, due to the efficient uptake of water by the human body. Dose conversion
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factors used were 1.893 x 10-3 Sv/mn for HTO and 7.717 x 10 -7 SV/Mi for HTCi/M 3  Gu/M3
(calculated from information given in reference 5.2).
System time constants were calculated assuming that clean up was essentially
complete once the tritium level was within 5 % of the steady state operating room
concentration. According to the work performed by Finn and Rogers 15.1], main-
tenance of levels below 50 pCi/m 3 does not appear justified from an economic
standpoint (for average tritium losses of 100 Ci/day). Adopting this value as the
normal operating tritium concentration in the reactor building resulted in the "end
of clean up" concentration (5 % above the steady state level) being 52.5 uCi//m.
In order to estimate the cumulative dose incurred, it was assumed that a crew
of 5 men would enter the reactor building after the tritium level had been reduced to
500 pCi/m'. The crew would then perform the necessary repair tasks to return the
plant to normal operation. Additionally, any other maintenance tasks, unrelated
to the accident could also be carried out at this time. In this way, the downtime
would be used to its fullest. Once the tritium level had achieved 52.5 ptCi/m 3,
all maintenance operations would be terminated and the reactor would commence
operation. Thus, the crew of 5 men would be present in the reactor building from
the time when the activity level had reached 500 pCi/m 3 until it had been reduced
to 52.5 pLCi/m 3
Important parameters describing the clean up systems are given in table 5.2.
Contact maintenance times and the cumulative doses incurred are summarized in
table 5.3. Details of the dose determinations are given in appendix E. A profile of
the tritium activity with time for each detritiation option is shown in figure 5.1.
The remote clean up period occurs until a level of 500 pCi/m 3 is achieved. Beyond
this time, contact clean up and maintenance can be carried out, and is terminated
when the tritium level has decreased to 52.5 pCi/m 3
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Table 5.2: Clean Up Option Parameters
Option No. of Clean
Up Units
Clean Up
Time
(min)
Duration of
Remote Work
(min)
Duration of
Contact Work
(min)
2.102 x 10 7
894
447
71
A
B
C
D
0
1
2
3
1.066 x 10"
4,533
2,266
1,511
8.558 x 107
3,639
1,819
1,440
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Table 5.3: Doses Incurred During Clean Up
Option Duration of
Contact Work
(min)
A 2.102 x 10 7
B 894
C 447
D 71
Total Dose
(person Sv)
4.39
1.88 x 10-5
9.35 x 10-r
1.48 x 106
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5.2.3 Replacement Power Costs
Subsequent to the accidental release of tritium, it was assumed that the reactor
will be shutdown for clean up and repair. Consequently, it will be necessary to
provide replacement power for the service area of the reactor. Although the duration
of reactor shutdown may be short, it was assumed that the utility had no other
option for meeting the needs of its service area, and replacement power had to be
purchased.
The replacemer.t power costs were estimated using the model described in
appendix C, assuming the power plant was located in the SPP National Electric
Reliability Council region (mid United States). Calculations were based on an
electric power generating level of 186 MWe for INTOR (620 MWth [5.9], with an
assumed thermal conversion efficiency of 30 %).
The replacement power costs incurred subsequent to the accident were deter-
mined to be 744 M$ for option A, 0.321 M$ for option B. 0.160 M$ for option'C
and 0.107 M$ for option D.
5.2.4 Decontamination Costs
As outlined in Chapter 3, a clean up program must be defined in order to
assess decontamination costs. Specific tasks, their duration, the required crew size
and the point in time at which the tasks should be carried out must be specified.
The decontamination program can be subdivided into phases or periods in which
similar tasks are carried out. Since the actual details of the accident and the
resulting condition of the plant are not known, it was not possible to specify the
decontamination program in detail. However, it was possible to define two distinct
decontamination phases: the remote clean up phase and the contact clean up phase.
208
An estimate of the time at which the manual phase should begin was obtained.
However, specific tasks, their duration and commencement times were not identified.
Decontamination costs should include the cost of removal and disposal of ra-
dioactive wastes, labor costs, decontamination equipment operating costs and health
detriment costs (see equation 3.9 in section 3.6.1.2). Since the accident sequence and
the resulting state of the plant were assumed to be the same for all of the systems
being examined, the cost of radioactive waste disposal should be the same for all
alternatives. Since marginal costs are only important in comparing the alternatives,
it was not necessary to include the waste disposal costs.
Table 5.4 presents decontamination costs for each clean up system being con-
sidered. Labor costs were based on an assumed crew size of 5 persons and a re-
muneration rate of 25 $/hr [5.11. Decontamination equipment operating costs were
assessed on the basis of a unit operating cost of 89 $/hr (estimated from information
given in reference 5.1). This cost would include the utilities costs, water clean up
costs and the associated labor costs for the operation of a decontamination unit.
Remote maintenance costs were estimated at 350 $/hr (based on information in ref-
erence 5.1). This assumes the use of five robotic units and would include any power
requirements, labor costs and maintenance costs resulting from their use during this
period.
It should be noted that for options B, C, and D, the effects of discounting and
escalation as specified in equation 3.9 in section 3.6.1.2 need not be considered. The
periods of time of concern are quite short and the effects of discounting and cost
escalation will be negligible. Consequently, each of the cost components in equation
3.9 can be given in dollars, rather than in dollars per year, as would be necessary
during a longer decontamination program when discounting and escalation are im-
portant. In the case of option A, where no detritiation units are employed, much
longer times are involved, and the effects of discounting were considered.
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Table 5.4: Decontamination Costs for the Detritiation Options
Option
A
($)
Option
B
($)
Option
C
($)
Option
D
($)
Phase 1: Remote Clean Up
Equipment Operating
Cost (Co 1 )
Total Phase 1 Cost
(Cdl)
Phase 2: Manual Clean Up
Labor Cost (CL2)
Equipment Operating
Cost (C0 2)
Health Detriment
Cost (CH2)
Total Phase 2 Cost
(Cd2 )
Total Decontamination
Program Cost (CD)
6.00 x 107
6.00 x 107
5.54 x 103
0
2.11
5.54 x 103
2.66 x 104
2.66 x 104
1.86 x 103
1.33 x 103
7.13 x 10-2
3.19 x 103
6.00 x 107 2.98 x 104
1.60 x 104
1.60 x 104
9.31 x 102
1.33 x 103
3.55 x 10-2
2.23 x 103
1.83 x 104
1.48 x 104
1.48 x 104
1.48 x 102
3.16 x 102
5.63 x 10-3
4.64 x 102
1.53 x 104
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Equation 3.12 also applies a discounting factor. Once again, since the decon-
tamination programs for options B,C, and D are of short duration, this effect can be
neglected. The costs incurred during each phase of the decontamination program
can simply be added. For option A, it was necessary to apply a discounting factor
to the costs incurred during phase two of the decontamination program in order to
obtain their present value.
Plant stabilization costs (costs incurred to ensure no further damage will result
or to prevent further releases of radioactive materials) should be added at this point,
but have not been included in this study. Since the exact condition of the plant is
not known, these costs could not be quantified. This should not affect the outcome,
since marginal costs are only of concern and plant stabilization costs will be the
same for all cases considered (assuming identical accident sequences).
From table 5.4, it appears that the shorter clean up time (option D) gives
the lowest decontamination cost. This results from the fact that the equipment. is
operating for a shorter period of time, resulting in lower operating costs. Phase 1
appears to be the dominant contributor to the decontamination program cost. This
is due to the fact that the cost of operating equipment remotely is relatively high.
It can also be seen that health detriment costs are almost negligible.
5.2.5 Other Costs
Other cost components which will contribute to the total economic risk of the
accident include plant repair costs and possibly fusion power industry costs, electric
utility business costs and onsite litigation costs. Decommissioning costs and plant
capital investment costs are not expected to contribute to the total economic risk
of the accident studied.
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Since the same accident sequence was assumed to have occurred for all the de-
tritiation systems being studied, the plant will be in the same condition subsequent
to the accident for all cases. Hence, plant repair costs will be the same. Unfortu-
nately, the condition of the plant is not known and hence, repair costs could not be
estimated. However, only marginal costs affect the analysis being undertaken and
not incorporating the repair costs into the total economic risk will not affect the
outcome. Additionally, fusion power industry costs, electric utility business costs
and onsite litigation costs will be the same for all systems (and will likely be quite
small). These costs are also difficult to quantify and have not been included in this
assessment.
The accident being examined does not result in a significant release of radioac-
tivity to areas external to the plant. Consequently, there were no offsite health
effects or health care costs to be considered.
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5.3 Conclusions Regarding The Cost Effectiveness Of The
Detritiation Systems for INTOR
The methodology of Chapter 3 requires that a value be obtained for !3, in
order for the detritiation systems to be assessed. The total costs associated with
each of the systems being evaluated are required. Approximate capital costs for
each option were given in table 5.1. Table 5.5 lists the accident related costs. Since
these costs will only be incurred if the accident occurrs, they must be multiplied by
the probability of the accident occurring to obtain the appropriate economic risk.
Similarly, the doses given in table 5.3 for each option should be multiplied by the
accident probability to give the health risk. It was assumed that the probability of
the given accident occurring was 10-4 over the 30 year plant lifetime (i.e. failure
frequency of the pump was assumed to be 3.3 x 10-6 yr-1). The economic and
health risks associated with-each detritiation option are found in table 5.5.
From table 5.5, it can be seen that with no detritiation capabilities, the eco-
nomic risk is the least. This occurs since the costs associated with this option will
only result if the accident does in fact occur. However, the health risk for this
option is the greatest. Examining options B, C and D, having one, two and three
detritiation units respectively, it can bee seen that the economic risk increases as
the health risk decreases. Whether or not it is justified to spend more on a clean
up system to reduce the health risk must be determined.
The incremental economic risks of options B, C and D, over option B, with their
corresponding dose reductions, are given in table 5.6. In order to determine which
detriation system should be employed, it must be determined if the increased costs
associated with options B, C and D, compared to option A, are justified. Values
for #, for clean up options B, C and D are also given in table 5.6. Comparing these
to 7.11 x 106 $/person Sv, the value calculated for a,, it is apparent that, for the
accident being studied, none of the options are cost effective.
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In the evaluation of 3,,, the value used for the probability of the accident
occurring was 10-4. The minimum probability of occurence of the given accident,
up to which it is justified to spend the extra money for options B, C and D can
be determined. By equating 13a to a, and substituting known quantities, these
probabilities can be found. It would be justified to invest 21.0 M$ in option B
(one unit) if the accident occurs with a probability of atleast 2.52 x 10-2. For
option C (two units), the minimum probability of the accident occurring for which
this system is economically justified is 3.05 x 10-2. The initial expenditure of 25.5
M$ for this system would then be justified. The capital expenditure for option D
(three units) of 30.0 M$ would be justified if the accident were to occur with a
probability of atleast 3.59 x 10-2. From these results, it can be seen that the
methodology allows for increased expenditures for more probable events.
If the probability of the accident occurring exceeds 3.59 x 10-2), then all three
options would be justified. Option B should then be selected since it has the mini-
mum value of 1a
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Table 5.5: Economic and Health Risks for the Detritiation Options
Option Accident
Related Costs
($)
Economic Risk
($).
Health Risk
(person Sv)
8.04 x 10 4
2.10 x 107
2.55 x 107
3.00 x 107
4.39 x 10-4
1.88 x 10~9
9.35 x 10-'o
1.48 x 10-10
A
B
C
D
8.04 x 10"
3.50 x 10'
1.79 x 105
1.22 x 10'
215
Table 5.6: Incremental Economic Risks and Health Risk Reductions
for Detritiation Options B, C and D
Option Increase in
-Economic Risk
compared to
Option A
($)
B
C
D
2.09 x 10 7
2.54 x 10 7
2.99 x 10 7
Reduction in
Health Risk
compared to
Option A
(person Sv)
4.39 x 10-4
4.39 x 10-4
4.39 x 10- 4
Expected Cost
($/person Sv)
4.76 x 1010
5.79 x 1010
6.82 x 1010
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IN
Chapter Six
Conclusions And Recommendations
6.1 Summary And Conclusions
The intent of this study was to develop an analytical tool which would aid
in achieving a balance between safety and economic constraints in fusion reactor
designs. The methodology is for the assessment of the cost effectiveness of proposed
design changes, aimed at improving plant safety. It can be applied to both normal
and accident conditions.
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To determine whether further dose reduction measures are justified, the costs
involved with a particular proposal are compared to the maximum justified ex-
penditure.. This maximum value is calculated from economic and social factors,
administrative/legal dose limits and the actual magnitude of the radiation risk.
Implementing a dose reduction measure will often result in increased costs.
For normal plant conditions, the total cost associated with a protective action is
comprised of four major components: the capital cost, and the change in annual
operating, maintenance and waste handling costs. The capital cost of the dose
reduction action includes the cost of materials and installation for those items di-
rectly responsible for the dose reduction. Annual operating, maintenance and waste
handling costs are comprised of several elements including the cost of additional ma-
terials and equipment required for carrying out tasks, the change in labor costs, the
change in health effects costs, the change in overhead costs, the change in replace-
ment power costs and the change in waste disposal costs. Knowing the costs due to
a protective action and the resulting dose savings for workers and the public, the
cost per unit dose saved can be found. Comparing this to the expenditure ceiling, it
can be determined if it is justified to invest in the proposed dose reduction measure.
The methodology for risk management under normal plant conditions has been
applied to assess the cost effectiveness of the low activation STARFIRE design.
The expenditure ceiling on design modifications to STARFIRE was evaluated at
$530,000 per person Sv averted. To determine the cost effectiveness, the costs asso-
ciated with changing to low activation materials from the reference design materials
were estimated. Costs were estimated using DOE costing guidelines. There was
some uncertainty as to the cost of high purity silicon carbide components. Hence,
in the determination of costs, a range of prices for silicon carbide was used. If the
installed price of high purity silicon carbide components is 30 $/kg, the annualized
capital cost for STARFIRE will in effect decrease by 19.3 M$/yr (to 235 M$/yr, from
254 M$/yr for the reference design). This would decrease the initial capital invest-
ment in the plant by 292 M$ from 3,850 M$ to 3,556 M$. If the price of silicon
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carbide is 110 $/kg, the inital capital investment would increase by 116 MS to
3,996 M$. This corresponds to an annual increase in capital cost of 7.6 M$/yr,
giving a value of 262 M$/yr. The initial capital investment if silicon carbide costs
315 $/kg would be 5,011 M$, resulting in an increase of 1,162 M$. On an annual
basis, this corresponds to an increase of 77 M$/yr, giving a value of 331 MS/yr.
Since it has been found that the capital cost component dominates the total cost,
it is important that these costs be determined as accurately as possible. Unfortu-
nately, all the necessary information to accomplish this is not available at this time.
These costs may have been overestimated since economic savings from faster con-
struction/liscensing, fewer safety systems, higher thermal efficiencies and cheaper
containment for the low activation design were ignored. If the necessary informa-
tion is provided in the future, these factors can be included. It appears that these
considerations would favor the low activation design.
In addition to the capital cost component, another large contributor to the total
cost is that of replacement power. A rough estimate of a maintenance schedule for
reactor equipment was provided in this study. From this, the downtime savings for
the low activation design was found to be 3.25 days. Perhaps, if this was looked at in
greater detail, the downtime savings for the low activation design would be altered.
This would impact the replacement power costs, and hence the total costs of the low
activation design. Major savings in waste handling costs were also found to result
for the low activation design. If the installed cost of silicon carbide components
is 30 $/kg, the total annual costs for the low activation design would decrease by
45.1 M$/yr, from 399.1 M$/yr to 354.0 M$/yr. An increase in annual costs of
0.1 M$/yr to 399.2 M$/yr would result if the cost of silicon carbide is 110 $/kg. At
a cost of 315 $/kg, the total annual costs would become 514.4 MS/yr, increasing by
115.3 M$/yr.
It was found that the annual dose incurred would decrease by 6.82 person Sv/yr
for the low activation design. Major areas impacted by the change in materials
include coolant/steam generator maintenance, first wall/blanket replacement and
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waste handling.
Knowing the costs associated with the change to the low activation design and
the resulting dose savings, the cost effectiveness could be assessed. At 315 $/kg,
the change would be unjustified. The change to the low activation design was found
to be justified for silicon carbide at a cost of 30 $/kg or 110 $/kg. For these cases,
justified research and development costs were estimated. If silicon carbide costs
30 $/kg, it would be justified to spend 10.9 M$/yr in each of the next 30 years,
21.5 M$/yr during each of the next 10 years or 38.2 M$/yr during each of the
next five years on research and development of low activation materials. Justified
spending on research and development if the silicon carbide costs 110 $/kg would be
0.78 M$/yr for each of the next 30 years, 1.55 M$/yr during each of the next ten
years or 2.75 M$/yr for each of the next five years.
The variation of total costs with the price of silicon carbide was found to be
linear. A break even value of 116 $/kg for silicon carbide was found. However,
this does hot allow for any research and development costs. A maximum cost in
the neighbourhood of 110 $/kg would allow for some research and development
expenditures. If the installed cost of high purity silicon carbide components is
less than this, then it would be justified to switch to the low activation design for
STARFIRE.
Dose reduction measures may be proposed for reducing the hazard subsequent
to an accident. Such measures may involve large capital expenditures. Using the
methodology, it can be ascertained if this expenditure is justified in the event of a
particular accident.
Subsequent to an accident, a cost will be incurred, the magnitude of which will
depend on the severity of the accident. Accidents have been classified into three
categories, based on accident severity or cost. Category I events are currently de-
fined as having only onsite consequences including replacement power costs, plant
repair costs and worker health effects and health care costs. Category II, or medium
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consequence events result in replacement power costs, decontamination costs, plant
repair costs and health effects costs being incurred. Additionally, offsite health ef-
fects and property damage may result. These costs may include health effects costs,
decontamination costs, agricultural production disposal costs, evacuation costs, re-
location costs and land interdiction costs. Category III events are large consequence
events, possibly resulting in large capital investment losses and even plant decom-
missioning costs. In addition to this, replacement power costs, plant decontamina-
tion costs and health effects costs may be incurred. The offsite cost components
mentioned in relation to category II events may also result subsequent to a category
III accident.
The methodology for risk assessment for accident consequence mitigation pro-
posals is similar in approach to that for normal plant conditions. The assessment
must be performed from the perspective of a particular accident scenario. The ceil-
ing on expenditures is determined using the maximum exposure rate estimated to
exist subsequent to the accident. It should be pointed out again that the expo-
sure limit for accident conditions does not necessarily have to be that employed for
normal conditions. Since in abnormal situations, it is permissible for a worker to
incur a dose of 0.25 Sv, the occupational dose limit may vary. If the duration of
exposure can be postulated, then a more appropriate occupational exposure limit
can be used. The public exposure limit should not be affected by this consideration.
To assess the cost effectiveness of an accident consequence mitigation proposal,
the actual costs associated with it must be evaluated. These include the capital
cost of the dose reduction measure and the costs incurred subsequent to the ac-
cident. Accident related costs will depend on the accident category. The change
in costs subsequent to the accident and the change in dose incurred subsequent to
the accident must be evaluated relative to the case where no accident consequence
mitigation proposal is used, or relative to some base case (the minimum cost alter-
native). Since these costs and doses will only be incurred if the accident does occur,
they must be multiplied by the probability of the accident occurring to determine
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the appropriate risks. Knowing the economic risk associated with a particular al-
ternative and the resulting reduction in health risk, the cost per unit dose saved
can be evaluated. As with dose reduction measures for normal plant conditions,
this must be compared to the expenditure ceiling to determine if the proposal is
justified.
The methodology for risk assessment for accident conditions has been applied
to assess the cost effectiveness of emergency detritiation systems for INTOR. The
expenditure ceiling for a release of 25 g of tritium into a reactor building volume
of 25,000 m3 was estimated at 7.11 x 106 $/person Sv. The costs associated with
using zero, one, two or three detritiation units for the 25 g release were estimated.
The use of any number of detritiation units would involve a large capital outlay.
As the number of detritiation units used increased, the capital cost increased, but
the accident related costs decreased (a result of more rapid removal of tritium).
However, since the accident related costs will only be incurred if the accident does
take place, they must be multiplied by the probability of the accident occurring.
This resulted in the economic risk for the options with detritiation units being
dominated by the capital costs. Consequently, the economic risk for the option
employing no emergency detritiation units was least. However, the health risk was
greatest for this option. A savings in health risk of 4.39 x 10-4 person Sv will
result from the use of any number of detritiation units. From the analysis, it was
determined that if the accident occurs with a probability over the plant lifetime
of 10-, none of the detritiation options would be justified. In order for it to be
justified to invest 21.0 MS in one emergency detritiation unit, the accident must
occur with a probability of atleast 2.52 x 10-2. For two emergency detritiation units,
the cost of 25.5 M$ would be justified if the accident occurred with a probability of
3.05 x 102. The initial capital expenditure of 30.0 M$ would be justified for three
emergency detritiation units if the accident occurred with a minimum probability
of 3.59 x 102. If the accident did occur with a probability of 3.59 x 102, and
these four options were being considered, the most cost effective alternative would
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be using a single detritiation unit. Since using one, two or three units would result
in nearly identical dose savings, the minimum cost justified alternative (having the
minimum value of 0,a) should be selected.
The procedure presented in this study is the first step for developing a method-
ology. Some areas still require attention. Future applications will serve to test the
validity of the methodology or to determine any areas of weakness.
This methodology has many applications beyond the illustrations presented in
this report. It is anticipated that the material presented in this study will be a
useful tool to the designer and aid in the evolution of safer, more economical fusion
reactor designs.
6.2 Recommendations For Future Work
In this study, the basic procedure for cost effective risk management was-estab-
lished. It is hoped that in the future, other factors affecting either the expenditure
ceiling or the costs associated with a dose reduction measure will be recognized
and incorporated into the methodology. Some considerations have been indentified
throughout the course of this work and are summarized below.
If the occupational dose limits are reached, the availability of skilled workers,
the cost of training new workers and the probable lower productivity of these work-
ers due to lack of experience may be important. These considerations should be
included as part of the socio-economic factors used to determine the expenditure
ceiling. The fact that higher dose rates may lead to lower productivity, and hence
increased task durations should be incorporated into the evaluation. The use of
per capita income in determining the ceiling on public safety expenditures may
seem unethical, since it implies that poorer countries can tolerate higher dose rates.
A more appropriate economic factor is needed. Perhaps this would somehow be
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related to a country's investment in fusion power.
One further consideration which was neglected due to lack of information was
that of reduced requirements on remote maintenance equipment. Since the low
activation design will involve lower mass components, the load handling capabilities
of the remote equipment will not need to be as great. Furthermore, lower structural
activation levels will result in reduced equipment degradation, which will lead to
less frequent replacement needs. It is expected that these considerations would lead
to a reduction in capital cost for maintenance equipment and a reduced cost for
replacement parts for the mairitenance equipment.
This methodology is suited for a wide range of applications. A suggested area
for study is the issue of increasing shielding to make certain areas of the plant
accessible for contact maintenance. This would lead to a reduction in downtime
and hence replacement power costs. The procedure presented in this study could
be applied to determine if the investment in the increased shielding is justified.
In the current study, no monetary value was provided for the division between
accident categories. In the future, such a guideline should be established. Perhaps,
comparing accident costs to some percentage of the plant capital costs would serve
as an appropriate means of distinguishing between accident categories.
For accident conditions, the methodology only considers one accident scenario.
In fact, a dose reduction measure may be useful for reducing the consequences of
more than one accident. If other events can be postulated where the used of a
particular reduction measure would reduce the health risks, then they should be
included in the analysis. This would involve determining the accident related costs
and doses incurred for each additional event. The doses should be multiplied by
the probability of occurrence of the corresponding accident to determine the health
risk. The total health risk would be determined by summing the risks presented
by each postulated event. The accident related costs should also be multiplied by
the probability of occurrence of the corresponding accident. Summing these for all
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events considered would give the economic risk for the proposal. This must then be
added to the capital cost to obtain the total economic risk associated with an option.
Knowing both the total economic risk and total health risk, the cost per unit dose
averted can be obtained. If several events are being included in the analysis, then
the expenditure ceiling must somehow be modified to account for this. It would seem
logical, that if a particular proposal was expected to impact the consequences of
several events, then the expenditure ceiling should be augmented. This could come
about by increasing R, the magnitude of the radiation risk used in assessing the
maximum justified spending. If several events are being considered, the appropriate
value of R could be determined by a simple sum of the radiation risks subsequent
to each postulated event. However, the event probabilities should somehow be
incorporated. Perhaps, some sort of weighting procedure would accomplish this. It
is hoped that future work in this area will resolve this issue.
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Nomenclature
a= ceiling on occupational safety expenditures ($/person Sv)
a*= ceiling on public safety expenditures ($/person Sv)
a'= overall ceiling on safety expenditures (including occupational and public com-
ponents) ($/person Sv)
aa= ceiling on occupational expenditures for the reduction oa accident consequences
($/person Sv)
a;= ceiling on public expenditures for the reduction of accident consequences
($/person Sv)
a= overall ceiling on expenditures for the reduction of accident consequences
($/person Sv)
A= size of an area to be decontaminated (acres)
/3= additional spending for a dose reduction measure ($/person Sv)
/3 = additional costs for an accident consequence mitigation measure, for a partic-
ular accidental occurrence ($/person Sv)
C= actual capacity factor of the plant had no outage occurred
C'= average capacity factor of the plant, obtained from operating data
Ca= change in accident related costs compared to the case where no accident con-
sequence mitigation measure has been used, or compared to the base case ($)
CaC capital cost of an accident consequence mitigation measure ($)
CAD= cost due to accelerated decommissioning ($)
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C,,r= average cost of decontamination labor ($/person yr)
CaT= increase in total costs for an accident consequence mitigation measure over the
costs which would be incurred if no consequence reduction scheme was used,
or over the costs which would be incurred for the base case ($)
CBV= book value of the plant or a plant component at the time of a severe accident
()
Cc= annualized capital cost of a dose reduction action ($/yr)
Ced= cost of crop disposal ($)
Cci= initial capital cost of a dose reduction measure ($)
Ccj'= capital investment loss resulting from a severe accident ($)
Cd= cost of land and property decontamination ($)
Cdd= cost of dairy product disposal ($)
CdI= labor cost for offsite decontamination ($)
Cdn= decontamination cost during phase n of an onsite clean up program ($)
CD= total cost of an onsite decontamination program ($)
CDW= change in annual waste disposal costs resulting from the use of a dose reduction
measure ($/yr)
CE= cost of evacuation ($)
CEP= = emergency phase population relocation cost ($)
CHy= total onsite health effects cost ($)
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CH,= health detriment cost due to radiation exposure during phase n of a decontam-
ination program ($/yr)
CH,= total offsite health effects cost ($)
CHP= total health effects cost due to exposure of the public to radiation ($)
CR= health detriment cost due to radiation exposure while performing a repair job
($/day)
CHW= total health effects cost due to exposure of offsite decontamination workers ($)
CH.= change in annual health detriment cost resulting from a dose reduction measure
($/yr)
CI= cost of land interdiction ($)
Cjp= intermediate phase relocation cost ($)
Ci= crew size for a decontamination or repair task (persons)
CLn= cost of labor to carry out tasks during phase n of a decontamination program
($)
CLR= labor cost to perform a repair job ($/day)
CL.= increase in annual labor costs for all jobs affected due to the implementation
of a dose reduction measure ($/yr)
CmiX= initial additional materials and equipment costs ($)
CMZ= annualized additional materials and equipment costs for carrying out all tasks
affected by a dose reduction measure ($/yr)
CMR= cost of replacement materials or components ($)
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C,,j= new crew size, after implementation of a dose reduction measure, required to
complete task j (persons)
CNP= capital investment in new plant components required to replace those destroyed
by an accident, or in the new plant built to replace the productive capacity of
the shutdown plant ($)
COHZ= increase in annual overhead costs resulting from a dose reduction measure
($/yr)
C0 3 = old crew size, before using a dose reduction measure, required to complete task
j (persons)
Con= cost to operate any equipment required during phase n of a decontamination
program ($/yr)
Cp= cost of replacement power during an outage ($)
Cpm= change in annual replacement power costs resulting from a dose reduction mea-
sure ($/yr)
Cr= cost of relocating a population from an area during an offsite decontamination
program ($)
CR= plant repair costs ($)
C, = annual cost to maintain a plant in a stable condition subsequent to an accident
($/yr)
C,t= plant stabilization costs subsequent to an accident ($)
CT= annualized cost of a dose reduction measure over the plant lifetime ($/yr)
CT.= increase in total annual operating, maintenance or waste handling costs result-
ing from a dose reduction measure ($/yr)
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Cwn,= cost of radioactive waste removal and disposal during phase n of a decontami-
nation program ($/yr)
DAD= dose incurred during accelerated decommissioning operations (person Sv)
Dao= occupational dose savings during a given accident scenario when an accident
consequence mitigation measure has been used (person Sv)
Da,= public dose savings during a given accident scenario when an accident conse-
quence mitigation measure has been used (person Sv)
DaT= total dose savings during a given accident scenario when an accident conse-
quence mitigation measure has been used (person Sv)
D,= dose which would be incurred by an individual from constant exposure to sur-
face deposited radionuclides for the entire decontamination period (Sv)
Db=. dose incurred during onsite plant decontamination procedures (person Sv)
DDn= dose incurred during phase n of a decontamination program (person Sv/yr)
DDW= dose incurred by decontamination workers due to exposure to surface deposited
radionuclides (person Sv)
DFf= cost to decontaminate farmland by a factor of f ($/acre)
D,= occupational dose savings resulting from a dose reduction measure (person Sv)
Dp= public dose savings resulting from a dose reduction measure (person Sv)
Dpo,= projected long term dose to the population affected by an accident (person Sv)
DR= dose incurred during plant repair (person Sv/day)
DRf= cost to decontaminate residential, business and public property by a factor of
f ($/person)
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DT= total dose saving (including occupational and public components) resulting
from the use of a dose reduction measure (person Sv)
DTZ= total dose savings during plant operation, maintenance or waste handling due
to the use of a dose reduction measure (person Sv/yr)
Dz0 = occupational dose savings during plant operation, maintenance or waste han-
dling due to the use of a dose reduction measure (person Sv/yr)
D.,= public dose savings during plant operation, maintenance or waste handling due
to the use of a dose reduction measure (person Sv/yr)
E= cost of food, lodging and transportation for an evacuee ($/person day)
ELIM= occupational exposure limit (Sv/yr)
EIlM= public exposure limit (Sv/yr)
f= decontamination factor
F= power production cost increase due to the purchase of replacement power
($/MWe)
Fo= power production cost increase (due to the purchase of replacement power) at
time zero ($/MWe)
f,= fraction of farmland sales from crops
Ff= fraction of a region to be decontaminated which is farmland
fj= frequency of carrying out task j during plant repair (days-)
fhn= frequency of carrying out task j during phase n of a plant decontamination
program (yr- 1)
233
A
tion factor, which is estimated to be paid labor
f,,j= new frequency of carrying out task j, after implementation of a dose reduction
measure (yr-1)
f03= old frequency of carrying out task j, before implementation of a dose reduction
measure (yr-1)
FP= average annual farm production (sales) for an area to be decontaminated ($/acre)
Fv = average national market value of farmland and structures in an area to be
decontaminated ($/acre)
g= rate of cost escalation (yr-')
G= electrical generation rating of the shutdown reactor (MWe)
H= estimate of somatic plus genetic societal detriment attributable to radiation
exposure (3,800 $/person Sv)
I= national average per capita and corporate income ($/person day)
If= fraction of farmland wealth in improvements in an affected area
I0= initial capital investment in plant components destroyed during an accident ($)
1,.= fraction of non-farmland wealth in improvements in an affected area
j= identification number for tasks carried out during normal plant operation,
maintenance or waste handling, or during plant repair or decontamination sub-
sequent to an accident
k= useful life of depreciating assets (yrs)
Lc= replacement labor cost ($/person yr)
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L'= per capita income in region where the power plant is located ($/person yr)
m= total number of phases required to complete an onsite decontamination pro-
gram
mj= rate of worker remuneration for task j of a repair job ($/person day)
mni= new rate of worker remuneration for task j, after implementation of a dose
reduction measure ($/person hr)
m0 3= old rate of worker remuneration for task j, before implementation of a dose
reduction measure ($/person hr)
n= identification number for phases of onsite decontamination program
N= exponent expressing harm induced by radiation (0.5)
Nw= number of decontamination workers required to complete an offsite decontam-
ination program within a specified amount of time (persons)
p= probability, over the plant lifetime, of a given accident occurring
P= size of the population affected by a dose reduction measure (persons)
Pd= population of an area affected by a decontamination program (persons)
PE= size of initially evacuated population (persons)
PEP= number of persons which must be relocated in addition to those previously
evacuated (persons)
Pi= total number of persons affected by a reactor accident (persons)
PIp= size of the population affected by intermediate phase relocation (persons)
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P,= size of population to be relocated during offsite decontamination operations
(persons)
r= real societal discount rate
R= occupational exposure rate before implementation of a dose reduction measure
(Sv/yr)
R'= public exposure rate before implementation of a dose reduction measure (Sv/yr)
Ra= maximum occupational exposure rate after the occurrence of an accident (Sv/yr)
R;= maximum public exposure rate after the occurrence of an accident (Sv/yr)
R,(t)= function describing how the dose rate varies with time while carrying out task
j of a repair job (Sv/hr)
R3 .(t)= function describing how the dose rate varies with time while carrying out task
j of phase n of a decontamination program (Sv/hr)
RLf= fraction of the residential, business and public decontamination cost, for the
appropriate decontamination factor, which is estimated to be paid labor
R, (t) = new function describing how the occupational dose rate varies with time while
carrying out task j, after implementing a dose reduction measure (Sv/hr)
Ra,,(t)= new function describing how the public dose rate varies with time while carrying
out task j, after implementing a dose reduction measure (Sv/hr)
R0j(t)= old function describing how the occupational dose rate varies with time while
carrying out task j, before implementing a dose reduction measure (Sv/hr)
Rop(t)= old function describing how the public dose rate varies with time while carrying
out task j, before implementing a dose reduction measure (Sv/hr)
Rp= plant repair during an outage (1,250 $/hr)
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Ri= ratio of region specific to national average personal incomes
Rv= average national per capita tangible wealth in an area ($/person)
RVf= ratio of region specific to national average market value of farmland and struc-
tures in an area
RVr= ratio of region specific to national average personal incomes in an area
s= sinking fund depreciation factor
S= end of life decommissioning cost ($)
ta= time of occurrence of severe accident (years after initial plant startup)
t,= duration of contact maintenance period (hr)
t E= duration of evacuation (days)
tlEP= time at the start of the emergency phase relocation period in areas where no
evacuation has occurred (days from accident occurrence)
t2EP= time at the end of the emergency phase relocation period in areas where no
evacuation has ocurred (days from accident occurrence)
td= outage duration (yrs)
tD= specified amount of time to complete an offsite decontamination effort (yrs)
tfj= time after an event occurrence at which task j of a decontamination program
is completed (hr)
tj= duration of interdiction period (yrs)
t 1 Ip= time at the start of the intermediate phase relocation period (days from accident
occurrence)
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t 2 1 = time at the end of the intermediate phase relocation period (days from accident
occurrence)
tj= time required to complete task j of a repair job (hr)
tl= expected plant lifetime remaining after a dose reduction measure is imple-
mented (yrs)
Tmy= total person-years of effort required to decontaminate an area (person yrs)
t,= duration of phase n of an onsite decontamination program (yrs)
tj= new time to complete task j, after implementation of a dose reduction measure
(hr)
toj= old time to complete task j, before implementation of a dose reduction measure
(hr)
t,,= time after an event occurrence at which phase n of a decontamination program
begins (yrs)
tpz= expected plant lifetime (yrs)
tr= duration of remote maintenance period (hr)
t R= time to complete an entire repair job (days)
tlj= time after an event occbrrence at which task j of a decontamination program
begins (hr)
t = duration of public exposure resulting from normal operation, maintenance or
waste handling activities (yrs)
U= fraction of total dose savings, due to a dose reduction measure, affecting plant
workers
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U,= fraction of total dose savings, due to an accident consequence mitigation mea-
sure, for a given accident scenario, affecting plant workers
V= fraction of total dose savings, due to a dose reduction measure, affecting the
public
Va= fraction of total dose savings, due to an accident consequence mitigation mea-
sure, for a given accident scenario, affecting the public
Wf= total farm wealth (prior to reactor accident) in an area from farmland and
structures ($)
WFf= ratio of decontamination worker dose, for an appropriate level of decontamina-
tion effort, in farm areas, to the dose which would be incurred by an individual
from constant exposure during the decontamination period
WRf= ratio of decontamination worker dose, for an appropriate level of decontamina-
tion effort, in residential, business and public areas, to the dose which would be
incurred by an individual from constant exposure during the decontamination
period
x= subscript indicating either operation (0), maintenance (M) or waste handling
(W) costs
Z= seasonal factor
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Appendix A
A.1 Discount Rate Used In Cost Estimations
The discount rate is used as a means of incorporating the time value of money
into financial analyses. It represents the earning power of money or the cost of
capital. The rate used in evaluating public projects, such as a fusion power plant,
is often referred to as the societal discount rate. Estimates of discount rates can be
obtained from interest rates charged in capital markets. These interest rates include
a component which allows for the general inflation in the economy. The real interest
rate, which does not include an inflationary component, can be estimated from the
observed market rate using:
r (1+ r (A.1)
1+
where
r = the real interest rate
rm= the market interest rate or apparent interest rate observed in the
economy
i= the inflation rate in the economy
To avoid projecting future inflation rates, analyses of future cash flows should
employ real discount rates. Furthermore, the analysis will be subject to less error
since real cash flows and discount rates show less variation than observed cash flows
and discount rates.
The societal discount rate can be interpreted as representing the cost to society
of capital based on the level of risk associated with a particular investment. It is a
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reflection of society's judgement of expending capital at the current point in time
versus expending it at some point in the future. The real societal discount rate is
arrived at by correcting the prime rate, or the interest rate charged by large money
lenders to their best business borrowers, for inflation. A real discount rate of 5 %
is recommended for use in present value calculations. It has been projected that
the inflation rate will gradually decline over the next few years. Reduced inflation
will reduce the inflation premium in nominal interest rates. Real interest rates are
also expected to decline, approaching 5 %, which prevailed prior to the onset of the
inflationary 1970's [A.1]. It is also recommended that continuous compounding be
employed in calculations. The result of this is to increase the effect of interest on
the time value of money. The assumption of continuous compounding also simplifies
the form of mathematical models.
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Appendix B
B.1 Health Effects And Health Care Costs
Studies have been carried out which estimate the costs and risks of radiation
exposure [B.1, B.21. These values have been used to estimate the cost to society
attributable to radiation exposure [B.3].
Assuming that the number of non-fatal cancers of all types induced by radiation
exposures is as large as the number of fatal cancers, a risk factor for cancer incidence
is approximately 2 x 10-2 (personSv)-'. If the average (of all types) cost of one
case of cancer (including medical care and lost income) is $75,000 , then an estimate
of the cost due to somatic effects would be 1,500 $/person Sv.
The risk factor for hereditary effects has been estimated at 8 x 10-3 (personSv)-
[B.4]. It has been suggested by the BEIR Committee, that 16 % of genetic disor-
ders resulting from radiation exposure would produce congenital disabilities while
84 % of the effects would be "irregularly inherited". These effects include congeni-
tal malformations, latent anomalies and degenerative diseases resulting in a serious
handicap at some point in an affected individual's life. The cost of congenital dis-
abilities has been estimated as $700,000 by assuming the cost of these effects to
be equivalent to the cost per case of cancer of the nervous system. Considering
lost earnings and institutional care, the cost of "irregularly -inherited" effects is es-
timated as $210,000 (from [B.3], adjusted using price indexes [B.5]). The cost to
society due to radiation induced genetic effects is then 2,300 $/person Sv.
An estimate of the total societal detriment attributable to radiation exposure
(H) can be found by summing the costs due to somatic and genetic effects. A
cautious estimate would be 3,800 $/person Sv. The ICRP has suggested that it
may be appropriate to arbitrarily increase the cost factor by a factor of ten to
provide further impetus for dose reduction actions when individual doses are near
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the dose limit [B.3].
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Appendix C
C.1 Replacement Power Costs
A major cost component during plant outages is that of replacement power.
Societal costs for replacing power can be quite substantial. These costs will arise
because the power previously produced by an operating fusion reactor must be
replaced by power generated by a more expensive source.
Short duration outages may not require the purchase of replacement power.
Short term generation increases and load management schemes may allow the utility
to meet the needs of its service area. Some possible emergency procedures for short
term outages are given in table C.1.
Longer term power plant outages or permanent plant shutdowns require a
different set of options to compensate for the loss in generating capacity. Included in
these alternatives are load management schemes, load conservation programs, long
term purchase agreements with neighboring utilities, additional interconnections in
the power grid, restructuring of electricity usage rates, deferment of planned power
plant decommissionings, acceleration of existing construction schedules and addition
of new capacity to the construction schedule. All options for compensating for lost
power production have associated costs. These costs will result because by the time
fusion power is commercially available, it is expected to be competitive with fission
[C.2], which has a very low operating and fuel cycle cost relative to fossil fueled
units. Lower marginal cost power is normally employed in base load electricity
generation, while higher marginal cost generating units are used to handle daily
or seasonal variations in power requirements. The loss of power generation from a
fusion plant would require that higher cost generating units be used. A net cost is
incurred as a result of using a more expensive energy source.
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Table C.1: Typical Utility Operating Procedures For Short
Duration Outages [C.1]
Utility Action' Typical Effect
Bypass plant pollution control
equipment
Switch from economic dispatch to
critical fuel conservation dispatch
Purchase excess industrial generation
Purchase entergency power from other
utilities
Reduce standby reserves
Direct load control (customer load
management)
Reduce voltage by
Appeal to industry
Appeal to public
Interrupt interruptible service
Run generating units at extreme outputs
Reduce spinning reserve to zero
Reduce voltage by 8( (an additional 3%)
Shed load (rotating blackouts)
Increase available generating
capacity by a small amount
Prolong time before more serious
emergency actions are necessary
Add generating capacity
Often makes substantial power
available, but at high cost
Increase generating capacity by
50-100% of the capacity of a
large unit
Reduce load
Reduce load by 3%
Reduce load by 1-2%
Reduce load by 1-2%
Reduce load
Increase generating capacity by
increase generating capacity by
the capacity of a large unit
Reduce load by 1-
Reduce load by amount necessary
to balance with supply
Actions are listed in the approximate order in which they would be implemented.
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I I
Different methods and fuels are used to generate replacement power in different-*
regions of the United States. To estimate costs arising from a fusion plant outage,
the plant location and resulting mix of units used to generate the replacement power
must be considered. Furthermore, the availability of excess capacity to generate the
replacement power must exist.
The cost incurred as a result of purchasing replacement power during a fusion
plant outage can be estimated from a simplified model developed for fission plant
outages [C.1]. Since fusion is expected to be competitive with fission, the model can
also be applied to estimate replacement power costs for fusion power plant outages.
The model relates power production cost increases during the first year of the
outage to the fraction of replacement power obtained from oil fired and non-economy
power sources (i.e. higher marginal cost fuel sources such as gas turbines). Figure
C.1 shows the relationship between oil fired and non-economy replacement power
fraction and the.power production cost increase due to one full year of reactor outage
time. These costs were obtained from a study carried out in 1982 [C.1] and have
been updated to current values using price indexes found in the Statistical Abstract
of the United States [C.3]. The importance of the fraction of replacement power
from non economy sources in determining production cost increases is evident. The
simplified model was derived from detailed loss of benefits case studies. The range
of results from these studies is also indicated in the figure. Beyond the first year of
outage time, the annual power production cost increases can be modified for cost
escalation to provide an estimate of the total power production cost increase for
longer duration outages.
As stated previously, the fraction of non-economy power purchases will vary
with location in the United States. The average fraction of replacement power from
non-economy purchases within each of the National Electric Reliability Council
(NERC) regions can be employed. These fractions are given in table C.2 and the
corresponding regions are shown in figure C.2.
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Figure C.1: Relationship Between Power Production Cost Increase and
Non-Economy Power Fraction [C.11
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Table C.2: Average Fraction of Oil Fired and Non-Economy Replacement
Energy by NERC Region [C.4]
National Electric
Reliability Council
Region
MARCA
NPCC
MAAC
MAIN
ERCOT
SPP
WSSS (California)
WSSS (non-California)
SERC
ECAR
Per cent of Replacement Energy
from Oil Fired Power Plants and
Non-Economy Power Purchases
20
95
50
15
50
40
95
25
15
5
250
$A4
zz
0
0-
-4.
4a
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Knowing the estimated fraction of non-economy replacement power purchases
for an outage, the present value of the production cost increase can be calculated.
The model presented here was developed by Buehring and Peerenboom [C.1] and
was also used by Burke [C.4]. The cost of replacement power is given by:
Cp= (GC )fttCy= C1 0a F(t) . e-rtdt
Cp= present value of the replacement power cost over the outage
period ($)
G= electrical generation rating of the reactor (MWe)
C= actual capacity factor of the plant had the outage not occurred
C'= average capacity factor of the plant, obtained from operating data
to,,ut= outage duration (yrs)
F(t)= unit production cost increase of outage versus time ($/MWe yr)
r= real discount rate
The unit production cost increase function, F(t), can be specified. It can be
taken as constant, representing zero growth in real power production costs. It can
also be taken to escalate at a real rate. In this case,
F(t) = F0 - eg' (C.2)
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where
(C.1)
where
Fo= power production cost increase at time zero, obtained from figure
C.1 ($/MWe)
g= real escalation rate of replacement power costs (yr-')
Using this form for the unit production cost increase, equation CA can be
integrated to give the replacement power cost for the outage.
CP GCFo 'I - e~(-~tu (C3
C/ r - g I
The limitations and assumptions involved in this simplified model for replace-
ment power cost should be outlined. These are:
(1) The model was derived to estimate the power production cost increases for long
duration outages.
(2) Utility specific characteristics including fuel mix, excess capacity, load curves
and alternative options which might be implemented during the outage are not
accounted for.
(3) The average fraction of non-economy replacement power purchases for the
NERC regions are used, as opposed to those for a specific utility.
(4) The fraction of replacement energy from non-economy purchases is correlated
to the production cost increase in the first year of the outage based on detailed
case studies.
(5) Fossil fuel prices are assumed to be high relative to fusion power generation
costs.
(6) Costs due to environmental effects resulting from the use of alternate energy
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sources are not considered.
(7) Although the model was not intended to be used for outages of less than one
year, it was assumed to be possible to extend it for use in short duration
outages.
(8) Daily or seasonal effects or alternative measures to alleviate the need for re-
placement power purchases are not accounted for in the model. Hence, costs
for very short duration outages may be overestimated.
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Appendix D
D.1 Low Activation Maintenance Downtime Estimates
Table D.1: Low Activation Scheduled Downtime Estimates for Reactor
Plant Equipment Maintenance
Component or Frequency Downtime per Days Per Days Per
Subassembly (yr-) Maintenance Year at Year at
Action 1.0 x 10- t 2.1 x 10-4
(days) Sv/h Sv/h
First wall/blanket system
13.70 Sector 0.16 8.8 0.34
16.30 Sector 0.167 10.3 0.40
Blanket coating 1.0 2.5 -
Shield
Shield door 0.167 *- 0.04
Cooling line shields 0.167 *- 0.01
RF & ECRH duct shield 0.167 *- 0.01
RF heating & current drive
Cross field amplifiers 1.0 20.0 20.0 -
Wave guide (blkt) 0.167 *- 0.34
Wave guide (bdle B) 0.167 *- 0.01
Phase shifter 1.0 4.7 4.7 -
Window Assembly 0.167 *- 0.01
Grill 0.167 * 0.01
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Component or Frequency Downtime per Days Per Days Per
Subassembly (yr~) Maintenance Year at Year at
Action 1.0 x 10" 2.1 x 10-4
(days) Sv/h Sv/h
Reactor vacuum system
Plasma chamber system:
Cryosorption pumps 0.5 16.3 - 1.88
Cryo. regen. valves 0.5 13.1 - 3.02
Cryo. isol. valves 1.0 1.1 - 0.25
Roughing pumps/motors 0.2 1.3 - 0.32
Roughing regen. valves 1.0 1.1 - 0.25
Equip. isol. valves 1.0 2.4 - 0.55
Traps 1.0 1.3 - 0.32
Magnet dewar system:
Roughing pumps/motors 0.2 1.3 0.32
Equip. isol. valves 1.0 1.6 0.38
Traps 1.0 1.3 0.32
Power supply and switching
ECRH plasma breakdown:
High volt. switch gear 1.0 0.2 0.2 -
Crowbar 1.0 0.2 0.2 -
Regulator 1.0 0.2 0.2 -
Low volt. switch gear 1.0 1.8 1.8 -
Controls 1.0 1.8 1.8
RF heating & current drive:
Power supply system 1.0 1.5 1.5
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Component or
Subassembly
Frequency
(yr- 1 )
Downtime per
Maintenance
Action
(days)
Days Per
Year at
1.0 x 10-8
Sv/h
TF magnets:
Power supply system
Dump resistor system
EF magnets:
Power supply system
Dump resistor system
OH magnets:
Power supply system
Dump resistor system
CF magnets:
Power supply system
Switch gear sets
ECRH plasma breakdown
Gyrotrons
Gry. mount assemblies
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.2
1.8
1.2
Total for scheduled maintenance: 65.60 days per year
(considering effect of task frequency)
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Days Per
Year at
2.1 x 10-4
Sv/h
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.2
1.8
1.2
Notes:
* The maintenance action is conducted in parallel with first wall/blanket sector
replacement on a non-interference basis so that the time required to complete
the task does not lengthen the outage duration. However, the task does con-
tribute to the total dose incurred.
t Dose rate behind the shield
t Dose rate just behind the blanket
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Table D.2: Low Activation Unscheduled Downtime Estimates for Reactor
Plant Equipment Maintenance
Component or Frequency Downtime per Days Per Days Per
Subassembly (yr-1) Maintenance Year at Year at
Action 1.0 x 10-8 2.1 x 104
(days) Sv/h Sv/h
First wall/blanket system
13.70 Sector 0.04 8.8 - 0.081
16.3' Sector 0.04 9.7 - 0.090
Blanket coating 0.10 13.5 - -
Shield
Shield door 0.04 8.6 - 0.080
Vacuum pump shield 0.01 1.8 - 0.004
Vacuum duct shield 0.005 5.5 - 0.006
RF & ECRH duct shield 0.005 1.3 - 0.001
Cooling line shields 0.005 1.3 - 0.001
Fuel injection shield 0.005 1.3 - 0.001
Magnets
TF coils 0.0005 261 - 0.030
EF coils/OH coils (u/e) 0.004 97.4 - 0.090
EF coils/OH coils (1/e) 0.004 138 - 0.128
CF coils (1/i) 0.0005 192 - 0.022
OH coils/EF coils (core) 0.004 95.6 - 0.088
RF heating & current drive
Cross field amplifiers 0.10 0.4 0.04 -
Wave guide (blkt) 0.005 10.0 - 0.012
Wave guide (bdle B) 0.03 2.0 - 0.014
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Component or Frequency Downtime per Days Per Days Per
Subassembly (yr') Maintenance Year at Year at
Action 1.0 x 10-8 2.1 x 10-4
(days) Sv/h Sv/h
Wave guide (dist'n) 0.0001 0.9 - 0.0001
Phase shifter 0.10 0.4 0.04 -
Circulator/dir'l cplr 0.0001 0.9 - 0.0001
Window Assembly 0.003 2.0 - 0.001
Grill 0.01 2.0 - 0.005
SF6 supply lines/valves 0.0003 0.2 - -
Primary structure support
Antitorque panels 0.0002 5.9 - 0.0003
Equip. support str. 0.0001 54.6 0.003 0.001
Centerpost sup. str. 0.0001 54.6 0.003 0.001
Reactor vacuum system
Plasma Chamber System:
Cryosorption pumps 0.02 2.5 0.011
Cryo. regen. valves 0.15 1.5 0.050
Cryo. isol. valves 0.0003 2.5 - 0.0002
Roughing pumps/motors 0.14 1.7 0.056
Roughing regen. valves 0.15 1.5 0.050
Equip. isol. valves 0.0003 1.5 - 0.0001
Roughing vacuum lines 0.003 1.5 - 0.001
Traps 0.01 1.5 - 0.003
Magnet dewar system:
Roughing pumps/motors 0.14 1.7 - 0.056
Equip. isol. valves 0.15 1.5 - 0.050
Roughing vacuum lines 0.003 1.5 - 0.001
261
Component or
Subassembly
Frequency
(yr- 1)
Downtime per
Maintenance
Action
(days)
Days Per
Year at
1.0 x 10-8
Sv/h
Days Per
Year at
2.1 x 10-
Sv/h
Traps
Power supply and switching
ECRH plasma breakdown:
High volt. switch gr
High voltage trans.
High voltage rect.
Crowbar
Regulator
Low voltage dist'n
Low volt. switch gear
Controls
RF heating & current drive:
Power supply system
TF magnets:
Power supply system
Dump resistor system
EF magnets:
Power supply system
Dump resistor system
OH magnets:
Power supply system
Dump resistor system
CF magnets:
Power supply system
0.01
0.006
0.004
0.004
0.006
0.20
0.0000127
0.006
0.09
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
1.5
1.8
2.0
2.0
1.8
2.0
2.0
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
0.003
0.01
0.008
0.008
0.01
0.4
0.01
0.16
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
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Component or
Subassembly
Frequency
(yr- 1 )
Downtime per
Maintenance
Action
(days)
Days Per
Year at
1.0 x 10-8
Sv/h
Switch gear sets 0.006 1.8
Uninter. pwr sys 0.33 1.0
ECRH plasma breakdown
Gyrotrons 5.0 0.8
Gry. mount assemblies 0.1 1.0
Wave guides (bdle B) 0.003 2.0
Total for unscheduled maintenance: 11.15 days per year
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Days Per
Year at
2.1 x 10-4
Sv/h
0.011
0.33
4.0
0.1.
0.001
D.3 Downtime Savings For The Low Activation STARFIRE
Design
The total time spent for maintenance activities on reactor plant equipment for
the reference STARFIRE design is estimated at 80 days (68.45 days scheduled plus
11.55 days unscheduled) [D.1]. Comparing this to the total time for scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance for the low activation design (76.75 days), it can be seen
that there is a time savings of 3.25 days. The low activation reactor would operate
for 277.2 days each year, resulting in an availabiltiy of 76 %.
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Appendix E
E.1 Tritium Dose Calculations
A simple linear first order differential equation can be developed to describe
the tritium activity concentration in the reactor building subsequent to the release
of 25 g of tritium from the cryopumps. The concentration in the reactor building at
any time was assumed uniform and the detritiation system was assumed to operate
at an efficiency ot 90 %. The normal operation detritiation system was assumed
to be operable subsequent to the accident, removing tritium at a rate sufficient to
balance the steady state leakage rate. Hence, leakage from any reactor components
does not place an additional load on the emergency system. Since the chemical
form of tritium is important in assessing the dose, both HT and HTO activity
concentrations must be described.
From simple mass balance considerations, the following equations were ob-
tained:
CHT(t) = CO-e0 - k (E.1)
k =0.9() + Ad+ A (E.2)
CHTO(t) = CO (e-mt _ e-kt) (E.3)
m = 0.9 q + Ad (E.4)
CTOT(t) = Co . e-mt (E.5)
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where
CHT= activity concentration of elemental tritium (Ci/m 3 )
CO= initial elemental tritium concentration evaluated immediately
after the release (Ci/m 3)
q= detritiation system volumetric flow rate (m 3 /min)
V= reactor building volume (m 3)
A,= conversion constant from elemental tritium to tritiated water
vapor
= 2.2075 x 10-7 min-1
Ad= decay constant for tritium
= 1.714 x 10-7 min-
CNTO= activity concentration of tritiated water vapor (Ci/m 3 )
CTOT= total tritium activity level (Ci/m 3 )
The flow rate (q) for a given option was dependent on the number of detritia-
tion units employed. For option A, no emergency detritiation units were used and
q = 0. For option B, one unit was used with q = 140 m 3 /nmin. For options C and
D, using two and three detritiation units respectively, the flow rates used were 280
m 3/min and 420 m3 /min.
The time at which manual clean up can begin was found by setting the total
tritium activity concentration equal to 500 pCi/m 3 . It was assumed that clean up
was "complete" once the total activity concentration was within 5 % of 50 gCi/m 3
(the steady state level).
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The dose rate due to HT or HTO at any time can be obtained by multiplying
each concentration by its appropriate dose conversion factor. The total dose rate
at any time is given by the sum of the HT, HTO and dose rates:
R(t) = RHT(t) + RHTO(t) + R (E.6)
= 7.717x10 - 7 CHT(t) + 1.893xl0- 2CHTo(t) + 2.5x10~5 Sv/min (E.7)
The dose incurred per individual was evaluated by integrating the time varying
dose rate over the duration of manual clean up.
The crew entering the reactor building subsequent to the accident was assumed
to consist of five persons. These workers would enter the building at a concentration
of 500 JzCi/m 3 and would begin to repair the damage resulting from the accident and
carry out any other necessary maintenance. Workers would remain in the building
until the outage was over, at which time a tritium level of 52.5 pCi/rm3 would exist.
If the contact period exceeded eight hours, a new crew of five workers was assumed
to take over. No allowance was made for lost time due to shift changes or breaks
during a shift. The total cumulative dose was assessed by summing the individual
doses and by assuming that five workers were present at all times during the contact
period of the outage.
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